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ABSTRACT 
The problem of low domestic savings is inherent in most Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries. This has motivated most of the SADC countries to institute 
policies that seek to attract foreign capital to cover the investment deficit that arises from low 
domestic savings rates. This study gives robust conclusions on the effectiveness of individual 
tax incentives commonly used by SADC countries in attracting foreign mobile capital. This 
study has broadened the dimensions research can take in analysing the contribution of tax 
incentives to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows into developing countries. In separating 
individual tax incentives mainly used in the SADC region the study gives a robust analysis on 
the impact of each tax incentive on FDI inflows into SADC countries. The tax incentives used 
in this study are: tax holidays, corporate income tax (CIT), reduced CIT in specific sectors and 
losses carried forward.  
The study also derives data indices for governance, infrastructure and economic policy 
variables which gives the study clean and reliable data for efficient regression results. These 
macroeconomic data derivations assist in giving the FDI attraction analysis more variables and 
well behaved data in drawing conclusions.  
Through an analysis and comparison of trends in FDI inflows and stock data in different 
African regions the study draws important conclusions on the impact of the socio-economic 
environment in FDI attraction. The study, in consultation with data from the period 2004 to 
2013 separates the SADC countries into four panels based on resource richness. Panel 1 
includes the resources-rich countries, Panel 2 the resources-poor countries, Panel 3 all SADC 
countries, except South Africa and Panel 4 all the SADC countries. Each of the estimate 
models in this study, use individual tax incentives variables to avoid the effects of collinearity 
between different tax incentives variables and to improve the predictive power of the panel data 
models. This study derived tax incentives data for individual SADC countries, from Ernst and 
Young’s worldwide tax data. Regular tax incentives in the SADC are derived from tax 
holidays, corporate income tax (CIT); losses carried forward and reduced CIT in specific 
sectors.   
This study seeks to achieve two major objectives: firstly, to establish the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI inflows into SADC countries, and, secondly, to establish other 
variables that influence FDI inflows into SADC countries. The study estimated four panels for 
SADC countries, separated according to resource richness. This was done because different 
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types of FDI are dependent on the available resources in developing countries and thus factors 
that influence the FDI inflows differ according to resource richness. Resource-seeking FDI 
moves to resources-rich economies, market-seeking FDI goes to economies that have access to 
larger markets and efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking FDI move to economies that 
ensure efficient use of their capital resources. Thus, as expected, factors that attract FDI to 
countries in the separate panels differ in direction of causality and magnitude of impact. 
The study adopts a system Generalised Method of Moments (SYS GMM) methodology to 
address the problem of endogeneity associated with dynamic panel data models. The estimated 
results established that tax holidays positively explain FDI inflows in Panel 2. CIT was found 
to negatively affect FDI inflows into all SADC countries despite their particular category of 
resource-richness. Losses carried forward are insignificant in all panels and reduced CIT in 
specific sectors negatively influences FDI inflows in Panel 1 and surprisingly positively 
influences FDI inflows in Panel 2. The lagged FDI variable shows a positive relationship with 
current year FDI inflows. The governance index is significant and positively affects FDI 
inflows in panels 1, 3 and 4. Panel 2 shows a negative relationship between governance and 
FDI inflows.  
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all the 
four panels in the study and negatively signed, except in models A and C of Panel 2. The stock 
of infrastructure is significant and negatively signed in all the panels. The log natural resources 
variable though insignificant in some models, mainly, exhibit a significant and negative effect 
in most models of the study’s panel estimations. The trade openness variable is positively 
related to FDI inflows in Panel 1. Panel 2 show negative effects of trade openness to FDI 
inflows.  Financial globalisation significantly impacts positive FDI inflows in all the four 
panels. The economic policy variable is insignificant in all the four panels of the study, except, 
in model B of Panel 1 where it is weakly significant at 10% level and negatively signed.   
The study concludes that tax incentives are important in FDI attraction in the SADC countries; 
therefore, an effective tax mix that ensures efficient use of tax incentives is important to ensure 
sustainable FDI inflows into the region. Good governance is important in the region for FDI 
inflows to increase. Increasing government rents from natural resources reduces FDI inflows in 
the SADC. 
Previous year flows of FDI are positively related to current year inflows, thus consistent FDI 
attraction policies in the SADC are important. Infrastructure in the SADC should be 
v 
 
consistently improved to ensure suitability with the dynamic nature of foreign investment. 
Financial markets should be developed to ensure effective flow of capital and growth in 
economies through more investment.   
Key words: tax incentives, system Generalised Methods of Moments, panel data, 
infrastructure, governance, economic policy, market size, openness to trade, corporate income 
tax (CIT), tax holidays, losses carried forward, reduced CIT in specific sectors and panel data 
models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Economic growth and development is a goal pursued by all African countries. However, 
realisation of growth and development remains a dream if there are no meaningful investments 
in an economy. Africa has a problem of low savings projected to be 18% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 (World Bank 2004), due to low incomes which 
create perennial deficits of investment funds. Therefore all regions in Africa, including the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) rely heavily on foreign capital to cover 
the investment-savings gap and ensure sustainable growth and development in their economies. 
Lack of investment in a country creates socio-economic problems mainly centred on 
unemployment and poverty. These two socio-economic problems have existed in Africa and 
indeed in the SADC since time immemorial. Akrami (2008) advised that, given the nature of 
capital that is required by developing countries to efficiently and effectively utilise the natural 
resources they have, it is important for them to source foreign capital. Therefore, African 
economies need to ensure suitable socio-economic environments that lure foreign mobile 
capital across their borders. 
There are two broad types of foreign investments that are crucial to developing countries to 
ensure growth and development: portfolio or indirect investment and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Portfolio investment involves the purchase of a stake in an enterprise by a foreign equity 
investor. FDI is the acquisition and control of the productive operations of a firm in a foreign 
country (Muradzikwa 2002). Both investment types have received attention from policy 
makers. Most developing countries seek policies that lure portfolio investments in a bid to 
improve their financial deepening and innovation which are crucial to growth. However the 
most dominant investment type in the SADC is FDI which involves fixed capital formation due 
to dominance of the natural resources sectors in the region. Therefore, the focus of this thesis 
will be on FDI. 
Given the fierce competition nations face in luring foreign mobile capital into their economies, 
most SADC countries opened their economies to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
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the 1990s in a bid to attract more investment. Taxes through the setting up of export processing 
zones (EPZs) became one of the important policies used in the region to attract foreign capital. 
This study thus seeks to establish the effectiveness of the most commonly used tax incentives 
such as tax holidays, corporate income tax (CIT), losses carried forward and reduced CIT in 
specific sectors in the region in FDI attraction. 
1.1.1 Background 
 
Klemm and Van Parys (2009), in a study of developing countries including some SADC 
countries, concluded that developing countries actively use tax incentives as a foreign capital 
attraction policy. In 2004, SADC countries established the SADC protocol on investment and 
finance aimed at creating a favourable environment for FDI attraction. The protocol had many 
objectives, one of which sought to establish common tax policies in the region to ensure 
regional competitiveness through tax cooperation. 
Robinson (2005) concludes that tax cooperation in the SADC might be the best route to ensure 
the region’s competitiveness as an investment destination given the integration efforts of 
countries in the region. It is against this background, that this study seeks to probe the 
importance of independent fiscal policy decisions taken by the SADC member states with their 
different resource endowments, in implementing tax incentives for improving their economies’ 
attractiveness to FDI inflows. 
In the year 2000, the SADC states established a tax subcommittee established under the 
National Treasury of South Africa (NTSA) with a mandate to ‘coordinate tax policies to the 
extent necessary to improve efficiency in tax collection, safeguard regional tax bases and 
reduce obstacles to intra-SADC trade and investment’. The committee has met its major 
shortcoming in establishing common policy in the area of tax incentives especially those aimed 
at luring FDI into individual SADC countries (Robinson 2005). Thus, it is imperative that an 
inquest be made into the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting foreign mobile capital. 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
The use of tax incentives as an FDI attraction tool is widespread in developing, transitional and 
developed countries despite cautions given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
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World Bank (WB) on their negative impact on competition and innovation which discourages 
economic growth. However, given the recent developments in regional and global economic 
cooperation, the use of tax incentives has been one major stumbling block to effective tax 
harmonisation that promotes uniform tax policies for better economic integration.  
In keeping with regional economic growth, the SADC established the SADC memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) in 2002 which sought to achieve cooperation in taxation issues. It 
required that countries design their tax incentives with set requirements. The requirements 
include avoiding harmful tax competition, avoiding policies that prejudice another member 
state’s economic policies, activities or the regional mobility of goods, services, capital or labour 
(SADC 2002). However, in 2006 the SADC formulated the SADC Protocol on Finance and 
Investment, with a vision to foster deeper integration in the region to promote industrialisation 
and attract FDI (SADC 2006). Given the fact that tax incentives are a key tool for attracting 
FDI, SADC policy makers are faced with conflicting choices between the use of tax incentives 
to attract FDI and fulfil the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment goals or abolishing tax 
incentives and avoiding harmful tax competition based on the 2002 MOU.  
UNCTAD (2015) data used in figures 5 and 6 shows that South Africa and Angola receive the 
highest FDI inflows in the SADC region. This is due to their vast mineral resource deposits. 
However, despite various efforts to lure investment most SADC countries continue to receive 
low FDI inflows. Therefore, policy makers in the region are faced with the task of designing 
effective policy mix including tax incentives to ensure regional competitiveness and to increase 
FDI inflows throughout the SADC region.   
1.3 Justification for the study 
 
Bolnick (2004) concludes that the SADC has a huge poverty level due to lack of investment in 
the region. The investment deficiencies emanate from low domestic savings thus the SADC 
needs to attract internationally mobile capital in order to develop its economies. This study 
seeks to test the Dunning (1977) eclectic paradigm which predicts that tax incentives, by 
lowering the cost of doing business improve the locational advantage of an economy and thus 
can be expected to attract FDI inflows. The study also seeks to establish why tax incentives 
yield different results in SADC countries. 
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The study gives a new dimension to the FDI attraction debate by testing the effects of various 
tax incentives such as: tax holidays, CIT, reduced CIT and losses carried forward variables to 
help policy makers in their choice of tax incentive mixes to attract FDI. The study also, by 
estimating each tax incentive in its own model, gives a robust and conclusive analysis on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives in FDI attraction.  
The study, by separating SADC countries into four panels based on resource richness and 
levels of development, establishes why tax incentives work better in some countries than in 
others. Thus, the study is critical to SADC policy makers in bringing a new dimension to FDI 
attraction. 
There have been various studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives in FDI attraction in 
developing countries; including some SADC countries [see Bolnick (2004); Klemm & Van 
Parys (2009) and Calitz, Wallace & Burrows (2013)]. However, most of these studies for 
example Calitz et al. (2013) and Klemm & Van Parys (2009) only focus on a few SADC 
countries. This study seeks to give an analysis of all the SADC countries. Bolnick (2004) gives 
a detailed analysis on the effectiveness of tax incentives in FDI attraction using Marginal 
Effective Tax Rates (METR) and Average Effective Tax Rates (AETR); these methods do not 
separate individual tax incentives’ effectiveness in FDI attraction. This study seeks to fill that 
gap by identifying commonly used tax incentives in the SADC and establishing their individual 
effects on FDI inflows into the region. 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
 
Given the profound changes in the economic, social and political environment in the SADC 
region, the traditional areas of cooperation such as tax harmonisation take on a totally new 
dimension. The need to establish the nature of contribution tax incentives have, in bringing the 
much needed FDI is important in the tax design strategies of SADC economies.  
In this study tax incentives will be analysed on their individual capacities in giving answers to 
each tax incentive’s importance in luring internationally mobile capital. SADC countries are 
separated into four groups according to resource richness, thereby bringing together those 
countries with similar characteristics. This helps in giving robust conclusions on the first major 
objective of the study which seeks to establish the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting 
FDI into SADC countries. 
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The second objective seeks to establish other socio-economic and political variables that 
contribute to final decisions by foreign investors on where to locate in SADC economies.  
1.5 Methodology 
 
This study uses the dynamic panel econometric technique of system Generalised Method of 
Moments (SYS GMM) to rigorously generate empirical evidence on the factors that determine 
FDI inflows into SADC countries. Data for individual tax incentives is derived from Ernst and 
Young’s worldwide tax data. Economic policy and infrastructure data are derived using the 
principal component analysis (PCA) method, and the governance index is calculated from the 
World Governance Index (WGI) data. The other variables are picked from the World Bank 
database. 
1.5.1 Hypotheses, data derivations and econometric methodology  
 
The methodology used in this study is discussed in Chapter 7. The first section describes data 
that incorporates the theoretical hypothesis into the story of FDI attraction into the SADC 
countries. The hypotheses are: 
1) Tax holidays do not explain FDI inflows into the SADC countries. 
2) Corporate income taxes (CITs) are not important in attracting FDI inflows into the 
SADC. 
3) Losses carried forward do not determine FDI location decisions of investors in the 
SADC. 
4) Reduced CIT in specific sectors does not encourage the location of foreign capital into 
the SADC countries. 
5) Previous FDI inflows are not related to current FDI flows into the SADC economies. 
6) Socio-economic conditions of a nation are not important in making them attractive to 
FDI in the SADC. 
7) Market-seeking FDI is not prevalent in the SADC countries. 
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8) Resource endowments are not important in explaining FDI inflows into the SADC 
countries. 
9) Infrastructure development is not significant in explaining FDI inflows into the SADC 
countries. 
10) Trade openness does not encourage the establishment of foreign capital in the SADC 
countries. 
11) Financial growth and development does not affect FDI inflows into the SADC. 
12) Economic policy is not an important factor in determining FDI location by investors in 
the SADC economies. 
Two SADC countries the Democratic Republic of Congo and Swaziland were dropped from 
the analyses due to unavailability of data. The data used in this study is obtained from the 
World Bank Databank, African development indicators, Ernst &Young’s global tax data and 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. The data covers the period between 2004 and 2013 for 
thirteen SADC countries because recent tax incentives data from Ernst & Young captures this 
period. The data is derived from individual country tax statutes and from the reports which 
record consistent and similar tax structures for the SADC countries. All data is expressed in 
natural logarithms except for data with negative values. 
In line with the Dunning eclectic paradigm theoretical framework the study established four 
panels for the SADC countries. Thus, four equations were estimated for each model: Panel 1 
includes six highest resource-rich SADC countries using the World Bank natural resource 
indicators, Panel 2 has the seven least resource-rich countries, Panel 3 will consists of all the 
SADC countries except South Africa which is an outlier in resource richness and growth, and 
Panel 4 has all the SADC countries. 
The study chose the SYS GMM method to overcome the problem of endogeneity. This method 
was used because it also incorporates extra moment conditions from the equation in levels and 
the method is popular in a finite sample with small time series models. 
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1.5.2 The story of the importance of FDI in explaining economic growth in the SADC 
 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters. Following a general introduction and background to 
the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 of the thesis moves to establishing the importance of FDI to 
the growth of developing countries, with a particular interest in the SADC countries.  
The story of the FDI growth nexus in the SADC is told through a chronological framework 
with three methods. The first method involves analysis and synthesis of theoretical arguments 
for and against relying on FDI as a growth strategy for developing countries. The second 
method involves an empirical studies analysis and synthesis where the study analyses the types 
of FDI into the SADC and other developing countries and establishes their importance to 
economic growth.   
The third method looks at the trend analysis of FDI into developing countries, with particular 
interest in African regions. The flow of FDI is compared to the socio-economic performance of 
these regions to draw conclusions on the importance of FDI inflows to the socio-economic 
status of developing countries. 
1.5.3 Factors that explain FDI flows: evidence from theory and empirical analysis 
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 build on cementing the study’s hypotheses. The chapters, using different 
approaches and methods, establish the important factors that determine the locational decisions 
of investors, with special focus on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI. 
In drawing conclusions on determinants of FDI inflows and motives for investment by foreign 
investors, Chapter 3 conducts an in-depth theoretical analysis and synthesis. Chapter 4 uses 
evidence from countries’ reports to discuss non-tax efforts of the SADC countries to increase 
their attractiveness to foreign capital. Chapter 5 analyses theory and empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI. Chapter 6 uses the SADC tax database and 
individual SADC country’s databases to establish the type of tax incentives used in the SADC 
countries. 
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1.6 Outline of the study 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 comprises an in-depth theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the role of FDI in the development process of developing economies from early 
classical propositions which conclude that low capital in an economy is a major hindrance to 
the development process, to the modern theories of foreign capital importance in economic 
growth of countries. Here, theoretical foundations for the justification of luring foreign capital 
are analysed. The chapter then moves to an overview of FDI flows into various countries at 
different stages of development, before, a comparative analysis is conducted on FDI inflows 
into the SADC relative to other African regions.  
Chapter 3 moves to an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the factors that determine the 
locational decisions of foreign capital in developing countries with specific focus on the SADC 
countries. This chapter develops the thesis research problem on a different level by giving 
theoretical underpinnings that determine factors considered by investors in making locational 
decisions. Here, factors that are internal to firms and location specific factors are considered in 
order to understand the dynamism of the process investors take in moving into foreign markets.  
Chapter 4 narrows the discussion down to the non-tax efforts that attract FDI to those pursued 
by the SADC countries. In this chapter, once the factors that attract FDI have been established, 
an analysis of the SADC countries’ efforts in establishing environments conducive to FDI is 
done. This chapter establishes the non-tax efforts of SADC countries to attract FDI. These are 
used as control variables in this study’s econometric estimations. 
Chapter 5 contains the theoretical and empirical findings on the effectiveness of tax incentives 
in attracting FDI. Here, the theoretical foundations which justify the use of tax incentives are 
analysed. The chapter then moves to analysing other studies that include effectiveness of tax 
incentives in FDI attraction with special focus on methodologies adopted and their 
effectiveness in giving robust answers. This chapter cements the research gap for this study. It 
establishes that there are no studies for the SADC that answer how effective individual tax 
variables are given different resource availability levels in the SADC countries. 
Chapter 6 moves on to discuss the use of tax incentives in the SADC. This chapter establishes 
the prevalence of tax incentives in SADC countries by referring to a recent SADC database. 
Chapter 7 shifts towards determining the locational advantages that are central in attracting FDI 
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into the SADC with special interest in the role tax incentives play in creating these advantages. 
Here, the emphasis is on the construction of econometric models to provide reliable data. 
Chapter 8 then displays the estimations and presents conclusions on the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in FDI attraction in the SADC region. Also in this chapter answers to other factors 
that impact FDI inflows are given. Finally, Chapter 9 closes the thesis with findings, thesis 
contribution and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RATIONALE FOR SEEKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FDI FLOWS INTO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
Developing countries, including African countries, have low domestic savings. The low 
domestic savings and low incomes in most developing countries, including African countries, 
means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to raise indigenous local capital to finance 
investment. Yet growth and development theorists Lewis (1954) and Domar (1946) conclude 
that rapid capital accumulation is important for economic growth and development.  As a 
result, most developing countries seek foreign private investors to help them finance 
investment to foster accelerated growth and development (Mkenda & Mkenda 2004).  
 
The lack of capacity by developing countries including the SADC countries to meet their own 
investment needs has motivated most countries to use tax incentives in a bid to lure FDI. Tax 
incentives in developing countries have primarily been used to lure FDI and portfolio 
investments. This is based on the argument that there is insufficient domestic capital to meet 
desired levels of economic development (Zhang 2005). Therefore, before analysing the efficacy 
of tax incentives to attract FDI, it is important to explore the importance of FDI to an economy 
in the first place. 
 
Lui and Gerlach (2010) in a Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) commodity and trade 
policy research working paper did a review of country case studies in West Africa on resource-
seeking foreign direct investment in the African agricultural sector. They conclude that the 
main benefits for the host country are economic benefits such as employment creation, higher 
productivity, improved access to finance and markets for smallholders, technology transfer and 
enforcement of production standards.   
The benefits of FDI also originate from the Asian success story where the experience of a small 
number of fast-growing East Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and recently China, 
demonstrate that attracting FDI is key to bridging the savings-investment gap in developing 
countries [United Nations (UN) 2005]. The accumulation of FDI in an economy further reduces 
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the debt burden, thus solving the problem of underdevelopment. This is based on the fact that 
on top of bringing stable capital inflows, FDI also brings greater technological know-how, 
higher-paying jobs, entrepreneurial and workplace skills, and new export opportunities to the 
developing world (Prasad, Roggoff, Wei & Kose 2007). 
 
 However, some studies find that FDI has not generated the expected benefits in Africa. A case 
in point are studies in Madagascar and Mali by The German Technical Cooperation Agency 
(GTZ) (2009a and GTZ 2009b) which conclude that investment projects by foreign 
multinational corporations (MNCs) remove income and investment opportunities for local 
entrepreneurs. This is caused by unfair competition that these large firms pose to growing local 
small to medium enterprises (SMEs). The large MNCs have in some economies created 
monopolies which negatively affect the welfare of the populace and the establishment of local 
firms. These MNCs claim the biggest market share and attract all the local expertise and 
competent staff to their ranks causing local firms to struggle in competing against them. 
 
 The studies by GTZ (2009) observe that the legal framework and procedures governing land 
acquisition, land registration, land-use and the rights of smallholder farmers are generally 
unclear and lack transparency in most West African countries. The granting of land without 
undertaking the relevant cost benefit analyses (CBA) and public consultations to ensure the 
social, environmental and economic feasibility of an investment project were deemed to have a 
negative impact on community development and to reduce their benefits from FDI inflows.  
 
However, domestic investment by African countries and official development assistance are 
clearly insufficient to reduce the investment crises that have led to food shortages and poverty 
across Africa. Therefore countries should seek to maximize the positive impacts of 
international investment while minimizing the risks. Governments should verify that the 
existing policies, regulations and institutions are adequate, as well as undertake preliminary 
studies and consultations with all stakeholders. Thus policy makers, especially in Africa, need 
to evaluate FDI projects to ensure that they become a complementary component of a wider 
package of development measures to raise growth; create jobs and diversify into more dynamic 
economic activities. 
 
This chapter looks at the importance of FDI in developing countries and also the general trend 
in FDI flows into the SADC region compared to other developing and developed countries. The 
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next section focuses on the early theoretical foundations and the importance of FDI. This is 
followed by the modern theories on the importance of FDI inflows into economies. The study 
then moves on to a discussion of the rationale for seeking foreign investment. Next is an 
analysis of the empirical literature on the FDI-growth nexus will follow. The chapter ends with 
an analysis of the FDI flows into developing countries and the SADC region in particular.  
2.2 Early theoretical foundations on the importance of FDI 
 
Theoretical literature dating back to the classicists has given rise to important writings on the 
contribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) to economic growth. The argument is that 
capital and national savings are scarce in countries with an under developed economy. Since 
saving determines the availability of funds for investment. Therefore domestic investment is 
low due to scarcity of funds which creates a high price on investment funds due to scarcity and 
therefore a low rate of economic growth and development. As a consequence, foreign 
investment is required to complement domestic investment and to raise the rate of economic 
growth, thus speeding up the process of economic development (Akrami 2008). 
 
The classicists were followed by the neo-classicists who proposed competitive and open free 
markets all over the world. Adelman in Akrami (2008) argues that, “a deficiency in capital is 
the fundamental cause of underdevelopment. This was the basic principle underlying the 
Bretton Woods institutions policy advice to developing countries in the 1990s, as well as 
bilateral foreign assistance programs” (Adelman 2001).  
 
According to the neoclassical theory, capital movement which necessitates external financing is 
articulated in the relationship between national income analysis and balance-of-payments 
analysis. For example, if there is an internal macroeconomic imbalance between national 
expenditure and national saving, then there will be an external imbalance in the balance-of-
payments (Meier 1995). This, in recent years, has been the major factor behind exchange rate 
crises in many African economies Zimbabwe and Zambia for example. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the failure to attract FDI over a long period led to a huge external imbalance (2000-
2008). As a result, the productive sectors of the economy collapsed and the overvalued 
Zimbabwean dollar under a fixed exchange rate regime became unmanageable which led to its 
demise in December 2008. 
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The early foundations on the importance of FDI to economic growth are cemented by Keynes 
(1936) who suggests a direct relationship between investment and employment. Baldwin 
(1995) concludes that the debate focuses on three key areas, the extent to which FDI substitutes 
for domestic investment, the extent to which FDI stimulates increases of exports of capital 
goods and whether FDI involves the construction of new plants. If the FDI is export-oriented, it 
will stabilise the nation’s foreign currency reserves and thus enhance the economy’s ability to 
administer demand management policies in the Keynesian framework which will foster growth 
and development. 
 
2.3 Modern theories on why firms undertake foreign investments  
 
2.3.1 The market imperfections theory 
 
The first formalisations of FDI tended to model it as capital, in other words as a production 
factor moving across countries. This idea was a logical extension of the traditional theory of 
investment responding to differences in the expected rates of return on capital. This view, 
therefore, predicted that FDI would go from capital abundant countries where its return was 
low to capital scarce countries where its return was high (Mundell 1957 and MacDougall 
1960). Thus in this model FDI is expected to move from developed countries to the less 
developed world. Countries are thus encouraged to put in place measures that will ensure that 
capital invested within their boundaries earns more than it does elsewhere. Holland and Vann 
(1998) argue that regional development is also a common objective of tax incentives. This idea 
is central to the idea of regional tax competition termed ‘race to the bottom’. 
 
 The market imperfections theory states that firms constantly seek market opportunities and 
their decision to invest overseas is explained as a strategy to capitalise on certain capabilities 
not shared by competitors in foreign countries (Hymer 1976). The capabilities or advantages of 
firms are explained by market imperfections for products and factors of production. That is, the 
theory of perfect competition dictates that firms produce homogeneous products and enjoy the 
same level of access to factors of production. However, the reality of imperfect competition, 
which is reflected in industrial organisation theory (Porter 2003), determines that firms gain 
different types of competitive advantages and each to varying degrees. Nonetheless, market 
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imperfections theory does not explain why foreign production is considered the most desirable 
means of harnessing the firm’s advantage. However, the major advantage would be exploring 
new markets and resources. 
The market imperfections theory suggests that the bulk of FDI flows originates in and is 
directed to developed economies, which should be capital abundant [Navaretti & Venables 
2004, chapter 1; Markusen 2002; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)]. However, recent investment trends from UNCTAD show increases in the share 
of investment going to developing countries as other countries such as China increase their 
presence in the developing world adding to the traditional sources of FDI United States (US) 
and United Kingdom (UK) in developing economies (Van der Lugt & Hamblin 2011). 
2.3.2 International production theory 
 
International production theory, developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), suggests that the 
propensity of a firm to initiate foreign production will depend on the specific attractions of its 
home country compared with resource implications and advantages of locating in another 
country. This theory makes it explicit that not only do resource differentials and the advantages 
of the firm play a part in determining overseas investment activities, but foreign government 
actions may significantly influence the piecemeal attractiveness and entry conditions for firms. 
This theory has been central in influencing policy change in favour of FDI attraction incentives 
in Africa. 
 
 A related aspect of this foreign investment theory is the concept of internalisation which has 
been extensively investigated by Buckley (1982, 1988) and Buckley and Casson (1976). 
Internalisation theory centres on the notion that firms aspire to develop their own internal 
markets whenever transactions can be made at lower cost within the firm. Thus, internalisation 
involves a form of vertical integration bringing new operations and activities, formerly carried 
out by intermediate markets, under the ownership and governance of the firm. This 
comprehensive treatment of vertical and horizontal FDI is possible in so much as, “the 
vertically integrated firm internalises a market for an intermediate product, just as the 
horizontal MNE internalises markets for proprietary assets” (Caves 1996:13). As internalisation 
occurs, MNEs will grow only as far as the benefits, including those associated with the barriers 
to new entrants, are not outweighed by the costs of communication, co-ordination and control, 
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and by the ‘foreignness’ inevitably associated with vertical and horizontal integrated firms. 
Rugman (1980, 1986) goes as far as to claim that this made internalisation the general theory of 
FDI. 
 
Buckley and Casson (1976) list several markets where internalisation is very likely to happen 
such as perishable agricultural products, intermediate products in capital-intensive 
manufacturing processes, and geographically concentrated raw materials. However, these are 
secondary in the analysis. 
 
According to Dunning (1988) who uses the internationalisation theory in his five stage theory, 
the major shortcoming of the international production theory is that it explains only part of FDI 
flows. 
2.3.3 Portfolio theory 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s some economists worked on the empirical relationship between FDI, 
the rate of return and risk (Agarwal 1980). The so called portfolio theory predicts a positive 
relation of FDI with respect to the rate of return and a negative one with respect to risk. 
Portfolio diversification may help to reduce the total risk involved, that is, a firm can reduce 
risks by undertaking projects in more than one country. However, the portfolio theory is an 
extension of a vision of FDI as capital movements (Jones 1996).  
 
The shortcoming of the theory is that the phenomenon does not have a major perceived 
economic impact. This is because it does not have a significant impact on employment and 
distribution since it is merely a movement of monetary assets as opposed to the desired setting 
up of physical capital. 
2.3.4 The product-cycle theory 
 
This theory gave useful explanations for the expansion of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
after World War II. It explains FDI as a reaction to the threat of losing markets as a product 
matures, and as a search for cheaper factor costs to face competition in the imitation gap 
hypothesis (Vernon 1966). Its essence is that most products follow a similar life cycle. In the 
first stage, the product appears as an innovation which is sold locally in the same country where 
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it is produced. This is so in order to facilitate satisfying local demand while having an efficient 
coordination between research, development and production units. In a second stage, the 
product begins to be exported.  
 
In a third stage, some competitors arise and if conditions are favourable the firm will establish 
foreign subsidiaries there to face the increased competition and it may also establish 
subsidiaries in less developed countries to have access to cheaper labour costs to enhance its 
competitiveness. This imitation gap hypothesis has been used to explain the dominance of 
Japan in the automobile industry which was initiated in the US. Thus, in this theory FDI is seen 
as a disadvantage to the source country as it will lose comparative advantage in the production 
of a product it innovated. 
 
The shortcomings of the product cycle theory were first stated by Clegg (1987:24) who claims 
that, “the product cycle is not, in itself, a complete theory of FDI as it does not explain the 
ownership of production”, not least because the competitive advantage of firms is frequently 
associated with country-specific advantages (Dunning 1993). Clegg (1987:26) adds that, “the 
product cycle is primarily a theory of new FDI, and it has little to say on the extensions of 
existing investments by a mature foreign-investing nation”. 
2.3.5 Five stage theories 
 
The stages have their roots in the Dunning (1988) view, which states that the role of FDI can be 
seen to exploit the home country’s comparative advantages in intermediate inputs. These 
intermediate goods are influential in the final production of a product and thus give an 
economy comparative advantage in the production of a commodity. 
 
In Stage 1 countries have low incoming FDI, but foreign companies are beginning to discover 
the advantages of the country and there is no outgoing FDI, that is, there are no specific 
advantages owned by the domestic firms. 
 
In Stage 2 there is a growth in incoming FDI due to the advantages of the country especially the 
low labour costs. The standards of living are rising which is drawing more foreign companies 
to the country to enhance the local market. 
 
17 
 
In Stage 3 there is still strong incoming FDI, but their nature is changing due to the rising 
wages. The outgoing FDI are taking off as domestic companies are getting stronger and 
develop their competitive advantages. This has been the major reason developing countries 
have in past years legislated investor favourable labour laws. 
 
Stage 4 has strong outgoing FDI seeking advantages abroad where there are low labour costs. 
 
In Stage 5 the investment decisions are based on the strategies of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and the flows of outgoing and incoming FDI come into equilibrium. 
 
 The major shortcoming of this theory is that not all countries seem to grow in this manner or, 
some countries have insignificant outgoing FDI. 
2.3.6 The eclectic paradigm 
 
According to Dunning (1979), the eclectic paradigm resulted from his dissatisfaction with 
existing theory of international production: the Hymer-Kindleberger approach, the product-
cycle theory, and the internalisation theory. The three were considered to be partial 
explanations of international production. Hence, he proposed an alternative line of development 
which tried to integrate the existing theories in a general and ‘eclectic’ model in which, “the 
subject to be explained is the extent and pattern of international production.” (Dunning 
1979:124). 
 
Dunning (1979) suggests that a firm engages in FDI if three conditions are satisfied: firstly, 
possession of net ownership advantage vis-à-vis firms from other countries; secondly, 
internalisation advantages rather than to use the market to pass them to foreign firms; and 
thirdly, location advantages in using the firm’s ownership advantage in a foreign location rather 
than at home. 
 
The OLI framework proposed that MNEs’ investment decisions are based on three important 
broad factors namely organisational specific ownership advantage (O), host market internal 
locational advantages (L) and internalisation (I) advantages.  From this eclectic theory, 
Dunning (1993) also comes up with the four strategic motives TNCs consider when setting up 
18 
 
their foreign enterprises. The motives are classified as resource-seeking FDI, market-seeking 
FDI, efficiency-seeking FDI and strategic-asset or capability-seeking FDI. 
 
Dunning (1980) suggests that resource-seeking FDI targets natural endowments of host 
countries. Nations with abundant natural resources attract these investors. Therefore, resource-
rich nations receive this kind of FDI. Market-seeking foreign firms pursue adjacent domestic or 
regional markets in which to investment. Densely populated regions thus attract more of this 
kind of investment and this is primarily why nations strive for regional economic integration to 
enhance their market bases. Efficiency-seeking FDI considers the rationalisation and expansion 
of economic activities of an organisation in a bid to maximise exploitation of economies of 
scale, scope and specialisation. In this case, the product or process specialisation and firms that 
advanced in technological innovation exploit this type of investment. Capability-seeking FDI 
seeks to maximise the use of organisational assets created in the foreign markets. The strategic 
assets include the business networks created by acquiring assets abroad which encompass 
technological and organisational capabilities (Dunning 1996). 
 
Dunning (1988) concludes that the OLI advantages are affected by many factors which vary 
from the nature of the market to the level of economic development, size of market and level of 
industrialisation and reach to the nature of the industry the investor operates in such as the 
technology, the competition and the size and age of the firm. Similarly, Caves (1996) in an 
earlier study illustrates that the organisational culture of a firm affects expansion. This includes 
research and development (R&D) efforts, product promotional activities, stage of product 
development and brand development. This is basically the reason behind many governments’ 
support for R&D through fiscal incentives. 
 
One of the main criticisms of the eclectic paradigm is that it includes so many variables that it 
loses its relevance (Dadzie 2012). Dunning (1991) partially accepts it, although he sees it as an 
inevitable consequence of trying to integrate the rather different motivations behind FDI into 
one general theory. 
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2.4 Rationale for seeking foreign investment 
 
A salient feature of developing countries is the relative shortage of capital for modernising 
agriculture, establishing industries, creating infrastructure, providing services like banking and 
telecommunications and, in general, meeting the financial needs for developing the economy 
(G-15 report 2010). An important way to overcome such a capital constraint is through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) which, while bridging the financial gap, also brings diversified 
investment into the economy.  
 
 Capital formation is a national phenomenon in the first place. However, many developing 
countries rely on foreign capital to overcome their domestic capital shortages. According to 
UNCTAD (2003) studies from many African and indeed other developing countries indicate 
that the FDI strategy can only be enhanced based on domestic investment. FDI is superior to 
other types of capital inflows in some respects, particularly because of its risk sharing 
properties, though not necessarily in all respects. The nexus between FDI and overall 
investment as well as economic growth in host countries is neither self-evident nor 
straightforward, but remains insufficiently explored territory. The research that follows will 
thus seek to examine studies that made conclusions on the importance of FDI to host countries. 
 
Sustainable economic growth and stability in developing nations is harnessed by the ability of a 
nation to maintain a healthy national savings rate and improve domestic investment source (De 
Mello 1997). However, FDI remains a very important form of investment in developing 
countries to the extent that even harsh critics of comprehensive capital account liberalisation 
dismiss the option of complete isolation from international capital markets and argue in favour 
of opening up towards FDI (Stiglitz 2000).  
 
Stiglitz (2000) attacks what he terms ‘the Washington consensus’ that sought to liberalise 
African and Latin American economies with the view to fostering capital account liberalisation 
to enhance growth. Though his ideas have been adopted by some developing nations, most 
remained open to FDI attraction policies. Policy makers in most emerging and developing 
economies are increasingly conscious of the role of FDI in boosting productivity, 
industrialisation and income growth. It can bridge the savings-investment gap, introduce 
modern capital goods and state-of-the-art management practices, sustain and drive to reform 
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host economies’ economic policies and create global vertical production networks within which 
multinational firms locate input processing in their foreign affiliates (Akrami 2008). 
 
FDI is considered less prone to crisis because direct investors typically have a longer-term 
perspective when engaging in a host country. In addition to the risk-sharing properties of FDI, 
it is widely believed that FDI provides a stronger stimulus to economic growth in host countries 
than other types of capital inflows. The underlying argument is that FDI is more than just 
capital, as it offers access to internationally available technologies and management know-how 
(The Economist 2001). 
 
FDI also addresses the problem of low incentives to invest in developing economies or a high 
level of incentives to invest in developed economies as it offers balance through trade and 
capital movement. It helps developing economies to grow beyond their capacity (Salvadori 
2003).  
 
FDI inflows are also related to the increase in social infrastructure and the development of 
human resources (Salehi-Isfahani 2005). This does not stimulate the economy in the short run, 
but is a management and social requirement which will favourably influence the economy in 
the long run (Yusef & Stiglitz 2004). In fact, social foundations should facilitate the creative 
part of the economy. Beyond an increase in the quantity of productive factors, it is necessary to 
improve the quality of the people as economic agents, and to continue to facilitate productive 
activities (Meier 1995). 
 
However, these benefits cannot be expected to occur automatically. They will depend to a large 
extent on the investment contract, the type of business model and the institutional framework in 
place in the host country. Further, various organisations have raised concerns about the possible 
adverse impacts on host countries of the new forms of international investment, in particular 
large-scale land acquisitions. These transactions have attracted the interest of policy-makers, 
development agencies, intergovernmental organisations and the media due to the economic, 
social, political and environmental issues they raise. They certainly raise complex challenges in 
terms of local participation, social equity, food security, poverty reduction, rural development 
and access to natural resources. 
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2.5 Empirical literature on FDI contribution to the economy 
 
There is vast empirical literature on the impact of FDI on various economic sectors and 
indicators. The empirical literature, however, finds mixed evidence on the existence of positive 
productivity externalities in the host country generated by foreign multinational companies.  
 
De Mello (1997) made a landmark inquiry on the impact of FDI on capital accumulation, 
output and total factor productivity (TFP) on the FDI recipient Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and non-OECD countries using data from 
1970-1990. The research concludes that although FDI increases output due to technological 
upgrading and knowledge spill over, the complementarities between FDI and local domestic 
investment are critical. This sensitivity analysis along the lines of Levine and Renelt (1992) 
shows a robust relationship between economic growth, FDI and human capital. 
 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1997) tested the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on economic growth in a cross-country regression framework, utilising data on FDI flows from 
industrial countries to 69 developing countries over the last two decades. Their results suggest 
that FDI is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, contributing relatively more to 
growth than domestic investment. However, they argue that higher productivity of FDI holds 
only when the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. Thus, FDI 
contributes to economic growth only when a sufficient absorptive capability of the advanced 
technologies is available in the host economy. 
 
De Gregorio (1992) shows, in a panel data study of 12 Latin American countries, that FDI is 
about three times more efficient than domestic investment. Blomstrom, Lipsey and Zejen 
(1992) also found a strong effect of FDI on economic growth in LDCs. It is more probable that 
a foreign firm that decides to invest in another country enjoys lower costs than its domestic 
competitors derive from higher productive efficiency. The higher efficiency may be due in part 
to the combination of foreign advanced management skills with domestic labour and inputs. 
 
Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sayek (2006), Durham (2004), and Hermes and Lensink 
(2003) bring a new perspective on the FDI effectiveness to economic growth by arguing that 
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only countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI in terms of 
their growth rates. 
 
Ng (2006) examined the linkage between foreign direct investment and productivity in eight 
East Asian economies – China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. The Granger causality test and the Toda-Yamamoto version 
of the Granger causality test were used to test if inflows of foreign direct investment “cause” 
productivity growth. The results showed that only two countries revealed evidence of a one-
way causality between inflows of foreign direct investment and total factor productivity 
growth. Similarly, there was also little evidence that inflows of foreign direct investment cause 
technical change or efficiency change in the sample economies. 
 
FDI is seen as an important channel for transmitting technology to many developing countries. 
Findlay (1978) suggests that FDI can increase the productivity of the host country as the more 
advanced management techniques and technologies of foreign firms spread to local firms. 
Multinational firms are usually at the technological frontier and have access to the latest and 
most advanced technologies. It is expected that as they invest in plants in developing countries 
they will, at the same time, transfer these high-level technologies. It is also hoped that the 
technology that is embedded in plants of multinational firms will spread to other plants in the 
countries. However, based on data from developed countries, Van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg (2001) show that FDI in the form of technology transfer is only possible if the 
companies that invest in foreign countries intensively engaged in research and development 
(R&D). Inward FDI from R&D-intensive countries does not seem to increase productivity. This 
suggests that foreign firms invest abroad in order to exploit their technological advantage rather 
than to diffuse their technology. 
 
Carkovic and Levine (2002), who used macro-level data, find little support for the importance 
of FDI in stimulating growth. They argue that previous studies, which show the benefits of FDI 
to economic growth, have not fully taken into account the endogeneity problem. Countries with 
a good economic performance tend to attract more FDI. Therefore, if the endogeneity problem 
is not taken into account, it is unclear whether FDI drives economic growth, or vice versa. 
Once the endogeneity problem was considered, it was concluded that growth drives FDI and 
not the other way around. 
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Table 1: Summaries of empirical studies on FDI growth Nexus 
Author Research summary Conclusions 
Farkas (2012) This study focuses on the 
relationships between FDI 
and different growth 
determinants. The findings 
show that the contribution of 
FDI to economic growth is 
positive and significant 
depending on the level of 
human capital and the 
development of financial 
markets, but its presence in 
developing countries must 
complement rather than 
substitute a set of other 
growth determinants. 
FDI is effective given a 
financially sound local 
market. 
Blomstrom, Lipsey, 
and Zejan (1992) 
Shows that FDI has a 
significant impact on growth 
and positive spill over effects 
from FDI depend on the 
income level of the host 
economy. 
FDI leads to growth 
depending on the level of 
income of the host country. 
Gorg and Girma (2005) FDI interacts with absorptive 
capacity. They show that 
there is a U-shaped 
relationship between this 
interaction term and TFP 
growth, suggesting that 
improvements in absorptive 
capacity at the firm level 
allow the firm to enhance the 
spill over effects of FDI. 
FDI depends on national 
technological growth. 
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Sethi and Sucharita (2010) Tests the effect of FDI on 
economic growth in 
Bangladesh and India 
respectively by using the data 
for the period 1974-2009. 
The regression results 
indicate that FDI is positively 
correlated to the economic 
growth of Bangladesh but it 
has not yet been established 
as a significant determining 
factor for the economic 
growth. On the other hand, 
the result indicates that FDI is 
negatively correlated to the 
economic growth in India and 
it has not yet been established 
as a significant determining 
factor for the economic 
growth. They conclude that 
the effect of FDI on 
economic growth is 
ambiguous for both India and 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
FDI contribution is 
ambiguous. 
Hansen and Rand (2004) Analyse the causal 
relationship between FDI and 
GDP in a sample of 31 
developing countries. Using 
estimators for heterogeneous 
panel data, they found a 
unidirectional causality 
FDI and GDP have 
unidirectional effects. 
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between FDI to GDP ratio 
implying that FDI causes 
growth. 
Alfaro,  Chanda,  Kalemli-
Ozcan and Sayek (2004) 
They examine the various 
links among foreign direct 
investment (FDI), financial 
markets, and economic 
growth. They explore 
whether countries with better 
financial systems could 
exploit FDI more efficiently. 
Empirical analysis, using 
cross-country data between 
1975 and 1995, shows that 
FDI alone plays an 
ambiguous role in 
contributing to economic 
growth. However, countries 
with well-developed financial 
markets gain significantly 
from FDI. The results are 
robust to different measures 
of financial market 
development, the inclusion of 
other determinants of 
economic growth, and 
consideration of endogeneity. 
FDI effectiveness depends on 
financial market growth. 
World Bank’s (2001) report Identifies the importance of 
‘absorptive capacities’ and 
the success of FDI. 
Absorptive capacities here 
include macroeconomic 
management (as captured by 
Countries with low 
absorptive capacities, such as 
Morocco, Uruguay and 
Venezuela (the last based on 
Aitken & Harrison 1999), fail 
to reap spill overs, whereas 
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inflation and trade openness), 
infrastructure (telephone lines 
and paved roads), and human 
capital (share of labour force 
with secondary education and 
percentage of population with 
access to sanitation). 
Malaysia and Taiwan fare 
well with higher absorptive 
capacities. 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) Point out that the net effect of 
FDI on productivity is quite 
small. FDI raises productivity 
within plants that receive the 
investment but lowers that of 
domestically owned plants 
thus seriously putting in 
doubt the ‘spill over’ theory. 
FDI crowds out domestic 
investment. 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of divergent findings on the effects of FDI on economic growth. 
While most studies support the view that FDI leads to growth and development, Table 1 above 
shows different empirical findings on FDI importance. Some results are insignificant; others 
inconclusive, while others show that FDI is important for growth given certain economic 
conditions in the host country. 
2.6 FDI flows in developing countries 
 
This section studies the trend in FDI inward stock and FDI inflows into various economic 
regions of the world using UNCTAD data (2014). 
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Figure 1: FDI inward stock per region from 1990-2014 (in USD millions) 
 
 Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
The world FDI stock has increased over time as shown by the line graph in Figure 1 drawn 
from UNCTAD (2015) estimates on world FDI stock. Though FDI inward stock is considered 
to be generally stable over time which is also indicated by an increasing trend in all the three 
economic categories in Figure 1, there are periods when FDI inward stock fluctuates. There is a 
significant fall in FDI inward stock for the world and DC trends in the period 2006 to 2008. 
This was due to the effects of the global financial crisis indicating that the economic climate of 
the host economy is important in attracting FDI. The effect of the financial and economic crisis 
on developed countries (DC) was more substantial than the subsequent impact on less 
developed countries (LDC).  
 
 The stock of FDI in LDCs, however, has increased rapidly in recent years since 2008 as shown 
by the steep slope of the LDC FDI stock line (see Figure 1). The surge in FDI inward stock in 
LDCs reached its peak in 2013, and 2014 shows a fall in the FDI inward stock. The growth in 
FDI in LDCs is attributed to policy reforms and growth in these economies (Van der Lugt & 
Hamblin 2011). Recently the policy focus in most LDCs has focused on attracting FDI to 
complement domestic savings in boosting investment.   
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Figure 2: FDI inward stock in African regions from 1990-2014 (in USD millions) 
   
Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
Figure 2 shows that FDI inward stock in Africa rose between 1990 and 2014 which means a 
general increase in FDI inward stock in all the African regions. This contradicts the view of the 
1980s that Africa was frequently considered to be on the side-lines when it came to 
participating in globalisation in general, and attracting FDI in particular. North Africa 
dominates inward stock of FDI in Africa due mainly to the rich resources in the region such as 
oil in the Arab countries like Libya. The flow of FDI since 1990 has been high in Southern 
Africa therefore the SADC block has been working hard in promoting inward FDI inflows into 
the region. The FDI inward stock in the region has fallen steeply since 2008 due to political 
problems in Zimbabwe. However, the FDI stock in Southern Africa increased steeply from 
2009 and reached its peak in 2010 before it started to fall steadily until 2014.  
 
Some countries in the SADC, however, are not defined as Southern African countries in the 
UNCTAD data. North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan 
and Tunisia. Central Africa is comprised of Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe; while West Africa comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Carpe Verde, and Cóte 
d’lvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. East Africa has the following countries: 
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Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania. Southern African countries are Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
FDI flows in North Africa rose steeply from 2006 to 2009 and fell sharply from 2010 due to the 
political unrest in most of the North African countries. The uprisings in the Arab world that 
started in Tunisia and spread to Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt and Libya led to a dramatic fall in FDI 
in the region. North Africa has traditionally been the recipient of about one third of inward FDI 
to the continent.  
 
West Africa is the third highest FDI inward stock recipient in Africa and it shows steadily 
increasing FDI inward stock from 1990 to 2004. The trend changed slightly from 2004 to 2005 
due to political instability in some countries in the region, mainly Cóte d’lvoire and Guinea. 
The flows then increased steeply from 2005 to 2014. This can be attributed to the integration 
efforts by ECOWAS and the regional bloc’s stance against political coups in the region which 
has brought a period of relative political calm to the region. Central and East Africa receive the 
least FDI in Africa as shown in Figure 2. The trends for the two regions are similar from 1990 
to 2011. From 2011 to 2014 Central Africa’s FDI inward stock increased more than that of East 
Africa.  
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Figure 3: FDI inflow to African regions from 1990-2014 (in USD millions) 
 
Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
Whilst the FDI inward stock shown in Figure 2 shows less fluctuation in the African regions, 
Figure 3 which represents FDI inflows in the regions shows huge fluctuation in the line graph 
movement. North Africa is the highest recipient of FDI inflows in most years; however, due to 
political unrest in the region the inflows fell drastically from their peak in 2006 until 2011 due 
to political unrest in the region. The trend steeply increased from 2011 to 2012 and started to 
fall again until 2014.  
 
Southern Africa shows huge fluctuations in FDI inflows indicating that FDI inflows are highly 
volatile in the region. This can be explained by the fact that most FDI inflows in the region 
target natural resources. The FDI flows in Southern Africa have increased steadily since 2010 
due to discoveries of minerals in most countries in the region, for example diamonds in 
Zimbabwe, and new discoveries of large-scale gas reserves in Mozambique. 
 
West Africa shows steadily increasing FDI inflows from 1990 to 2009. From 2009 the inflows 
fell steeply until 2010, and then increased steeply from 2010 to reach their peak in 2011 before 
falling steeply until 2014. These fluctuations from 2009 are due to civil and political unrest in 
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the regions with notable problems being Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria, civil war in Mali, 
political problems in Togo and a military coup in Mauritania during the period. 
 Figure 4: FDI inflow per region from 1990-2014(in USD millions) 
 
Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
 
Figure 4 displays an analysis of Africa’s share of FDI inflows in the developing world. Africa 
shows significant contribution to the FDI inflows to LDCs from 1990 to 2014. The visible FDI 
inflows in the region show that Africa is a significant economic region in the LDC community. 
FDI inflows in the LDCs increase rapidly from 1990 to 2014 showing success in LDC efforts to 
lure investment. 
2.7 FDI flows in the SADC region 
 
 Most of the FDI in Southern Africa and indeed in Africa is based on primary resource 
exploitation. IMF staff estimates of 2001 concluded that France, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America hold approximately three quarters of FDI stock in Africa with 
Nigeria and Angola being the largest recipients since they are oil exporting. 75% of FDI in 
Africa goes to oil exporting countries (Word Investment Report 2001). 
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FDI in SADC in some cases is export-related with the host country used as an export platform. 
Export Processing Zones for example, were a success story in Mauritius with special export 
opportunities in EU countries and South Africa. Macroeconomic policies such as massive 
privatisation in Mozambique and South Africa have also played an important role in 
influencing FDI flows in the SADC region. 
Figure 5: FDI inflows per country in low resources-endowed SADC countries from 1990-
2014 (in USD millions) 
 
Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
 
The SADC region has countries with diverse and different investment opportunities. Figure 5 
shows FDI inflow into the SADC’s low resource ranked countries; Lesotho the mountainous 
and natural resource poor country has the lowest FDI inflow in the period 1990-2014. 
Malawi, Mauritius and Seychelles also receive the least FDI in the region due to their size and 
low resource endowments. Madagascar, Namibia and Botswana have greater FDI inflows 
recipients in the panel due to tourism growth in Madagascar and political stability in Namibia 
and Botswana. Madagascar, Namibia and Botswana have more FDI inflows than other 
countries ranked higher than them on resource endowment such as Zimbabwe and the DRC. 
This raises the argument that in the SADC region there are factors other than resources that 
attract FDI in the region. However, the economies in Figure 5 show huge fluctuations in FDI 
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inflows. Notably, Madagascar had steeply rising inflows from 1997 to 1998 but the trend fell 
steeply from 1998 to 1999. The FDI inflows in Madagascar rose steadily again in 2005 until 
2009 and began to fall until 2014. The recent fall in FDI inflow in the country is due to political 
instability. 
Figure 6: FDI inflows per country in the SADC resource-rich countries from 1990-2014 
(in USD millions) 
 
Source: Author’s drawings from UNCTAD data 
 
The evolution of FDI inflows in the resources-rich SADC countries shows South African 
hegemony. South Africa is the greatest recipient of FDI in the region as seen by high FDI 
inflows in Figure 6. South Africa’s economic hegemony in the region is clearly due to its 
advanced economic environment, rich resource endowments and political stability ( all factors 
which work to its advantage). 
Angola has the second highest FDI inward stock in the SADC region due to its unique resource 
endowment as the only oil exporting country in the region. However, due to political instability 
the FDI inflows into Angola show huge fluctuations. FDI inflows fell drastically from 2004 to 
2013 and started rising slowly again in 2014. Zimbabwe and Mozambique have received high 
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FDI inflow in recent years which can be attributed to the discovery of new resources such as 
natural gas in Mozambique and diamonds in Zimbabwe. In Mozambique FDI inflows rose 
drastically from 2010 to 2014 while in Zimbabwe FDI inflows rose slightly between 2010 and 
2014. 
2.8 Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter looked extensively at the importance of FDI to the host nations. It provides a 
thorough background to the theoretical importance of investment to economies. Despite certain 
empirical findings to the contrary, the majority of the findings suggest that FDI is crucial for 
economic growth. 
The chapter looked at the theoretical arguments that influence economic policy on the need to 
attract FDI in developing and developed countries.  Both classical and neoclassical economists’ 
contributions indicate the importance of capital investment to achieve sustainable growth and 
development. Theoretically FDI is seen to augment the domestic capital shortfalls and is thus a 
critical factor, especially in the developing world where incomes are too low to sustain the 
required savings for investment. 
Keynesian theorists, who are essentially demand-management-oriented, view FDI as important 
in unlocking the production constraint in the local productive sector. As the economy seeks to 
achieve full employment, the FDI provides the much needed capital for development. Modern 
theorists are mainly concerned about the micro-firm investment perspective. The main focus is 
on the individual MNE’s prospects in the foreign market. John Dunning, the major theorist of 
20
th
 century, argues that the host country’s economic environment is most critical for FDI 
attraction and firms seek to achieve greater results and profits from foreign production. 
Although most empirical findings suggest that it is important for the host country to rely more 
on domestic capital the consensus view seems to be that FDI is important to the growth of 
economies. The data for FDI stock suggests that the developing countries receive the greatest 
share of world FDI. It is, however, clear that the developed world’s share of FDI flows has 
increased in the recent years.  
An analysis of the movement of FDI in the African countries shows that resource-rich 
(especially oil-producing) countries are the greatest recipients of FDI. However, political 
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stability is of great importance to FDI inflows to Africa as viewed by a sharp decrease in FDI 
flows to North Africa from the start of the ‘Arab spring’ crisis that led to political unrest in 
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. In the SADC it can be concluded that the regional economic 
differences affect FDI flows, with the South African economic hegemony clearly visible from 
high FDI flows into the country compared to other SADC countries. 
Therefore it can be concluded that FDI in Africa is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable 
economic growth. African governments should thus focus on policies that promote high FDI 
attractions; this is the main thrust of Chapter 3 which will look at various attraction strategies 
employed by countries to lure more investors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT FLOWS TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
  
Botrić and Škuflić (2005) argue that investors’ motives are changing in view of various 
objectives they seek to achieve in their foreign investments and advise nations to seek new 
ways of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Cost differences, well developed 
infrastructure and efficient institutions that enhance the ease of doing business are some factors 
cited in the World Bank (2013) Doing Business Report for attracting greater attention from 
investors.  
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) member countries have over the years 
failed to attract enough investment to warrant capital formation for sustainable economic 
growth and development. Various reasons can be attributed to this dismal investment 
performance such as the small size of domestic and regional markets, property rights, political 
instability and macroeconomic instability (Muradzikwa 2002). The low investment flow into 
the SADC region is despite most countries’ tax incentive efforts. Therefore it is important to 
explore various factors that determine the location of FDI and understand whether these factors 
complement or substitute the importance of tax incentives. 
In this chapter the study seeks to distinguish between traditional determinants for foreign 
investment by firms and country-specific determinants for FDI with special focus on the SADC 
region. This chapter will explore the literature on determinants for both indirect and direct 
foreign investment flows to developing countries. The chapter is divided into three sections. 
The next section, 3.2, will analyse the fundamental theories behind foreign investment flows 
based on the investors’ motive to invest and factors that firms consider when choosing 
investment destinations. Section 3.3 will deal with theoretical determinants of FDI based on the 
host country’s characteristics dealing with conditions that attract foreign investment to 
developing countries with special focus on the SADC member countries. The chapter will end 
with a section on the strategic motives for foreign direct investment. 
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3.2 Analysing the fundamental theories behind foreign investment flows 
3.2.1 Background to the theory of FDI 
 
It is not only important to understand the various factors investors consider when choosing their 
final investment destination, but also the differences in FDI attraction performances among 
countries. Inward FDI flow favours destinations where advantage can be taken of ownership 
especially new innovation. Given multinational companies’ operational advantages combined 
with the host nation’s locational advantages, large MNCs strive for the best returns from their 
investments [United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1998]. 
 
Faeth (2009) established that the first theory on international capital movements that led to FDI 
is rooted in the Heckscher-Ohlin neoclassical trade theory. Historical developments on the 
study of FDI attraction factor determinants were premised on descriptive analysis in the early 
1930s to 1960s with leading studies by MacDougall (1960) and Kemp (1964). Econometric 
analysis which followed the advance in tools of economic analysis was extended to studies on 
FDI movement by Dunning and Buckley (1977).  These studies gave better and more 
conclusive results on the factors that attracted FDI. The introduction of econometric analysis 
gave theoretical propositions more solid empirical support. Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan and Berg 
(2003) studied the trend of the FDI movement focusing on United States’ investors. Their 
findings concurred with those of Marinova and Marinov (2003a) in that given the riskiness of 
foreign investments; host countries’ expected locational advantages are handy in attracting 
foreign investment. The factors that affect the locational advantages are political, economic, 
commercial and financial conditions which allow investors to exploit low operational costs in 
new markets. Therefore, investors are concerned about the returns they get from the risk-taking 
investments in foreign markets. 
 
Faeth (2009), in one of the most recent studies on FDI attraction factors concludes that the 
subject matter on the theory of FDI has grown to include a number of different theories and 
perspectives on how international firms choose to locate their production activities. Thus, an 
effective inquiry into the determinants of inward FDI flows must be grounded on a 
comprehensive understanding and analysis of the various theories that have been used over the 
years to explain foreign investment flows in the world. The theories embrace considerations 
38 
 
that range from models such as investor advantage and agglomeration economics to the effects 
of large markets and consumer preferences, cost differences, transport infrastructure, investor 
protection and macroeconomic policy variables. It is clear that a combination of factors 
determine the final destination decision of an investor. 
 
From the investor’s perspective the major motive for investing in the foreign country is to 
increase profits. Thus, the major factors that attract investors are those that increase the ease of 
doing business and allow investors to harness the maximum possible returns from an 
investment (World Bank Report 2001). The theory of FDI movements between countries can 
thus be grouped into two: firstly, there are those that are internal to the investor and, secondly, 
there are country specific characteristics that attract investment. The Baseline Profitability 
Index (BPI), published by the Foreign Policy Magazine, ranked Rwanda among the top 10 
good investment destination in the world for 2010 with Botswana ranked second. Included in 
the elements cited as important to the two countries’ good performance is the fact that no sector 
is barred from foreign investment, tax incentives and massive networking sessions (World 
Bank 2011). 
3.2.2 Classical and neoclassical models 
 
Classical theorists developed their models during the era of economic nationalism. The period 
was dominated by the mercantilists’ view of balanced trade. Thus, the classicists base their 
arguments on the assumption of internationally immobile factors of production. This 
assumption limits their role in giving meaningful conclusions to the determinants of FDI flows 
amongst countries. Although the early neoclassical theory made efforts to explain international 
capital movements led by the Heckscher-Ohlin model framework (Heckscher & Ohlin 1991), 
they were constrained by the perfect competition assumption. It is more favourable to 
undertake foreign investment when the investor possesses resource endowments which are 
better than those available to the host country's firms. Therefore, in perfectly competitive 
models of early neoclassical trade theory, foreign investment could not be undertaken by firms 
who sought profitable investments (Hirsch 1976).  
 
The breakthrough in the neoclassical analysis of the FDI movement came with later models that 
dropped the assumption of immobile capital under perfect competition pioneered by Coase 
(1937). The Coasean analysis drops the assumption of factor immobility and introduces goods 
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immobility and includes information asymmetric framework analysis. Coase concludes that 
movement of factors responds to differentials in resource endowments amongst countries. 
Thus, factors of production are seen to favour where they get the highest earnings. 
 
The ideas of Coase were formally integrated into Mundell’s (1957) factor price equalisation 
model. However, the factor price equalisation model assumes perfect competition, and so fails 
to give a convincing analysis of the determinants of FDI but rather helps in explaining portfolio 
investment. The Mundell (1957) model discerned the effects of trade barriers imposed by 
governments in distorting the movement of factors in search of higher earnings. These 
governments imposed distortions such that trade tariffs affect FDI movement as investors seek 
to reduce operational costs, ceteris paribus, capital would move to where the trade barriers are 
minimal and cheaper. Faeth (2005) concluded that FDI decisions by foreign firms require 
guaranteed positive returns to the investor. Therefore, the neoclassical theories can be criticised 
for their failure to explain the advantages of firm ownership in FDI movement. 
 
 The explanation of movement of international capital under the neoclassical theory was 
premised on neoclassical financial theory of portfolio flows. According to the theory, capital 
was assumed to be transacted between independent buyers and sellers. This was heavily 
criticised by Dunning (1998) as its major flaw in explaining FDI movement as it ignored the 
role of MNCs. Yet the major contributors of the flow of capital between countries are the 
MNCs who seek to grow beyond their home countries’ capacity. 
 
Neoclassical macroeconomists were worried about goods market equilibrium where saving 
should equal investment. An imbalance would affect the money market equilibrium leading to 
inflation. Therefore, FDI and international capital flows were necessary to close the savings-
investment gap in developing countries (Bond & Samuelson 1986). The goods market 
disequilibrium is common in capital poor countries, thus capital is expected to move from 
where it is available in abundance to regions where there are capital deficiencies. These were 
also the assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Capital from the capital abundant region 
will help in improving the capital formation in the developing world by creating employment 
and helping to reduce poverty. 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model offers the first theoretical explanations of the flow of FDI. The 
model is a neoclassical model that views FDI as international capital trade. “The Heckscher-
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Ohlin model is a 2x2x2 general equilibrium model. The major assumption of the model is that 
there are only two countries (home and host), two factors of production (capital and labour) and 
two goods. The model also assumes perfect competition in the goods and factor markets, with 
identical constant returns to scale production functions, no transport costs and there are natural 
factor endowments that exclude specialisation between countries” (Faeth 2005:37). 
 
Faeth (2009) argues that the general economic explanation given by the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
theory is based on the additional assumption that countries have different resource endowments 
that create different factor prices. Therefore, due to different relative factor intensities needed 
in the production of different goods there will always be differing comparative advantages 
between nations. For example, a country with relative capital abundance, normally the home 
country, is expected to export a product that requires capital-intensive production to a host 
country. If there is no commodity trade, then capital will migrate to the foreign market where it 
will receive higher returns than labour. The movement continues until factor prices are 
equalised. 
 
International trade theorists, like the neoclassical theorists base their theory on international 
trade in an open economy model. They have dominated international economics since the 
1950s after the death of Keynesian macroeconomics that dominated the world order in the 
1940s. These international trade theorists’ theories make an effort to explain the distribution of 
commodity production activities based on factor endowments of the host countries and ignore 
the determinants of FDI location based on the individual firm’s ownership advantage (Hannula 
2005). 
 
Aliber (1970) expands the view of Heckscher and Ohlin that capital moves in search of higher 
returns. Aliber’s model incorporates the concept of exchange rates and states that capital moves 
due to differences in capital endowments and currency risks. The model shows that, due to 
risks in currency movements, traders impose a premium above the prevailing interest rate. 
Thus, firms from nations with a stronger currency are seen borrowing capital from weaker 
currency markets at a lower interest rate than in their own markets due to the reduced risk of 
the currency’s depreciation. FDI is stimulated when foreign firms have a better expected stream 
of returns than host nations’ firms due to their easy access to stable stronger currencies. The 
basic premise is that firms invest in countries with a relatively low capital endowment and high 
capital costs. FDI serves as international capital arbitrage. In this case, foreign firms earn a 
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currency premium by utilising the interest differential between hard currency and weak 
currency countries (Faeth 2009). It can thus be concluded that foreign firms take advantage of 
scarcity in their currency and earn a premium in host nations. 
3.2.3 Ownership advantage theory 
 
The theory was developed as a critique to the neoclassical theory and is also called the 
‘monopolistic advantage theory’. Hymer (1960) and Kindleberger (1969) pioneered the idea 
that the foreign firm had to have some competitive advantage to take to the foreign market as 
an advantage such as: the economies of scale, product differentiation, technology and finance 
or intangible assets such as marketing, innovatory and managerial skills or famous trademarks 
and brands. The foreign firms, according to Caves (1996) would need these monopolistic 
advantages for their competitiveness against local firms who take advantage of their knowledge 
of the local business environment and have better networks. Hence they concluded that 
monopolistic market structures needed attention for the neoclassical theory to be more realistic. 
 
Hymer (1960) reckons that FDI takes place because MNEs choose markets or industries in 
which they possess higher competitive advantages, such as technological knowledge, which are 
not available to other operating firms in a host country. Firm-specific (also known as 
ownership-specific) advantages are also referred to as ‘competitive advantages’ (Shenkar 
2007). Knickerbocker (1973) extends Hymer’s view by looking at oligopolistic market 
structures and surmises that foreign investments by MNEs favour regions with imperfect 
competition. Most MNEs seek to maximise their returns and so adopt a ‘follow-the-leader’ 
strategy to minimise losses.  
 
This theory shows that firms always follow a cautious approach in moving capital to 
international markets. The advantages intrinsic to the firm that help them in amassing the 
maximum possible returns are paramount in the investment decision. According to this theory 
the need for government effort in guaranteeing protection of the firm’s ownership advantage is 
critical in attracting FDI. 
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3.2.4 Industrial organisation theory 
 
Pioneered by the works of Mason (1939), the theory has been actively used to explain the 
location of manufacturing firms. The theory identifies the importance of managerial capabilities 
and argues that a firm that seeks maximum profits must seek ways to increase its market share. 
Williamson (1996) concludes that managers’ decisions are vital to the growth of a firms’ 
market share and power. They must have accurate knowledge of the available resources, 
organisational culture and objectives for them to be able to make optimal decisions. Penrose 
(1959) suggests that, as management tries to make the best use of available resources, a truly 
dynamic interacting process occurs. This process encourages continuous growth but limits the 
rate of growth. Therefore, the conclusion was that firms move to foreign markets in a quest to 
increase their market share. 
 
According to Penrose (1959), the growth and experimentation of the firm, is reliant on its 
ability to retain experienced managers. Thus the Penrose effect states that, “if a firm 
deliberately or inadvertently expands its organisation more rapidly than the workers in the 
organisation, it cannot obtain the experience within the firm that is necessary for the effective 
operation of the group, the efficiency of the firm will suffer and a period of stagnation may 
follow” Penrose (1959:47-8).  Since the services from inherited managerial resources control 
the amount of new managerial resources that can be absorbed, they create a fundamental and 
inescapable limit to the amount of expansion a firm can undertake at any time. Therefore, the 
Penrose effect suggests that the managerial advantage of a large firm makes it more 
competitive in the international market. 
 
3.2.5 The Nordic internationalisation model 
 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and Luostarinen (1979) developed this model in response to their 
studies on individual firm expansion behaviour. Also known as the Uppsala model, the model 
argues that the rationale for firms to establish in foreign markets is due to their quest to gain 
experience and knowledge on how to grow their spheres of influence. The model describes 
foreign investment by investors as an internationalisation process that takes firm production 
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activities into new markets as firms take risks meant for continued expansion and growth of 
their revenue and business experience. 
Buckley and Casson (1976) develop the Coasean (1937) theory into a more integrated theory of 
the MNE location. Coase identifies the problem of transaction costs as a market failure in 
international trade. The major source of these costs that Coase identifies was information 
asymmetry between agents, thus MNEs started internalising the costs through setting up of 
subsidiaries in various countries. 
 
 Buckley and Casson (1976) in line with the Coasean hypothesis find that imperfect 
information and bargaining costs brings about high risk and uncertainty in the trade of 
intermediate products, such as physical production, product promotion, management 
capabilities and services. Thus, given industry specific characteristics, the decision to locate to 
markets abroad to minimise MNEs cost at various stages of production becomes important. The 
theory concludes that nature and type of industry and locational characteristics affect 
internationalisation of production. Industry characteristics include market structure, scale 
economies and specialisation, while locational characteristics are political and financial risks. 
 
Helleiner (1989:472) commented on the model that:  
 “FDI occurs in consequence of transaction costs, risks and uncertainties in arm's-length 
markets, and the potential for increased control, improved deployment of market power, 
reduced uncertainty, and scale and scope economies. Also advantageous transfer pricing in 
internalised systems leads to FDI. Internationalisation is a means of overcoming market 
imperfections generated by national boundaries, informational deficiencies, and the like and, 
via the creation of internal markets, contributes to worldwide efficiency.” 
3.2.6 The behavioural theory of the firm 
 
This theory was pioneered by Cyert and March (1963), with the main emphasis on firm culture 
and objectives that formulate its behaviour as the major influence in investment decisions as 
opposed to profit maximisation in previous theories. This theory, however, has not been useful 
in explaining the major trends in FDI movement between economies because influence of firm 
culture and objectives is not a characteristic of MNEs but mainly of family businesses which 
have not been seen to have active influence on FDI. 
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Cyert and March questioned the major assumptions of the firm that existed before their theory 
that firms seek profit maximisation and act with perfect information. Cyert and March (1963) 
state that the industrial dynamics can only be understood through a study of industrial 
microeconomics and organisational culture which determines the firm’s strategic objectives.  
 
The authors of the theory reckon that firms’ operational behaviour in investment is determined 
by organisational goals, organisational expectations, organisational choice and organisational 
control. The goals deal with what firms seek to achieve and these goals change over time and 
expectations depend on the information available to the firm and on the ambitions of the 
leaders. The organisational choices depend on the preference orderings of the firm and control 
depends on the power given to managers by the shareholders and the objectives of managers 
differ from those of owners. 
3.2.7 International strategic management 
 
The theory is based on business policy and strategic management which have been developed 
from organisation behaviour, marketing, economics and psychology (Wilska 2002). Porter 
(1990) developed the theory based on the argument that firm success depends on its strategic 
decision formulation and strategic management. Porter, in his diamond model, identifies the 
four major locational attributes of a nation which give them a competitive advantage over 
others.  
The four attributes are: pool of inputs, perceived opportunities, skills and knowledge. 
According to Porter (1991), the environment via the diamond model affects the firm’s initial 
conditions and managerial decisions. Firms, on the other hand have the ability to influence the 
environment. Generally firms relocate their production resources and thus FDI when they fail 
to influence the environment to their competitive advantage (Porter 1991). This has been the 
main type of FDI from China into Africa where low quality production and fewer competitive 
firms are seen operating in the African market while competitive firms operate in Asia with 
markets in Europe and the United States. 
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3.2.8 Industrial network theory 
 
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) propose that FDI develops as part of relationship marketing and 
establishment. Their argument is that as firms continue to trade with their counterparts in the 
foreign land they develop mutual trust and commitment to each other. These relationships are 
seen as motivating internationalisation of business and thus FDI.  
This theory is rooted in the transaction cost approach initiated by Coase (1937) and developed 
in the well-known works of Williamson (1975). Firms operating in an imperfect market face 
informational asymmetry on the nature and value of products or transaction costs arising from 
enforcing contracts with partners and monitoring the quality of intermediate products. 
Internationalisation is thus likely to be an important strategy by which a market-making firm 
can guarantee the quality of the final products it offers to customers. The idea of establishing 
branches internationally arose as firms sought to break the transaction cost bubble created by 
information asymmetry.  
 
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) identify three sets of issues that may affect market transactions 
between MNEs and local producers in host economies. The first one arises due to incomplete 
contracts where there is mistrust between international partners in doing business. Thus, parties 
in these transactions might wish to renegotiate the terms of the contract ex-post, and if the 
investment is specific to the relationship, then the supplier’s bargaining position is weak. Due 
to incomplete contracts foreign investors normally do not get fair share on their investment 
from local business partners. The suboptimal investment will give the investor the motive to 
establish a vibrant subsidiary and reduce the loss arising from incomplete contracts. 
 
The second one is based on protection of innovation and patent rights. Local partners may 
acquire the firm’s technology at minimal cost and use it to their own advantage by becoming in 
future. Moreover, they could dissipate MNE’s reputation by producing low quality products 
under high-quality brands. In both cases, the risk of dissipation is lower if the firm carries out 
the activities with its own subsidiaries. The third issue concerns the principal-agency 
relationship between MNEs and local firms. In this case, the relationship can be affected by 
problems of hidden action or hidden information about the local market. The local agents could 
have an interest in reporting that the market is worse than it actually is to justify their poor 
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performance. This adverse selection of information encourages MNEs to form affiliates in the 
host nation. 
3.2.9 Proximity–Concentration Hypothesis 
 
This theory is based on the works of Brainard (1993) cited in Faeth (2005:49)-the theory is 
premised on industrial economics models extending from industrial organisation theory, firm 
internalisation and the OLI theory. Inspired by the microeconomic models of Hymer, 
Kindleberger and Caves, the trade theory combines firm ownership advantages with country 
locational advantages factoring in the effects of technological innovation to explain the 
movement of FDI.  
 
Brainard (1993) studied the behaviour of industries in different countries looking at how 
economic policy affects the strength of currency, tax, trade liberalisation, tariffs and freight 
safety. The study looked at the determinants of plant scale economies by considering the 
affiliate sales between US firms and other markets used to proxy FDI. The Proximity-
Concentration Hypothesis concluded that the trade between US firms increased with markets 
that had fewer barriers to trade and those that had low costs of transport thus closeness of the 
market affected trade and FDI. This study thus echoed the stance of the neoclassical theorists 
that factors that lower the returns on investment discourage investment in those markets. 
 
The proximity-concentration hypothesis is a robust model which suggests that resource 
endowments are not important in FDI location but cites transport costs, market size and barriers 
to trade as affecting FDI location. This supports the earlier propositions by Dunning (1980) that 
MNEs’ ownership advantage is more important in foreign investment decisions. 
3.2.10 Synthesis  
 
The theories on FDI movement between countries have grown significantly over time and 
many theories have emerged since the inception of the subject in the classical era. Though the 
classical and neoclassical theorists’ conclusions are limited by their respective assumptions of 
capital controls and perfect competition, their conclusions are still relevant in today’s policy 
formulation in many countries. The issue of capital controls has limited the flow of FDI into 
many developing countries prompting policy change in most countries towards free capital 
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flows in many sectors. In Zambia, the government loosened the repatriation of profits policies 
which improved their doing business index, moving it from 90 in 2009 to 76 in 2010 (World 
Bank 2011). 
Neoclassical theory supposes that capital moves from capital abundant regions to capital poor 
regions in search of higher returns. It considers the locational advantages in FDI destinations 
ignoring economic conditions and ownership advantage which has limited its influence in the 
movement of capital in recent years. Most capital into developing countries has been motivated 
by the economic fortunes of the host nations. This was evident in Zimbabwe from 2000 to date 
where the economic meltdown saw investment in the country fall significantly. The Heckscher-
Ohlin model (the main model in neoclassical synthesis) argues that capital moves because of 
comparative advantages between countries and firms produce a commodity they view as 
dominating world production in that region. This argument is now not so critical since firms 
have established various strategic reasons for foreign investment that might ignore the 
comparative advantages. 
Aliber’s extension of the neoclassical arguments regarding FDI flows includes currency 
premiums where firms from stronger currency countries are seen making speculative 
investments in weaker currency regions and gaining from the arbitrage. This argument explains 
why most developing countries are creating favourable borrowing rules to investors since they 
gain from borrowing cheap capital from countries with weaker currencies than that of their 
home countries. Angola has responded in this regard by reducing interest rates to foreigners in 
sectors that create employment. The Angolan government also offers grants for setting up or 
transferring businesses, with a view to supporting infrastructure-related public works, usually 
up to a maximum of 30% of total investment (UNCTAD 2003).  
The analytical shortcomings of the classical and neoclassical analyses prompted the emergence 
of the ownership advantage theory by Hymer (1960). The theory is more realistic since it 
examines the behaviour of MNEs and includes the monopolistic model. Most MNEs seek 
market dominance to enhance their profits. This has seen the Anglo-American group 
dominating the mining activities in SADC countries. Countries that have tried to diffuse the 
MNE’s monopolistic power have lost out on significant investment, for example in Zimbabwe 
after the introduction of the indigenisation legislation in 2008 that sought to give indigenous 
people a greater role in economic activities (UNCTAD 2012). 
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The emergence of the industrial organisation theory was premised on the idea that firms seek to 
have a greater market share for their products. Firms were seen giving a greater role to 
managerial capabilities, thus most MNEs placed expatriate managers in host nations to take 
advantage of managerial experience that would then diffuse to their local recruits.  
The international strategic management theory of Porter (1991) and the international network 
theory by Johanson and Mattsson (1988) suggest that firms establish themselves in foreign 
markets based on relationships of trust with foreign firms. Governments are now more open to 
foreign investors and most governments will now allow foreigners to compete for government 
tenders.  
3.3 Theoretical determinants of FDI based on host country’s characteristics 
 
The characteristics of a host country that determine the attraction of FDI are normally grouped 
into three broad categories, namely: policy framework for the FDI, economic conditions and 
business facilitations (Botrić & Škuflić 2005). The nature of FDI inflows into less developed 
countries is essentially vertical in nature and inspired by the firm’s need to expand and grow. 
This is mainly so because developing countries take time to produce products initiated in the 
developed countries. In the case of vertical FDI, firms re-locate part of their production process 
and some stages of production are left in the parent nation. Vertical FDI is inspired by the 
neoclassical arguments for MNCs to locate to foreign markets because factor endowments 
differ in nations and returns to factors of production also differ across borders (Mariotti, 
Mutinelli & Piscitello 2003). Thus, firms should expect to increase their efficiency and 
earnings by locating to other markets outside their home market. 
 
Markusen (1997) conducted a more robust analysis on the nature of horizontal and vertical 
MNEs. Horizontal Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) produce the same goods and services in 
each of several locations. The horizontal FDI is mainly driven by the existence of trade costs 
such as transport costs, trade tariffs and quotas. Horizontal MNEs occur because of trade costs 
and differences in factor endowments. However, vertical FDI occurs due to internationalisation, 
where firms seek to transfer knowledge internally in order to maintain the value of assets and 
prevent asset dissipation (Markusen 2002). 
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3.3.1 Policy variables as determinants of FDI 
 
Botrić and Škuflić (2005) present determinants of FDI flows from a game theoretic perspective 
between the investor and the host nation or a number of destinations competing for FDI. The 
investor’s choice between undertaking vertical or horizontal FDI is highly dependent on the 
nature of attraction policies and the incentive structure presented by the host nation. 
Government’s treatment of foreign investment influences the investor’s decisions on whether to 
establish production affiliates; acquire licensing or embark on FDI.  
 
The investor’s choice to locate from one region to a specific location is also determined by 
government policies. Faeth (2009) suggests that a firm’s choice between establishing 
production factories, embarking on mergers or acquiring stake after investing, hinge on the host 
government’s friendliness. Therefore, foreign investment decisions are complex. Countries 
competing for FDI ought to be aware of the factors which influence investor decisions. 
 
Bond and Samuelson (1986) show how governments can lure FDI by establishing incentive 
structures that include fiscal incentives such as tax holidays. These incentives are meant to 
signal the quality of resources in the host countries. Incentives are used to bridge the 
information gap between the players in FDI, which include the host nation and the investors. 
Incentives are also meant to deal with information asymmetry where firms do not have 
adequate information about the nature and availability of inputs and markets when choosing 
investment destinations.  
 
Barros and Cabral (2000) add the possibility of relocation by firms after a certain period of 
time. An examination of the firm equilibrium efficiency properties led them to discover that 
some firms use the tax holidays and other incentives to maximise profits before relocating 
when the incentives end. They suggested that governments introduce a non-exit clause in the 
investment contract in order to protect countries’ resources from unfair exploitation by MNEs. 
This was also meant to prevent investors’ abuse of fiscal incentives. 
 
Black and Hoyt (1989) studied the nature of competition between cities bidding for FDI in a 
federal government situation. Their model concluded that firms ‘voted with their feet’ and 
located in the cities where the cost of doing business was lowest. Haaparanta (1996) extended 
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Black and Hoyt’s (1989) model to regional countries competing for FDI using a principal-agent 
model. 
 
 Haaparanta (1996) shows that given the assumption that investors have perfect information 
countries with low labour costs manage to lure more investors than those with high labour costs 
assuming countries do not use subsidies to attract investors. However, with the help of 
subsidies high labour cost countries can attract more FDI where subsidies cover the increased 
labour costs. This deduction suggests that foreign investors are worried about increasing their 
profits and do not care about improving the welfare of the host nation’s citizens. There is 
therefore a need for contractual non-exit clauses to ensure long-term existence of an investment 
in the host nation which benefits locals in terms of increased employment. 
3.3.2 Host country determinants  
 
A wide range of government policies affect national advantage in some industry or group of 
industries. Education policy, tax policy, healthcare policy, anti-trust policy, regulatory policy, 
environmental policy, fiscal and monetary policy and many others are all relevant. However, 
most governments are concerned about establishing their authority in the economy and thus end 
up compromising their competitiveness to attract FDI (Proksch 2004). UNCTAD (1998) notes 
that FDI is a complex economic phenomenon that is affected by a host of factors whose relative 
importance changes as the economic environment evolves over time; it is possible that, as the 
economy of the host country changes and the international environment evolves, then the FDI 
factors may also change. 
 
Hannula (2005) concludes that firms consider a lot of factors before deciding on the final 
investment destination. Firms are guided by strategic objectives, available resources and the 
nature of the industry. Key to all these investment decisions is the host country’s characteristics 
and advantages.  Wilska (2002) divides the determinants into primary determinants comprising 
the host country’s market and input-related factors and secondary determinants which included 
external trade, capital movement determinants and background conditions. 
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3.3.3 Host country market and input-related determinants  
 
Market size and growth are major determinants of FDI attraction in developing countries since 
most FDI is profit-seeking and thus seeks to increase sales. According to the world investment 
report [World Bank (WB) 2004], China is the top investor attraction country due to its huge 
population and market. Transport infrastructure and distribution systems are also important to 
investors as they seek potential destinations. The quantity and quality of labour is important in 
attracting FDI. 
 
 Natural resources and land have been key factors affecting FDI attraction since 2007 and 2008 
due to the food crisis. The spike in food prices prompted countries that are heavily dependent 
on food imports to invest in other countries where land and other natural resources are 
abundant with a view to securing food supply [Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
2010]. Capital, production related infrastructure, linkages and competition are the other home 
country market factors that influence FDI movement. 
3.3.4 External trade-related determinants  
 
Wilska (2002) argues that government policies towards liberalising external trade and foreign 
investment are central to attracting FDI. This has also been cited by the World Bank (2011) as 
one of the major contributors to the Rwandese success story in attracting FDI. Economic 
integration, exchange rate policy, promotional policies and geographical distance are the other 
factors that Wilska found to be important. 
 
Liberalising investment which includes giving equal treatment to local and foreign firms and 
removing restrictive measures on profit remittances was also seen to be the major determinant 
of an increase in FDI in Mauritius (UNCTAD 1997). 
3.3.5 Capital movement-related determinants  
 
The degree of openness towards foreign investment is one of the most important country 
determinants of investment flows. FDI depends on the long-term expansion plans of the MNCs. 
The investor’s perceptions of the host nation’s macroeconomic vulnerability are also an 
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important determinant (Lall 1997). Economies that are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks 
are thus likely to attract less FDI than relatively stable economies.  
3.3.6 Gravity approach   
 
According to the gravity approach to FDI (Hannula 2005), the closer two countries are 
geographically, economically or culturally the higher the FDI flows between these countries 
will be. Cultural distance is also important in lowering the information asymmetry and costs of 
operating in a new market. The gravity model has been helpful in explaining some investment 
flows in Africa due to the difficulties firms face in doing risk-rating studies and evaluations in 
the region. South Africa is the only country subject to regular ratings, with some coverage of 
Mauritius and Botswana (UNCTAD 2003).  
 
An important background condition to attracting FDI is domestic investment; public investment 
is used to proxy physical and human infrastructure. The argument is that better infrastructure 
ensures high profitable investments. Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee (1991) also suggest that 
investment in transportation infrastructure has a positive impact on FDI attraction. 
3.3.7 Synthesis 
 
The proponents of government intervention as a major determinant of FDI attraction divided 
the host country characteristics into policy framework, economic conditions and business 
facilitation. Policy variables were taken as a strategic game between government and investors. 
Due to information asymmetry the game is typically a zero sum game where all parties seek to 
harness the maximum returns from the contract given the behaviour of the other party. 
The governments use the policy attraction incentives to signal the potential of the market given 
the limited information at the disposal of investors. However, due to competition amongst 
countries, firms are using these fiscal incentives to increase their economic rent at the expense 
of the host nations.  Thus, in order to overcome exploitation, countries introduced no-exit 
clauses and also imposed capital control to encourage reinvestments of profits, guarantee 
continued growth and employment creation leading to better income distribution from FDI. 
The host country characteristics that influence FDI flows have also changed over time. The size 
of the market is fast losing its importance due to increased regional economic integration in the 
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African states such as SADC, ECOWAS and COMESA. Trade has thus increased the market 
size of most countries. The invention of faster and better transportation facilities has also 
helped to create regional markets for investors. Investors are now focusing on issues such as 
cost differences as locational advantages, so regions should introduce incentive structures to 
reduce the establishment costs. The creation of regional markets has also prompted most 
nations to change the legal structures that hamper doing business with ease such as stringent 
registration rules for foreign firms. 
However, even in the face of growing regional markets domestic demand still remains an 
important factor in attracting investment. The developing nations must thus seek to develop 
their economies and improve the living standards of their citizens so as to increase their 
incomes and buying potential. Investment in education is also important in raising the quality 
of labour in host nations. Education also increases the capabilities of individuals in doing 
competitive business. Educated citizens will attract firms that seek to learn from host nations. 
African nations like Mauritius and Rwanda which embrace openness to international trade do 
well in attracting investors. Openness to trade, apart from creating broader markets, also opens 
up access of local firms to foreign markets. This is expected to create international networks 
that give the firm potential to expand its establishments in other countries. 
Capital movement has, however, been a tricky issue for host nations. Primary resources in 
developing nations are exploited at the cost of other sectors. The gravity model is important in 
explaining regional capital movement; this helps regions to compete for investment as a 
combined unit. Once a firm establishes itself in a region it will easily expand to other nations in 
the same region since it has the benefit of reduced transport costs and knowledge of indigenous 
language and preferences.  
3.4 Strategic motives of FDI 
 
Dunning (1993) advanced the study on the motives that prompt firms to invest in the foreign 
markets. Behrman (1972) cited in a recent study by Dunning and Lundan (2008) which 
identifies four major categories that distinguish foreign investors based on the motive for 
investment. The classification sees firms divided into natural resource-seekers, market-seekers, 
efficiency-seekers and strategic-asset or capability-seekers.  
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FDI, while benefitting the host nation by creating employment, increasing revenue from taxes 
and the royalties and transfer of technology and skills, also aids the growth of the investor. The 
decision on the final destination of FDI is thus of interest to countries that desire investment 
and the investors and their competitors. The investors may strategically locate their subsidiaries 
in such a way that profitability may be hinged on the location of a particular affiliate firm 
(Benito & Gripsrud 1995). Dunning points out that the study on FDI trends and movement 
should establish motive. Firms make strategic decisions about whether investment should 
protect the market or venture into new ones. Investors are seen to react to government decisions 
or competitors or, in some instances, to take the lead in investment initiatives. Hence, firms will 
be actively looking for risky avenues to expand their market share. 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) found out that MNEs engage in foreign investments to improve 
the welfare of their stakeholders who include employees, managers and shareholders, rather 
than for the benefits of the societies in which they operate. They further noted that most MNEs 
today invest abroad based on two or more of the strategic motives of FDI. 
3.4.1 Market-seeking FDI 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) conclude that market-seekers seek to serve local and regional 
markets previously served by the supplier now seeking to reduce costs by locating in that 
market. A classic example is FDI in the South African automobiles sector seeking to serve 
Africa and the huge South African market. Market-seeking FDI is normally horizontal in nature 
and involves replication of production facilities in the host country. Lower operational costs 
through tariff avoidance and export-substitution encourage this type of FDI.  
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) state that market-seeking FDI is motivated by MNCs’ desire to 
maintain dominance in the world markets, thus they seek to sustain and protect existing 
markets as well as to access new untapped markets. Firms seek effective demand to their 
products so generally the favourable markets will be those that are densely populated with high 
per capita incomes. Market-seeking FDI does not only look at the market for final products but 
also for input. Firms may need to locate to foreign markets in order to retain their business 
should their main suppliers move their production abroad.  
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Shepherd, Silberston and Strange (1985) conducted an empirical study on the motives 
underlying UK outward FDI. They found that most firms establish abroad in order to keep in 
close proximity with their customers. A similar study by Shaukat and Hafiz (1996) on UK 
outward FDI in Central Europe also concluded that staying close to customers was among the 
most important strategic motivations for FDI. 
 
Market-seeking FDI is also encouraged by the need to establish consumer loyalty for products 
through advertising and promotions which need market knowledge on host country market 
characteristics. Knowledge of the market can only be achieved through presence in the market 
in the form of established investment. Due to competition with local firms a foreign investor 
who is not well acquainted with the host country’s specific characteristics such as language, 
laws and business customs may find it difficult to compete in specialised industries such as 
petrochemicals and forestry products, financial and professional services (Dunning & Lundan 
2008). 
 
“The market-seeking firm also locates in foreign market because of the reason that the 
production and transaction costs of serving a local market from an adjacent facility may be 
lower than when supplying that market from a distance. The investment is highly activity and 
product determined. The production of what is relatively costly to transport and can be 
produced economically in small quantities is more likely to be located near the main centres of 
consumption than are those that cost relatively little to transport and yield substantial 
economies of scale in their production” (Dunning & Lundan 2008:70). 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) see FDI as a possible tool for a global strategy where MNCs might 
find it helpful to position themselves close to their competitors. This has led to the formation of 
fierce oligopolistic competition in most sectors dominated by large MNEs. Cases in point are 
the oil and pharmaceuticals that operate production units in each of the host markets and 
engage in massive R&D.  
 
According to Randoy (2004) in Dadzie (2012) market seekers treat each production plant as an 
independent unit separate from the other units. Thus, each plant will be responsive to the 
market requirements in which they operate. However, the products of the affiliate firms will be 
similar to those produced by the parent firm.  The products of affiliate firms, though mainly 
meant for the local market, may be sold in other adjacent markets.  
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3.4.2 Resource-seeking FDI 
 
This is when firms invest abroad aiming to capitalise on the availability of specific resources 
they cannot find in their home countries which include minerals, land, raw materials and low-
cost labour. Resource-seeking firms in some cases target specific resources which they will 
seek to exploit at a lower cost than they can in their home country if the resource is available at 
home (Dunning & Lundan 2008). 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) conclude that resource seekers aim at improving the profitability 
of their enterprises by exploiting resources abroad and the outputs of affiliates are mainly 
exported to developing countries. Resource-seeking is the most dominant inward FDI flow in 
Africa where UNCTAD data over the years has shown that resource rich-countries, especially 
oil producing countries, receive the biggest share of FDI. Factor-cost considerations become 
important particularly in the manufacturing sector, where multinationals invest directly in order 
to export. 
 
In contrast to market-seeking FDI which is horizontal FDI, resource-seeking FDI is vertical or 
export-oriented FDI. Vertical FDI involves relocating parts of the production chain to the host 
country. Availability of low-cost labour is a prime driver for export-oriented FDI. Naturally, 
FDI in the resource sector, such as oil and natural gas, is attracted to countries with plentiful 
natural endowments. 
 
These types of FDI, whilst targeting mainly the primary sectors in Africa seek to secure raw 
materials for parent firms in the home country with the view to reducing production costs. This 
in most cases shows the operation of the ‘invisible hand’ in the allocation of factors of 
production, where factors move to where they produce at the least cost. Resource-seeking FDI 
is highly export-oriented and are thus independent of the host country’s market characteristics 
(Anderson & Svensson 1994). This is evident in Africa’s mining sector where value addition is 
minimal and most of the resources are then exported as ore. 
 
Locational advantages are the key attraction to resource-seeking FDIs, where investors are 
lured by the specific resources with which that the location is endowed (Dadzie 2012). 
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Therefore most MNEs benefit from the mix of ownership advantages (that local firms do not 
have) with the locational advantages of the host countries and increase potential economic rent. 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) identify three types of resource-seeking FDI.  The first type of 
resources-seeking FDI targets minerals, raw materials and agricultural products. These MNEs 
include primary products, producers or manufacturers mainly driven by the desire to minimise 
costs or to establish guaranteed raw material supplies. 
 
The second type of resource-seeking FDI seeks human resources in the form of unskilled or      
semi-skilled labour. This type of investment is classical in the establishment of the imitation 
gap hypothesis where large MNEs copy productions developed elsewhere in markets with 
cheap labour. They are then able to produce the commodity at cheaper and more competitive 
prices. In their quest to attract this form of investment, the SADC countries liberalised labour 
laws and set up free trade or export processing zones. 
 
The third type of resource-seeking FDI describes nations that invest in skills training and 
development since it targets technological capacity, management or marketing expertise and 
organisational skills (Dunning & Lundan 2008). This is mainly carried out in the R&D of 
specialised products whose resources requirements are in foreign markets. 
3.4.3 Efficiency-seeking FDI 
 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is common in firms that seek to exploit economies of scale and scope 
by positioning themselves in many different locations. While it can be resource-seeking or 
market-seeking, this form of FDI plans and strategically rationalises investments in a way that 
achieves efficiency. The major aim is to benefit from diversification of risk, economies of 
scope and scale from established managerial styles in different regions and markets (Dunning 
& Lundan 2008). 
 
 Behrman (1981:31) argues that firms undertaking efficiency-seeking FDIs are, “looking for the 
economic sources of production to serve a multi-country standardised market”. The firms will 
benefit from establishing themselves in many unique markets and in most cases minimise the 
risk of market shocks. Efficiency-seeking FDIs as defined by Dunning (1997) are, therefore, 
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undertaken primarily to capture, advance and utilise a firm’s transaction cost minimising 
advantages by locating in many markets. 
 
Due to the differences in the factor endowments and markets in different nations, efficiency-
seeking FDIs’ main objective is to strategically locate its resources in order to exploit 
economies of scale and scope (Robson 1993). The efficiency-seeking investments differ from 
resource-seeking FDI in that resources-seeking FDI only concentrates on cost saving but 
efficient-seeking exploits economies of scale and scope in different locations to achieve 
economic efficiency. Efficiency-seeking FDI benefits from geographically dispersed economic 
activities in maximising returns from the economic potential of each region. 
 
Efficiency-seeking FDI takes advantage of differences in the markets which affect the demand 
and business operations of commodities such as culture, caste, politics and institutions. 
Efficiency-seeking investment can also be spread in countries with similar economic structures 
and income levels intending to take advantage of the economies of scale and scope (Dunning & 
Lundan 2008). 
 
Kim and Whang (1994) argue that regional integrations can create geographical business 
concentration that initiate regional and scope economies and leads to a larger product base that 
encourages firms to establish FDI. Taking advantage of regional markets makes it easy for 
firms to exploit economies of scale and scope. The firms simply have to rationalise and 
restructure their production units in different regions for maximum benefits. The efficiency 
benefits have been influential in motivating firms to locate the manufacturing units in nations 
where cost of production are lowest (Kim et al. 1994). 
 
Dunning (1993) observes that in efficiency-seeking FDI products factor endowments do not 
matter. The major aim of firms is exploitation of economies of scale and scope.  
3.4.4 Strategic-assets-seeking FDI  
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) identified the strategic-asset-seeking FDI as the type of investment 
that seeks to advance and sustain a firm’s international competitiveness. It is undertaken 
strategically by firms in a quest to establish influence in new markets. The motive of foreign 
investment is mainly to increase the asset worth of a firm. Investors under the strategic-assets-
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seeking FDI are normally large established MNCs seeking to consolidate their world market 
dominance and new investors seeking to grow their potential (Dunning 1993). 
 
Shan and Song (1997) conclude that firms do not seek exploitation of ownership advantages 
only but also use FDI to develop firm specific advantages or to acquire necessary strategic 
assets in a host country. In line with Dunning’s (1993) research, Shan and Song (1997) also 
suggest that the firm's firm-specific advantages arise from the firm’s ability to coordinate 
acquisition and operation of assets from other firms in the host nation.  
 
The firm-specific advantages emerge from the acquisition of assets in foreign markets that 
advance the firm’s competitiveness and weaken the competitors’ potential (Dunning 1993) 
Mergers also form an integral part of strategic objectives for FDI where firms seek to form an 
international strategic cooperation (Marinova & Marinov 2003b).  
 
Dunning (1993) reckons that strategic-asset-seeking FDI is becoming the most vibrant form of 
international capital movement. Investors are seeking strategic assets abroad as a long-term 
strategy for dealing with lack of opportunities in their home markets. Strategic-asset-seeking 
FDI differs from the other forms of FDI in that it does not exploit the firm’s existing ownership 
advantage but rather it seeks to establish that firm’s specific advantages by ensuring expansion 
in the global market. In some cases the strategic-asset-seekers may aim to reduce the 
competitors’ competitiveness through FDI in strategic assets and markets (Dunning 1993). 
3.4.5 Other strategic motives for FDI 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) identify a further three motives for MNEs’ foreign establishments. 
The three categories are: escape investments, support investments and passive investments. 
3.4.5.1 Escape investments 
 
The trend of FDI movement in some cases has been to escape restrictive legislation or macro-
organisational policies of the home country (Dunning & Lundan 2008). This form of FDI 
normally originates from nations that institute policies that are friendly to the business 
community. The classic example of escape investments is round tripping of investments 
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between China and Hong Kong in a quest to exploit incentives by host countries (Dunning & 
Lundan 2008). 
3.4.5.2 Support investments 
 
Dunning and Lundan (2008) view this motive for FDI as a means of supporting the activities of 
the whole enterprise across the globe. The established affiliates may not make a direct profit 
themselves but their activities will benefit the whole enterprise. These activities include the sale 
of sophisticated intermediate products which might need after sales servicing and maintenance 
that might require expert attention and the establishment of spare parts warehousing.  
3.4.5.3 Passive investments 
 
These include investments in which investors do not seek managerial control of the affiliates 
(Dunning & Lundan 2008). The first type of passive investment is identified as investment in 
real estate including land and hotels which investors expect to increase in future value. The 
second type is seen to be undertaken by small firms in real estate with the aim of foreign 
ownership of holiday or second homes. This has been used to explain the boom in real estate in 
leading world cities and emerging tourist centres (Dunning & Lundan 2008). 
3.4.6 Synthesis  
 
Dunning (1993) provides a more comprehensive theory of FDI that has dominated the analysis 
of FDI flows since its proposition. The OLI theory coupled with the various motives of FDI 
location have given policy makers greater insight into what investors seek in foreign markets.  
According to this view, SADC countries have intensified their integration in order to attract 
FDI into the region in the face of competition from other regions. The removal of human travel 
control systems in the SADC has been used to create a larger market and give the region 
locational advantages. The ownership advantage that investors use to enhance their competitive 
advantages has seen many developing countries introducing patent rights to protect MNEs’ 
innovations and technological advances. Internalisation has been used by investors to maintain 
quality control over their products. Most FDI in developing countries is seen as being vertical 
in nature with part of the productions being initiated in the home countries. Thus, countries that 
offer incentives on raw materials are likely to receive higher FDI of this nature. 
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Strategic motives have been central to the theory of the FDI movement since Dunning’s 
proposition in 1993. The motives broadly give governments the greatest role in ensuring that 
they attract international firms and retain investors. The market-seeking FDI requires 
governments to ensure a solid domestic demand for the international products which might be 
mass-produced as firms seek to benefit from the early stages of a product in the new markets. 
The market-seeking FDI is the major contributor to FDI in South Africa which enjoys a 
regional economic hegemony that has created a high rating of its product in the SADC region. 
Products from South Africa thus dominate the regional market. 
Resource-seeking FDI requires governments that are open to international trade and allows 
repatriation of profits. Resource seekers are the major investors in Africa and they favour 
socio-economic stability for their continued existence. Without stringent government 
legislation to allow reinvestments of the profits, resource-seeking FDI does not develop other 
sectors of the economy since it is mainly concentrated in the primary industries such as mining 
and agriculture. 
Efficiency-seeking and strategic asset seeking FDI is common in the developed world where 
firms seek to establish dominance.  
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The study of FDI flows has grown over time as shown in this chapter. Various theories have 
emerged and helped policy makers in creating favourable policies to attract investment. The 
early theorists base their arguments on the supply side of FDI with the focus on the critical 
areas MNEs need to consider before investing abroad. However, as theory continued to grow 
the determinants shifted to a cooperative game between governments and investors, thus host 
country characteristics became an important demand side characteristic to attract investment.  
Strategic motives for investment required a combined analysis that looked at both the supply 
and demand side characteristics of FDI flows. Below is Table 2 that summarises the major 
propositions of FDI theory. Over the years government policy makers in the SADC region have 
endeavoured to institute policies that make the region competitive in attracting FDI. It is thus 
important to mention the areas of FDI attraction that depend on demand side (government 
initiatives) and supply side (investors’ motives) so as to clarify effective policy areas. 
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Table 2: Summary of the major theories of FDI flows based on supply and demand 
approaches to FDI 
Theory Proponents Supply side Demand side 
Neoclassical Hirch (1976) and 
Coase (1937) 
 
 
Aliber (1970) 
Firms seek profitable 
investments and 
capital moves where 
earnings are high. 
 
Firms use arbitrage to 
make profitable 
investments. 
Governments should 
reduce distortions 
that reduce returns 
from investments. 
 
n/a. 
Ownership advantage Hymer (1960) and 
Kindleberger (1969) 
MNEs seek market 
power through 
foreign investments. 
Governments should 
protect firms’ 
ownership advantage 
to attract FDI. 
Industrial 
organisation 
Mason(1939) Firms seek market 
power through a 
bigger market share 
to increase profits. 
n/a. 
Eclectic paradigm Dunning (1993) Ownership advantage 
requires that firms 
seek to use 
competitive 
advantage over local 
firms to make profits. 
Locational 
advantages require 
that governments set 
up favourable 
policies. 
Internationalisation 
of ownership 
advantage requires 
that government 
protects patent rights 
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and quality control. 
Nordic 
internationalisation 
model 
Johansson and 
Vahlne (1977) and 
Luostarinen (1979) 
Firms seek to gain 
experience in 
international markets. 
n/a. 
Behavioural theory Cyert and March 
(1963) 
Firms’ behaviour 
rather than profits 
prompt FDI 
n/a. 
International strategic 
management 
Porter (1990) Firms’ strategy, 
structure and rivalry 
encourage FDI. 
Four main 
environmental 
attribute that 
encourage FDI. The 
factors are 
specialised training, 
education, 
information, research, 
and technical support 
Industrial network Johansson and 
Mattsson (1988) 
Business 
relationships and 
incomplete 
transactions with 
local firms encourage 
formation of 
subsidiaries. 
n/a. 
Proximity 
concentration 
hypothesis 
Brainard (1997) n/a. Market size, 
transaction costs and 
trade policies affect 
FDI location. 
Policy variables Botrić and Škuflić 
(2005), Bond and 
Samuelson ( 1986) 
n/a. Government 
institutes incentive 
structures to attract 
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investment. 
Host country 
determinants 
Proksch (2004) n/a. Education policy, 
health care policy, 
anti-trust policy, 
environmental policy, 
fiscal and monetary 
policy are important 
for investment. 
External trade Wilska (2002) n/a. Openness to trade 
and foreign 
investment is central 
to FDI attraction. 
Capital movement Lall (1997) n/a. Risk perceptions and 
macroeconomic 
vulnerability affect 
FDI attraction. 
Gravity approach Coughlin, Terza and 
Arromdee (1991) 
n/a. Transportation 
infrastructure 
increases FDI. 
Market-seeking FDI Dunning (1993) Firms seek to sustain 
and protect existing 
markets and access 
new markets. 
n/a. 
Resource-seeking Dunning (1993) Investors are 
attracted by natural 
resources, raw 
materials and low 
labour costs. 
Investors are 
attracted by free trade 
zones or export 
processing zones. 
Efficiency-seeking Dunning (1993) Firms seek to benefit 
from economies of 
n/a. 
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scale and risk 
diversification. 
Strategic-asset-
seeking 
Dunning (1993) Firms seek to buy 
competitive strength 
in unfamiliar 
markets. 
n/a. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NON-TAX INCENTIVES IN THE SADC REGION 
4.1 Introduction  
 
James (2010) suggests that a good investment climate is the prerequisite for the effectiveness of 
tax incentives in FDI attraction. Although lower tax rates attract foreign mobile capital, they 
must be supported by a good investment climate for them to be more effective. The investment 
climate is shaped by a combination of non-tax incentives used by governments to lure foreign 
mobile capital. World Bank in James (2010) concludes that non tax factors are important for 
the effectiveness of tax incentives. Changes in the marginal tax rates of countries in the top half 
of the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators had eight times more impact than for those 
countries in the bottom half
1
. 
The United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2005) suggests that 
the low levels of FDI flows into Africa are caused by the continent’s failure to integrate into the 
family of nations. The macroeconomic developments in Africa such as high inflation and weak 
currencies are cited by UNCTAD as the major hindrance to the region’s competitiveness. These 
macroeconomic ills affect the investment climate which is critical for business growth and 
viability. Entry of FDI is also discouraged by the high production costs, distorted incentives 
and a history of misguided policy inconsistencies (UNCTAD 2005). Therefore, African 
countries have to ensure implementation of policies that increase productivity within their 
boundaries and increase the potential for greater returns to investors for them to be able to 
attract more internationally mobile capital. 
 
South-to-South FDI flows are also becoming increasingly significant in Africa; in 2004 the 
World Bank estimated that South-to-South FDI flows contributed 30-36% of total FDI into 
developing countries.  South-South flows have been important in explaining FDI movement in 
the SADC where South Africa accounts for more than 50% of all FDI flows into Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland (UNCTAD 2006). Therefore, 
with more advanced integration in the African economies the flow of South-to-South FDI is set 
to increase. 
                                                          
1 There is however limited empirical studies on the effectiveness non-tax incentives in FDI attraction in the SADC 
region. 
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UNCTAD (2003) notes government attitude towards FDI has been changing around the globe 
over the years. Since the move by many African economies towards economic liberalisation in 
the early 1980s, FDI has taken a leading role in the economic growth and development 
strategies of most African states. This has led to a paradigm shift in FDI discussions from 
whether FDI is or is not necessary to academics and policy makers now being concerned about 
finding solutions on how countries can attract more FDI for sustainable development. 
 
Africa is faced with a problem of low per capita GDP and thus a small market. In the past, FDI 
in Africa was mainly concentrated in the primary production sector, particularly mineral 
extraction. Kazembe and Namizinga (2007) notes that FDI attraction in Africa is determined by 
uncontrollable factors and resource-poor nations such as Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland 
attract little FDI regardless of the policies they pursue. However, recent UNCTAD data in 
Figure 5 shows that these countries are receiving substantial FDI inflows; Malawi in particular 
is receiving significant FDI inflows, which can only be attributed to good investment 
incentives. 
 
FDI attraction incentives are generally those policies used by governments to attract 
internationally mobile capital. In the SADC region for example, the EPZs in many of the 
countries have established a vast number of incentive policies such as tax holidays and 
exemptions on import and export duties and special treatments, and reduced workers’ rights to 
lure foreign investment. Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are examples of countries in the 
SADC which have ensured that privatisation is also important in ensuring competition that 
attracts investors. 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is made up of fifteen voluntary 
member states in the southern part of Africa. The grouping has the aim of achieving economic 
growth for its member states through increased cooperation and economic integration premised 
on democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development (SADC 2006). 
 
Various SADC economic and policy reports in the past have encouraged nations to promote 
foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction. In 2006 the SADC formulated the SADC Protocol 
on Finance and Investment, with a vision to foster deeper integration in the region to promote 
industrialisation and to attract FDI (SADC 2006). To cement the body’s commitment to 
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regional international competitiveness in FDI attraction, the regional block was founded on 
fundamental principles of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. In the quest 
to achieve transparency the region had until 2010 a SADC tribunal to show international 
investors the region’s commitment to protection of property rights. SADC member states’ 
country reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that policy makers in the 
region are aware of the importance of regional cooperation in attraction of FDI. 
 
It is noted in the Southern African Development Community European Community Regional 
Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme (2008) for the period 2002-2007 that:  
“The recent drive by regional leaders to promote better access to individual country     
markets and the region is likely going to encourage intra-regional trade. With well-
established statutes on the conduct of tariff and non-tariff barriers the regional block 
seeks to focus on the effects of market segmentation due to domestic policies on health, 
safety, competition policies, business licensing and certification”.  
 
Therefore, like all regional blocks in Africa and beyond, the SADC seeks to improve individual 
nations’ international attractiveness. The benefits of cooperation are an increase in market size, 
product diversification and competition which improves the citizens’ quality of life and in turn 
attracts more investment. 
This chapter is organised as follows:  In section 4.2 we look at the non-tax incentives that are 
important to the SADC given the various stages of SADC economic development. Section 4.3 
deals with the socio-economic conditions in the SADC region before proceeding to section 4.4 
which will deal with individual SADC countries’ efforts in trying to meet the basic non-tax 
incentives that promote efficiency in the market to attract FDI. Section 4.5 has the conclusion 
which summarises the key non-tax policies of each SADC country. 
4.2 Non-tax incentives in the SADC 
 
The competitiveness of any economy in the world is based on its ability to ensure greater 
productivity (World Bank 2013). Governments the world over have been working on ensuring 
a business environment that facilitates greater productivity in order to attract mobile foreign 
capital into their borders. These factors form the non-tax incentive structures that governments 
69 
 
have used to enhance their attractiveness. These non-tax incentives are important for the 
efficacy of tax incentives in attracting FDI. 
Although the SADC has been working as a bloc to attract investment into the region, individual 
member states have been pursuing their own set of incentives to make themselves more 
attractive to investors than their neighbours in the region. Therefore, it is imperative that this 
study explore individual SADC country efforts in attracting FDI. To give a comparative 
analysis on SADC countries non-tax efforts in attracting FDI, the study used indicators 
provided by the World Bank (WB) in the Global Competitiveness Index and Ease of Doing 
Business Report. The differences in the SADC countries classified by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) were incorporated. 
 
 The study combines related factors from the Ease of Doing Business Report and the African 
Competitiveness Report which the governments can influence in a bid to attract FDI. Taxes 
will be dealt with in the next chapters. The factors are: public institutions and access to credit; 
infrastructure and access to electricity; protecting investors; macroeconomic policies; market 
size and trade across borders. 
4.2.1 Public institutions and access to credit 
 
Public institutions are critical to the competitiveness of factor driven economies. What follows 
is a list of the economies in the Global Competitiveness Index stage 1 of development whose 
competitiveness hinges on their natural resources endowments and abundance of cheap labour 
(African Competitiveness Report 2013). Most of the SADC countries are classified as being in 
this stage of development, namely: Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana are classified in the transition stage from stage 1 to stage 2. 
Angola and DRC are in stage 1 as all resource-rich countries are classified as being in this stage 
[World Economic Forum (WEF) 2012]. A strong public institutional base ensures that investors 
have easy access to the market by minimising regulations in permit application and setting up 
businesses. 
The WB Doing Business Reports since their inception in 2003 have valued access to credit as a 
means of facilitating new business in an economy. The access to credit rating in the Doing 
Business Report covers the viability of institutions that offer credit, availability of information 
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to both borrowers and lenders and the strength of the legal institutions in promoting fairness in 
the credit market (Doing Business Report 2013). 
4.2.2 Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
A well-developed infrastructural system is important for productivity and the increased returns 
to investors especially to countries in the GCI stage 1 of development (WEF 2013). A well-
developed quality infrastructure ensures easy access to the country’s remote areas where 
untapped natural resources are abundant.  
The electricity infrastructure is also important and removal of red tape to ensure easy access to 
electricity is equally important in increasing ease of doing business that promotes increased 
returns to investors (WB 2013). The time it takes for a new business establishment to get a 
reliable permanent electricity supply is critical in attracting investors. 
4.2.3 Protecting investors 
 
Investors are reluctant to invest in economies that do not have adequate laws to guarantee their 
protection (WB 2013). Investors thus require that their properties are protected from 
nationalisation and compulsory acquisitions. Regulations that ensure good protection of 
investments require disclosure of company information, and participation of shareholders in 
company critical decisions and procedures (WB 2013). 
4.2.4 Macroeconomic policies 
 
A stable macro-economy is good for business development and profits. Macroeconomic 
policies that ensure low inflation, a stable growth rate and efficient allocation of resources 
attract efficiency-seeking FDI. The African Competitiveness Report (2013) acknowledges that 
foreign investors seek a market that ensures growth and efficiency. 
 
4.2.5 Market size and trade across borders 
 
This is important for the countries in the GCI stage 2 of development. In the SADC there are 
five countries in GCI stage 2 and they are: Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and 
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Seychelles. Seychelles is also classified as being in the transition stage from stage 2 to stage 3 
of development (WEF 2013). These are efficiency driven economies that require large markets 
and normally attract market-seeking FDI. The 2013 Doing Business Report notes that making it 
easy to trade across borders is important in attracting investment as it lowers the cost of doing 
business. Easy customs laws and adequate infrastructure increases the market for local 
producers as they can move their products easily to other markets. 
4.3 Socio-economic and political conditions in the SADC 
 
The SADC regional grouping was established in 1992 after the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC). The SADCC took place in 1980 at the request of the 
Frontline States whose mandate was to fight apartheid in the region. The objective of the 
SADCC was to cultivate a culture of confidence and cooperation among member states (SADC 
profile 1980). SADC’s major objectives on inception were to improve the lives of the people in 
the region through poverty alleviation, economic growth and development. These objectives 
were set to be achieved through increased regional integration, built on democratic principles 
and equitable and sustainable development (SADC 2006). Since then the region has grown and 
strengthened its ties with greater integration and the possibility of a currency union in the 
future. 
 
UNCTAD statistics (2010) estimated the total population of SADC’s fifteen member states to 
total 253 million with a per capita income of USD2230. The region’s economic activities are 
dominated by South Africa which contributes two thirds of the SADC’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).   
 
Alternatives to neoliberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA) (2007) used World Bank data to 
show that on the basis of  trade volumes, both imports and exports intra SADC trade are high 
and reached 11% in 2010 compared to COMESA’s 6% and the Arab-Maghreb Union’s (AMU) 
5% in the same period. Therefore, the SADC region is more integrated than most African 
regional blocs indicating that the regional bloc is effective in the development of individual 
countries.  The success of the region’s integration has, among many factors, been attributed to 
the formation of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment by the regional leaders whose 
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mandate is to advise on strategy to attract FDI in the face of fierce competition the region faces 
from other regional blocs in Africa (SADC 2006). 
 
In the 1990s most SADC countries adopted the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). These 
policies such as privatisation and foreign exchange liberalisation had a bias towards free trade 
and openness to FDI and shunned protectionism. These policies have affected the FDI 
operations in the region to date. During this era, export processing zones (EPZs) were 
established; these gave preferential treatment to the export sector thus encouraging investors to 
move into the export sector. The EPZs were established in Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa. 
 
The SAPs were, however, a monumental failure in the SADC due to lack of political will to 
implement the recommendations of the policies, hence the region has attracted less FDI in 
recent years as shown by IMF 2012 data. Kamidza, Matlosa and Mwanza (2002) conclude that 
the region has not been the most preferred destination of FDI; this is largely so because FDI 
flows are a function of the relationships between the host countries and the investors’ home 
country. Most countries in the region, however, have experienced cold diplomatic relations 
with the developed countries. Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and most recently Swaziland and 
Madagascar have adopted policies that are deemed to be against human rights conventions. 
This situation is further exacerbated by the continued political instability in the region, where 
DRC, Mozambique and Angola have civil war problems while Zimbabwe has the perennial 
problem of questionable elections. A coup was staged in Madagascar in 2009 and Swaziland is 
resisting the operation of democratic institutions. Individual SADC countries’ problems reduce 
FDI flows into the region. However, incentive structures can be used to counter these negative 
factors and improve FDI into the SADC region. 
4.4 FDI attraction strategies in the SADC member states 
4.4.1 Angola 
 
The United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2012) noted that 
Angola’s FDI competitiveness rose after 1998 due to increased exploitation of offshore oil. The 
total investment into Angola was maintained at around US$5 billion from 2003 to 2008. In 
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2009 UNCTAD data showed that Angola attracted over US$11 billion in FDI (UNCTAD 
2012). The World Bank (WB) Doing Business Report (2013) ranked Angola number 172 out of 
185 countries on the ease of doing business index.  
 
The Angolan economy started its recovery in 2002. After the civil war, the government made 
an effort to resuscitate public infrastructure. In recent years the Angolan government has 
increased its public investment rising by 14% between 2011 and 2012 (WB 2013). Public 
expenditure predicted to increase and the modernisation of infrastructure should attract 
valuable FDI. 
 
4.4.1.1 Policies to attract FDI in Angola 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The government of Angola constituted a law that established the Angolan National Private 
Investment Agency (ANIP) in 2003. The institution was established with the aim of bringing 
easy facilitation to FDI location in the country. The agency facilitates and ensures that there is 
fair treatment of investors, it creates fiscal incentives and is meant to reduce red tape in 
investment. Angola is rated very low on access to credit in the Doing Business Report of 2013. 
However, Angola adopted new laws for credit bureaus that provide openness and availability of 
information to borrowers and thus increase access to less risky credit (WB 2013). 
 
WB (2013) noted that the financial regulations in Angola coupled with increased investment 
have expanded the banking sector. Access to credit is still greatly constrained, though, hence its 
reduced economic efficiency and growth. After the 2002 ceasefire which brought an end to 
over three decades of civil war, the Angolan government launched financial liberalisation 
policies. The policies saw an increase in banks from 9 to 23 and the total financial assets grew 
from less than US$3 billion in 2003 to over US$57 billion in 2011 (WB 2013). The World 
Bank (2013) thus concluded that, “Angolan firms are now enjoying a greatly expanded access 
to the financial system, but the system is not yet capable of evaluating them accurately on their 
merits as borrowers.” 
 
74 
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Angola is fast improving its infrastructure and it has one of the fastest growing information 
technology industries. It launched its 4G services in 2012. Mobile phone operation is growing 
rapidly reaching 52% of the population in 2013, and internet services reaching 12% (WB 
2013). 
 
The major infrastructural challenge in Angola is electricity with only 25% of the population 
connected by 2007. Angola is ranked lowest in electricity availability in the SADC. It has two 
electricity utility companies (WB 2013). According to the doing business report (2013) Angola 
has eliminated the customer requirements for accessing electricity. 
 
The government of Angola established the National Energy Security Policy Strategy (NESPS) 
meant to bring about reforms in the energy sector and to increase access to electricity for new 
investors (SADC 2012). The policy gives the guidelines for the operation of the energy sector 
with the view to exploiting local resources and increasing energy generation. 
 
Protecting investors 
 
Investor protection encourages companies to source more capital for growth, innovation, 
diversification and competition (WB 2013). Angola is ranked just above the regional average 
on protecting investors with an index of 70. According to the WB Doing Business Report 
(2013) Angola is ranked 5
th
 in the region on the strength of investor protection. 
 
ANIP (2014) reported that Angola has a number of measures in place to protects foreign 
investment: effective defence, easy access to courts of law, monetary restitution to foreign 
businesses in cases of expropriation, guaranteed investor rights in case of nationalisation of 
businesses, and reciprocal protection of businesses under bilateral agreements. 
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Macroeconomic policies 
 
Angola being an oil producing country attracts ever increasing revenue due to the high demand 
for oil. Its fiscal and external balance has thus been positive over the years (African 
Development Bank (AfDB) 2008). The AfDB (2008) stated that Angola has large oil reserves 
estimated at 13.5 billion barrels making it the second largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa.  
GDP growth in Angola stagnated from 2009-2011 due to a fall in oil prices but rose sharply to 
8.1%  in 2012  from 3.4% in 2011 (WB 2013). According to The World Bank (2013), the 
Angolan economy is growing rapidly due to its strong fiscal and external balance which has led 
to a stable exchange rate and low inflation. 
 
Angola is one of the natural resource-rich countries in the SADC with oil and substantial 
deposits of natural gas. The monetary economy of Angola is dollarised with a parallel local 
kwanza. The monetary policy has been active since 2007 due to a decline in dollarisation and 
an increase in local kwanza deposits (AfDB 2008). The decline in dollarisation and subsequent 
increased effectiveness of monetary policy increases the investor confidence in the ability of 
the economy to resist external macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Market size and trade across borders 
Angola has a reasonably dense population of just over 17 million and thus a large market. 
Given its growing per capita income from increased oil sales and production Angola has a 
considerably high local demand which has attracted foreign retailers such as the Teixeira 
Duarte Group (from Portugal). The location of foreign retailers in Angola increased the 
commercial sector activities by 9.3% in 2012 (WB 2013).  
 
In her quest to increase market size Angola is a member of the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and 
the WTO. Angola is also a member of various international treaties that encourages free trade 
such as AGOA and the Cotonou Agreement for the renegotiation of the trade partnership 
agreement between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with the EU (IMF 2012). 
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4.4.2 Botswana 
 
Botswana is regarded as a model economy in Southern Africa and is rated highly by various 
world research institutions. It was ranked as one of the best democracies in the SADSC by the 
World Bank in the 2010 Doing Business Report. Botswana was rated as the best African 
economy in dealing with corruption by the Transparency International’s anti-corruption index 
in 2012. The WB Doing Business Report of 2012 rated Botswana as one of the best performing 
African states, coming fourth after Mauritius, South Africa and Rwanda (WB 2012). 
 
Botswana made an effort to improve its skills and education way back in 1994 through the 
Revised Education Policy. More recently the government of Botswana diversified the training 
and education of its young workforce to meet the demands of the changing labour market 
through the National Youth Policy (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis 
(BIDPA) 2006). The Vocational Education and Training Policy of 1998 sought to equip school 
leavers with the skills needed in the working environment and also to promote self-employment 
(Botswana Federation of Trade Unions 2007). 
 
4.4.2.1 Policies adopted by Botswana to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
Tabengwa (2011) notes that Botswana has good institutions that offer credit and the World 
Competitiveness Report of 2010 rated it amongst top 50 countries with stable institutions.  In 
an effort to improve competitiveness Botswana has embarked on various programmes 
including “hubs” that seek to improve agricultural production, innovation in the diamond 
industry, health, education and transport. The Botswana government also set up a private 
institution, the Botswana Export Development and Investment Agency (BEDIA), which 
administers foreign business establishments and this has reduced the cumbersome red tape in 
setting up business in Botswana (BEDIA 2013). 
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Business registration in Botswana is rigorous and is ranked low in the SADC with an index of 
10 only above Swaziland. Sixty-one days are required to start a business but computerisation of 
the registry has resulted in greater efficiency and substantial time reduction (WB 2013).  
The Doing Business Report (2014) noted that Botswana eliminated the stringent environmental 
assessment demands on construction permits hence reducing the cost of erecting new business 
structures. 
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
The infrastructure development in Botswana has been poor and the world competitiveness 
report ranked it 92 out of 142 with notable poor performances in ports, electricity and air 
transport (Tabengwa 2011). However, there are efforts by the government to improve roads, 
airline transport and railways. This is expected to improve the infrastructure index of 
Botswana.  Botswana has policies that ensure ease of access to electricity for new business and 
is ranked third in the SADC on the least steps required to accessing electricity (WB 2013).  
 
The government of Botswana acknowledges the pivotal role played by electricity supply in 
industrialisation (SADC 2012). Therefore the government embarked on massive electricity 
infrastructural investment with the Morupule B project which was initiated in 2008. The SADC 
report of 2012 also commended Botswana for the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariffs (REFIT) 
study of 2011 which aimed at establishing effective tariffs and improving on taxation methods 
in the energy sector. 
 
Protecting investors 
 
Botswana strengthened investor protection by requiring that related-party transactions be 
approved by the shareholders’, and by allowing shareholders to sue directors and obtain the 
payment of damages if successful (WB 2013).  
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Macroeconomic policies 
 
Botswana’s economy is highly dependent on diamond exports and due to the good diamond 
price on the world market the economy has experienced budget surpluses over the years. The 
Government of Botswana has vision 2016 aimed at reducing poverty and growing the 
operations of the private sector (Government of Botswana 2007). The economic blueprint for 
Botswana has been the National Development Plan (NDP); the strategic thrust of the NDP is to 
accelerate diversification and competitiveness through: harnessing productive and 
knowledgeable human resources, focusing on environmentally sustainable growth, enhancing 
wellbeing and social protection, improving safety and security, and maintaining transparency 
and good governance (AfDB 2009). 
 
Not only is the government of Botswana is fostering policies aimed at diversifying the 
economy such as the National Strategy on Economic Diversification Drive (EDD) 2011-2016, 
it is also increasing its competitiveness in its main economic activity, the diamond trade.  AfDB 
(2012) sees the initiative by Botswana to sign an agreement with De Beers to move their 
diamond trade from London to Gaborone by 2013 as a move that will put Botswana at the 
centre of the world diamond trade. The diamond trade in Botswana was inaugurated in 2013. 
 
The current fiscal policy strategy which aims to attain a budget balance in 2012/13 will also 
bring about an improvement in the macroeconomic environment pillar (Government of 
Botswana 2011). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
Botswana has a low population density and thus relies on its neighbours for markets. It has 
various trade agreements in this regard. Botswana has free trade bilateral agreements with 
Malawi and Zimbabwe and is a member of the SADC and the SACU where it benefits from 
customs agreements which promote trade. In its quest to increase market size, the SACU is 
making efforts to open free trade with China and India.  
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4.4.3 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
 
The DRC has experienced and continues to experience tribal clashes that culminate in civil 
wars. This has compromised infrastructural development and hence the poor state of the 
nation’s roads, airports and water supplies. The poor infrastructure coupled with the high 
political risk has reduced investment in the country but the government continues in its attempt 
to increase the country’s competitiveness.  
4.4.3.1 Policies adopted by the DRC to attract FDI 
  
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The DRC has strong financial institutions and in 2012 only two small banks failed to meet the 
required minimum central bank capital requirement of US$10 million, which was raised from 
US$5 million in 2010 meaning most financial institutions have a sound capital base (IMF 
2012). The 20 commercial banks operating in the DRC exceeded the capital adequacy ratios in 
terms of risk-weighted assets which were pegged at 33% in June 2012. The banking sector 
improved its risk rating in the market as evidenced by the fall in non-performing loans to 8.3% 
of total loans in June 2012 (down from 17% in 2009). Due to high operational costs in the 
DRC’s financial sector, though, profit margins are very low. Returns on bank assets at the end 
of 2011 stood at 0.5% which is lower than other markets in the region, thus reducing the DRC’s 
competitiveness (IMF 2012). 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013 made the access to credit by investors easier by 
adopting the OHADA (Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa) 
Uniform Act on Secured Transactions (WB 2014).  The law helps to increase the range of 
assets that can be used as collateral and hence broadens the investors’ ability to access credit. 
The new assets encompass futures, secured obligations and security interest from proceeds of 
the original asset (WB Doing Business Report 2014). 
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Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
 Kadiayi (2013) reports a number of partnerships the DRC government has entered into to 
further develop its electricity sector. The energy potential of the DRC is over 100 000 Mega 
Watts (MW). To reach this potential the government entered into a number of parterships to 
develop electricity infrastructure. The Bank of China is working on the Zongo 2 hydro power 
station with a capacity of 150 MW. Indian partners entered into a partnership with the DRC 
government to construct the Katende hydro power plant with a capacity of 63 MW. The World 
Bank and the DRC government entered an agreement to rehabilitate the Inga 1 power  plant.  
 
The African Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (ICD) (2010) declared the DRC to have the 
most damaged infrastructure in the SADC as a result of conflict and civil war in that country 
since 2005. The DRC was estimated to require USD 53 billion a year (which constitutes 70% 
of its GDP) to reconstruct its delapidated infrastructure. However, the DRC was only spending 
700 000 million (which adds up to 10% of its GDP) a year on infrastructure in 2010. The ICD 
(2010) did however highlight that the DRC has advanced communication signals at a 
reasonable cost, Port Matadi which services Kinshasa and a rapidly expanding access to 
latrines. 
 
Protecting investors 
 
To protect investors and increase investor confidence the DRC government adopted the 
OHADA Uniform Act on Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Group in 2013. The 
Act requires disclosure in transactions and reduces the problem of moral hazard in business 
transactions (WB Doing Business Report 2014). 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo eased business start-up costs by eliminating procedures, 
including the company registration requirements (WB 2013).  
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Macroeconomic policies  
 
The DRC macro economy started to perform well after 2006 with economic growth increasing 
by 3% between 2005 and 2006. This growth was mainly fuelled by increases in production of 
copper, cement, wood, beverages and electricity production (AfDB 2007).  
 
The AfDB (2007) declared the DRC to have vast mineral resources and that mining contributed 
to 8.8% of the DRC’s GDP for the year 2005 with a potential for growth. The DRC has vast 
mineral wealth which includes uranium, copper, zinc, silver and accounts for 34% of world 
coltan. This has made the DRC one of the SADC’s resources-rich countries with vast mineral 
resources. 
 
The fiscal balance in the DRC improved from 2005 to 2006 due to large inflows of foreign 
grants and budgetary support. The grants accounted for 5.2% of GDP and external aid was also 
high accounting for 57% of government revenue in 2006. Tax revenue performance in the DRC 
is also good and is attributed to the revival of the productive sectors of the economy (IMF 
2012). This increases investor confidence in the economy. 
 
The operation of monetary policy in the DRC is compromised by the high level of dollarisation 
with 99% of time deposits and savings deposits being in foreign currency. However, external 
stability has been strengthened through Highly Indebted and Poor Country (HIPC) debt relief 
and a build-up of international reserves (IMF 2012). Dollarisation can on the other hand 
increase portfolio investments since it reduces exchange rate risk on foreign investments. 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
The  WTO (2010) reported that the DRC under the auspices of the WTO had opened its 
economy to international trade. The DRC economy has been growing at an average rate of 
5.5% per annum since 2001. The DRC has a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
which increase its accessibility to the international markets. It is a signatory to the NewYork 
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the auspices of 
the UN and the Washington convention which established the International Centre for 
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Settlement of Investment Disputes. The DRC is also a member of the Seoul Convention of 
1985 which established a multilateral investment guarantee agency which was set up to 
guarantee non-commercial business risks. 
 
To guarantee investor rights, the DRC is a signatory in the OHADA treaty. The DRC has 
access to foreign markets due to its membership of COMESA, the SADC, the Cotonou 
agreement, AGOA, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and WTO. 
4.4.4 Lesotho 
4.4.4.1 Policies adopted by Lesotho to attract FDI  
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The government of Lesotho in its quest to increase and maintain FDI set up an Inter-Ministerial 
Task Team (IMTT) (Government of Lesotho 2013).  The team is made up of private and public 
sector representatives and its main task is to reduce bureaucratic channels in setting up 
investment projects. In 2007 the IMTT initiated a one-stop shop for registration and processing 
of foreign documents in setting up business or seeking employment (Government of Lesotho 
2013). 
 
Lesotho encourages foreign investors to form joint ventures with locals especially in doing 
business with government where government tender procedures require local participation. The 
government of Lesotho reduced red tape and bureaucracy by empowering the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to offer a one-stop shop for licences and government permits to foreigners. There 
is also the Lesotho National Development Corporation which facilitates easy access to 
information and markets to foreign investors (Government of Lesotho 2013). 
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
 Lesotho is undertaking a massive hydro power generation project under the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP) which was initiated in 1986 and resumed in 2013. On its completion it 
is going to double electricity generation in Lesotho. However, despite the efforts the national 
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infrastructure in Lesotho remains one of the poorest in the region. The transport sector is 
characterised by poor road networks thus the quality of road networks linking Lesotho and its 
major trading partner, South Africa, needs to improve (SADC 2012). 
 
Macroeconomic policies  
 
The main trading partner to Lesotho is South Africa which supplies around 80% of imported 
goods and services, and acquires over a quarter of Lesotho’s exports (IMF 2012). The economy 
is based on the mining industry especially diamond mining which constitutes the biggest FDI 
attraction. The 4.2% growth in Lesotho for the year 2011 was due to the 14.5% growth in 
mining (SADC 2012).  
 
On the monetary front the Lesotho economy is aided by its membership of the Southern Africa 
Currency Union. The Common Monetary Area (CMA) comprises Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The economy operates a fixed exchange rate system 
with the Lesotho local currency, the Loti, fixed to the South African Rand. IMF (2012) noted 
that due to Lesotho’s membership of the CMA, monetary and exchange rate policies are 
imported from South Africa. This helps to boost investor confidence in the macroeconomic 
policy’s consistency and effectiveness. 
 
The economic blueprint of Lesotho is the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility prepared in 
partnership with the IMF whose main focus is improving the business environment for private 
sector growth, infrastructural development, economic diversification and improvement of 
investment climate (Odhiambo & Mahembe 2012). 
 
Lesotho is ranked 105 out of 133 in the World Doing Business Report on labour development. 
Lesotho has one of the highest literacy levels (85%) in the SADC thus it has an abundance of 
skilled labour. Unemployment is very high and technical efficiency is limited due to a 
mismatch between skills and labour market requirements (IMF 2012). 
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Protecting investors 
 
 The US (2014) reported that in Lesotho foreign investors are treated in the same way as their 
local counterparts but Lesotho has limited bilateral and multilateral treaties to protect investors. 
The government of Lesotho established the commercial court in 2010 to address commercial 
cases, thus increasing investor protection. The Doing Business Report (2012) states that 
Lesotho instituted a law to protect investors from exploitation by company directors by setting 
out duties of care, diligence and the skills required of directors. 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
The Lesotho census of 2006 showed that the national population stands at around 1.88 million. 
The low population density coupled with the low per capita income in the nation mean that the 
economy has a low effective demand which discourages investment. Lesotho adopted a growth 
strategy to address this. The strategy seeks to exploit international markets, predominantly in 
labour-intensive export industries (IMF 2012). Lesotho’s membership of the SACU helps its 
fiscal revenue and its membership of the SADC increases its trade potential in the region. 
4.4.5 Madagascar 
 
Madagascar is considerably integrated into the world economy. It is a member of various 
regional and international groupings which include the SADC, the Indian Ocean Commission 
and COMESA. It is a member of global trade agreements such as AGOA. The Madagascar 
government has Economic Priority Zones. The Economic Priority Zones have received 
incentives that have increased industrial productivity and attracted foreign capital over the 
years. Madagascar has in recent years suffered political instability after the March 2009 coup 
d’état and thus its competitiveness has fallen to position 142 out of 183 (World Bank 2013). 
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4.4.5.1 Policies adopted by Madagascar to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
The IMF (2015) reported that Madagascar is politically unstable and thus the establishment of 
strong public institutions is compromised. Financial services comprise 11 banks, 5 financial 
establishments, 30 micro-finance institutions (MFIs), and 5 insurance companies. New banks 
are also being established thus the financial base is expected to grow in the future (IMF 2015). 
Infrastructure and access to electricity  
In 2007 Madagascar in partnership with the AfDB embarked on a major hydroelectric power 
project worth 6 million British pounds. The Sahanivotry Hydroelectric Power Station, a 30 year 
project on completion, will increase power generation, and will bring about the construction of 
new access road infrastructure and bridges (AfDB 2007).  
Protecting investors 
 
Since 1998 the Madagascan government has liberalised its foreign exchange market to 
eliminate the exchange rate risk for investors. This allows foreigners to operate in foreign 
currency and also gives investors the right to operate foreign currency accounts (Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs 2013). Madagascar is open to FDI in all sectors and has passed 
friendly laws to encourage an influx of FDI. The laws allow full foreign ownership of business 
enterprises (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2013). 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The macro-economy of Madagascar has been affected by the poor political environment  in 
recent years with the 2012 World Bank economic report pointing to a stalled economy, an 
inflation rate of 8.5% and a growth rate of 2.5% (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 
2013).    
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Market size and trade across borders 
 
Madagascar has a small market and therefore the government has a number of agreements with 
other countries to boost trade relations. The government of Madagascar has concluded bilateral 
investment agreements with Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Mauritius, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Thailand. Madagascar has also signed double taxation treaties with 
France and Mauritius (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2013). 
 
Madagascar facilitated cross border trading and allowed exporters easy access to foreign 
markets by introducing online connections linking government departments and agencies to 
trade operations (WB Doing Business Report 2014). 
4.4.6 Malawi 
 
Landlocked Malawi is one of the SADC’s resources-poor countries. The GDP in Malawi is low 
and the poverty levels are high, hence low effective demand. This has made the country less 
attractive to FDI over the years since most foreign investors focus on local markets for their 
products. Therefore, it is important for the government to intervene in order to attract possible 
investors to the country given the competition for FDI in the region. 
Malawi has many factors that make it attractive to investors, the chief one being a low crime 
rate. Countries with high crime rates do not guarantee security of private property. Malawi is 
thus an attractive destination since it has a low crime rate compared to most SADC countries 
(UNCTAD 2003). 
4.4.6.1 Policies adopted by Malawi to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The Malawian government has made efforts to improve its competitiveness by setting up 
institutions for promoting investment including the Malawi Investment Promotion Agency 
(MIPA) which promotes, facilitates and encourages FDI. This agency is meant to reduce 
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bureaucracy in setting up investment and acts as a one stop investment centre. The agency was 
constituted in the Investment Promotion Act of 1991 (Kubalasa 2003). 
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Malawi´s government is making efforts to ensure national self-sufficiency in energy production 
by increasing capacity hence it increased energy tariffs by 63.52% in 2011 to raise revenue for 
the capacity building programme (SADC 2012).  
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The Malawian economy is highly dependent on donor funding. It is one of the African 
countries that adopted the Highly Indebted Poor Countries’ (HIPC) initiative. The initiative 
encouraged multilateral institutions to cancel Malawi’s external debt which brought some level 
of economic stability to encourage investment (Kubalasa 2003). 
 
Malawi’s privatisation initiative which started in 1996 attracted investors by stimulating 
competition in most sectors of the economy. The privatisation drive saw 66 state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) being privatised and 44 enterprises given to local Malawians (UNCTAD 
2005). 
 
Protecting investors 
The US Department of State (2014) reported that due to Malawi’s political stability it has a low 
risk of violence. Malawi has laws that are effective in protecting the rights of foreign investors. 
Malawi repealed the Forfeiture Act in 1992, and since then expropriation of foreign assets has 
become difficult (US Department of State 2014). Malawi is also a member of the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which allows international abitration in 
case of disputes with foreign investors. In addition, Malawi is a signatory to international 
conventions that promote protection of foreign investment which includes the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), the Berne Convention, and the Universal Copyright 
Convention  (KPMG 2012). 
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Market size and trade across borders 
 
Malawi has bilateral and multilateral agreements that promote free trade. It is a member of the 
COMESA free trade area (KPMG 2012). Malawi is also a member of the SADC which has a 
potential of  258 million people and a combined GDP of US$471.1 billion  (KPMG 2012). It is 
also a member of AGOA and has bilateral trade agreements with Zimbabwe, South Africa and 
Mozambique. 
4.4.7 Mauritius 
 
Mauritius is amongst the most competitive economies in attracting FDI in Africa due to its 
economic liberalisation and trade openness. The World Bank’s 2011 Ease of Doing Business 
Report ranked it 23 out of 175 countries due to good governance and political stability amongst 
many other factors (WB 2011). Mauritius was ranked first in Africa on economic freedom and 
9
th
 in the world (out of 141 surveyed countries) by an internationally reputable organisation, the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom (Bank of Mauritius 2013).  
4.4.7.1 Policies adopted by Mauritius to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
Mauritius has a liberalised banking system whereby the existing 21 banks can trade in a 
currency of their choice including the local currency, the Mauritian rupee. There are also many 
other non-bank financial institutions which can conduct foreign exchange transactions (Bank of 
Mauritius 2013). This reduces the exchange rate risk and investors are assured of returns in a 
currency of their choice. The banking sector in Mauritius is dominated by the two local banks 
that hold 65% of the total banking assets. There are also a number of foreign banks and 
multinational banks mainly for trade financing such as Standard Chartered and Standard Bank 
(Bank of Mauritius 2013).  
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The Doing Business Report of 2014 noted that Mauritius widened the scope of credit 
information available to investors in a bid to reduce credit risk in the market and to attract 
investors. This was achieved by increasing the available data coverage from 2 to 3 years.  
 
The Bank of Mauritius (2013) pointed out that since 2005 the Mauritian government has 
sanctioned policies that encourage FDI. The Business Facilitation Act of 2006 was constituted 
with the view to streamlining the procedures for setting up business in the country. Work 
permits for entrepreneurs and professionals were reduced to a combined single work permit 
called an occupation permit, which takes three days to process. Mauritius also has the Board of 
Investment which acts as a one-stop shop for business registration. 
 
The Mauritian Central Statistics Office (2010) reported that the economy has managed to 
diversify operations and move from FDI concentration in EPZs as in the 1980s. FDI is now 
concentrated in the tourism and export sectors. Macroeconomic stability has made it possible 
for government to use fiscal incentives in FDI attraction and so broaden operations. 
  
Mauritius has opened nearly all sectors to foreign investment. The World Bank (2011) reported 
that 32 of 33 surveyed sectors in the WB Investing across Borders Report were open to FDI. 
Mauritius has an act of parliament that seeks to facilitate investment. Under the Business 
Facilitation Act (2006) investors are allowed to open shop three days after incorporation, while 
occupation permits for professionals take only three days to process.  
 
Mauritius is regarded as one of the success stories of the SAPs because in the early 1970s it 
established the EPZs. Under the EPZs businesses were given various fiscal incentives, product 
marketing support and easy access to capital (UNCTAD 2002). 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The government of Mauritius abolished foreign exchange controls in 1994 to reduce exchange 
rate risk for foreign investors (Bank of Mauritius 2013).  Therefore, repatriation of profits and 
dividends by foreign investors does not require government approval.  Foreign exchange is 
traded on the open market with minimal government intervention and most business 
transactions by foreigners are done in foreign exchange. 
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The Mauritian success story can be explained by the strategic economic reforms embarked on 
since 2005. These programmes promoted free trade, opened the economy to FDI in all sectors 
and facilitated business (Bank of Mauritius 2013). Mauritius has also moved from the 
manufacturing industries into the services industries (African Competitiveness Report 2013). 
Mauritius has hence been ranked the best nation in Africa for the past five years and the World 
Bank’s 2013 Doing Business Report also ranked it the top African economy (Bank of Mauritius 
2013). 
 
Mauritius benefits largely from its educated population and the adult literacy stood at 87% in 
2009. The nation is also bilingual with English and French used as official languages in the 
country thus it has managed to attract significant human resources-seeking FDI over the years 
(Bank of Mauritius 2013). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
The UNCTAD Investment Policy Review (2012) noted that Mauritius has a wide and 
diversified market due to regional trade agreements within the regional blocs wherein it 
participates, mainly the SADC and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). This has led to growth in its services sector as investors seek wider markets.  
4.4.8 Mozambique 
 
Mozambique enacted a unique investment law in 1984, to encourage FDI in the economy after 
recognising the increasing foreign competition in FDI attraction (UNCTAD 2013). In 1993 a 
new law was introduced by the Mozambique parliament which sought to “favour greater 
participation, complementarities and equality of treatment of national and foreign investments” 
(UNCTAD 2013).  
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4.4.8.1 Policies adopted by Mozambique to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
The Investment Promotion Centre (CPI) (2012) reported that Mozambique has a stable growing 
financial sector with over 40 banks and several microfinance institutions. The Mozambique 
Financial Sector Development Strategy, 2012-21, which was approved in April 2013, paved the 
way for the establishment of legal reforms and a private credit registry bureau (AfDB 2014). 
The bureau established a collateral registry, and a new Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism law (AfDB 2014). 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Mozambique increased electricity and water production by 1% in 2011 through construction of 
new transportation and distribution infrastructure (SADC 2012). This improved the availability 
of water and electricity to businesses and thus encourages investment. 
 
The government of Mozambique has made infrastructural rehabilitation its core objective since 
the end of the civil war. The major source of financing has been the donor community. 
Government expenditures on infrastructure have been around 10% of GDP annually since 2001 
(UNCTAD 2013). 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
Despite a gradual decline in poverty in Mozambique and rapid, continued growth with 
significant rise in GDP per capita to US$571 today, Mozambique has 54.7% of its population 
living on much less than $1.25 a day (UNCTAD 2013). Therefore Mozambique has been party 
to international agreements to increase its market for the benefit of its investors.  
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Protecting investors 
 
Mozambique is committed to protecting foreign investment, thus it has legislation that 
guarantees protection of property rights. It allows free transfer of dividends abroad and allows 
international arbitration in investment disputes (CPI 2012). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
Mozambique is strategically located, and thus supplies of raw materials are easily accessible. 
The 2014 Doing Business Report lauded the Mozambican government for improving trade 
across borders through the introduction of an electronic single-window system (WB 2014).  
 
As a SADC member Mozambique benefits from free trade agreements in the region to increase 
its market. 
4.4.9 Namibia 
4.4.9.1 Policies adopted in Namibia to attract FDI 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The World Bank (2005) reported that it is difficult to launch business in Namibia because it 
takes 85 days as opposed to an average 63 days in other SADC countries. 
 
The government of Namibia passed the Foreign Investment Act of 1990 which gives foreign 
firms the right to repatriate their profits to their mother countries. The Bank of Namibia (2006) 
stated that, apart from the 10% Non-Resident Shareholders’ Tax on dividends, capital 
movement is governed by common market agreements which are liberalised. 
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Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Namibia has seen an increase of 190.2% growth in its energy sector since 2011 due to 
significant water flows into the Kunene River at the Ruacana Hydro Power Station, and a 
further 130.6% increase by 2012 (SADC 2012).  
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The IMF (2013) noted that to stabilise its economy the Namibian government introduced a 
three year fiscal policy in 2011 in order to improve its infrastructure and create employment. Its 
purpose was also to create a national buffer against external shocks. 
 
Protecting investors 
 
Namibia has legislation that protects foreign investment under the Foreign Investment Act. The 
act prevents expropriation. The act also guarantees international arbitration in disputes (Asian 
Business Forum 2014). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
Namibia has vast areas of desert land which are uninhabitable and thus its population is small. 
This has encouraged the government to seek foreign markets in a bid to attract investors; 
Namibia is thus a member of the SADC and the SACU where it enjoys free trade agreements. 
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4.4.10 Seychelles 
 
Seychelles relies heavily on tourism for its economic growth and development. It is a nation 
comprising 10 islands and is a middle income country (WB 2012). 
4.4.10.1 Policies to attract FDI in Seychelles 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
Seychelles has a stable public enterprise favourable for investors and in 2012 the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) ranked Seychelles above the 50
th
 percentile for most 
dimensions of governance, including political stability, government effectiveness, and control 
of corruption (WB 2013). 
 
Access to credit for business development is constrained in Seychelles; however, the 
government in partnership with the AfDB and the World Bank is working on developing the 
financial environment including capitalising the Development Bank of Seychelles (IMF 2013).  
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Seychelles increased power generation through installation of new fuel oil generators in 2011. 
There is also a significant increase in green energy production through the biomass project and 
the Seychelles government signed an agreement with Masdar from the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), a renewable energy company, to implement a wind farm project (SADC 2012). The 
Seychelles government in partnership with the AfDB is working on an infrastructural 
development plan for 2013 with the view to creating competitive environment for business 
operations (IMF 2013). 
 
The World Bank (2012) reported that the government of Seychelles values a skilled labour 
force, thus secondary education is free and tertiary education is subsidised. The state also 
provides free health care and hence investors are guaranteed a healthy workforce. The IMF 
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(2013) noted that the establishment of the University of Seychelles and other tourism training 
programmes help in improving skills in the country. 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The macro-economy of Seychelles has had a number of reforms in recent years with the view 
to attracting FDI, since FDI and tourism are central to the development of the country. The 
major reforms have been liberalisation of the exchange rate, privatisation and debt restructuring 
(WB 2012). 
 
The IMF (2013) noted that the reforms in Seychelles are paying off and in 2013 according to 
the Doing Business Report it was ranked 74th on the starting business indicator.  This was 
achieved through partnership with the World Bank in improving online business to government 
interactions, improving the company act to meet world standards and improving protection of 
property rights. 
 
Protecting Investors 
 
Seychelles founded the Investment Protection Act in 2010 which assured foreign investors 
equal protection with local investment (Government of Seychelles 2010). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
The 2013 WB Doing Business Report noted that Seychelles made trading across borders easy 
by adopting electronic customs operations.  
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4.4.11 South Africa 
4.4.11.1 Policies to attract FDI in South Africa 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
The US commercial Services (2011) reported that South Africa has advanced infrastructure that 
matches the developed world. The financial system is sophisticated with advanced financial 
instruments and services and  the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is ranked among the 
world’s top markets. Thus access to credit is advanced. 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
The South African economy has a growing industrial sector which demands more electrical 
power. Coupled with the government rural electrification drive, the demand for electricity is 
projected to increase by more than double by 2030 (South African Yearbook 2012). The 
government of South Africa has been under-investing in the energy sector thus Eskom, the 
country’s utility provider, is failing to meet the current demand which has seen massive power 
shortages in the country (South African Yearbook 2012). 
 
To counter the electricity shortages the government of South Africa since 2013 (through 
Eskom) is building new electricity plants, namely Medupi in Limpopo which was planned to be 
completed in 2013 and Kusile earmarked for completion by year end in 2014 (South African 
Year Book 2012).  
 
The South African government has developed an energy scrutiny plan to increase access to 
electricity. It seeks to increase efficiency in the energy sector to ensure accelerated access to 
cleaner fuel (SADC 2012). 
 
The world competitiveness report of 2013 concluded that South Africa is one of the economies 
with a well-developed infrastructural development programme. The government of South 
Africa has a running infrastructural budget of 3.2 trillion South African rand (R), where 
electricity and energy development take prominence and 60% of the funding is towards energy 
programmes (WB 2013). 
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Protecting investors 
 
South Africa, being a signatory to the New York Convention of 1958 enforces international 
arbitration awards on investment disputes (US Commercial Services 2011).  South Africa 
enforces property rights and contractual rights through an independent and objective court 
system. The South African Government implements decisions of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, which supervises the resolution of transnational disputes (US Commercial Services 
2011).     
 
Macroeconomic policies  
 
The government of South Africa has adopted developmental policies since independence in 
1994 where the Reconstruction and Development Programmes (RDP) were launched with a 
focus on long-term development and growth (Government of South Africa 2011). The RDP 
was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework in 1996. The 
GEAR framework sought to increase employment and increase GDP through liberal policies in 
trade and investment aimed at reducing poverty (UN 2011).  
 
GEAR, though it brought a sound financial services sector, was, however, not successful in 
achieving employment as sought by the South African government (UN 2011). The 
government of South Africa thus in 2006 introduced a new policy framework called the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). AsgiSA aimed at 
bringing accelerated growth and improving the living standards of the ordinary South African 
(Government of South Africa 2006).  
 
The government of South Africa also has a long-term growth plan, the National Development 
Plan (NDP), with a life-span that ends in 2030. This plan seeks to increase the nation’s 
competitiveness and ensure stable macroeconomic growth and development (Government of 
South Africa 2011). 
 
The WB Doing Business Report (2013) noted that South Africa improved the conditions for 
establishing new business through a new company law that removes the need to reserve a 
company name and offers simpler incorporation documents.  
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Market size and access to foreign markets 
 
South Africa had an estimated population of 50 million people in 2009, with a high gross 
domestic product (GDP) of $287.2 billion in 2009 (US Commercial Services 2011). The South 
African market is well integrated into the foreign market through its membership of the SADC 
and the SACU. As a signatory to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) South 
Africa has access to the U.S. market duty free (US Commercial Services 2011).   
 
4.4.12 Swaziland 
 
COMESA (2012) noted that Swaziland launched the revised Investor Road Map (IRM) aimed 
at ensuring ease of doing business in the nation. The IRM has seventeen objectives chief among 
them being improvement of the key areas that attract internationally mobile capital such as 
infrastructure, access to credit, education and the macroeconomic environment. 
 
4.4.12.1 Policies to attract FDI in Swaziland 
Public Institutions and access to credit 
 
KPMG (2014) reported that Swaziland established the Swaziland Industrial Development 
Company that extends funding to private sector investments. The economy has a stable banking 
sector constituted with big South African Bank subsidiaries which are FNB, Standard Bank and 
Nedbank.  
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
Swaziland relies on electricity, coal, petroleum products and renewable waste for its energy 
supply. The government of Swaziland also has a partnership programme with the European 
Union (EU) for its energy policy with the aim of achieving increased access to local businesses 
and improved employment and livelihoods of the local population (SADC 2012). 
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Macroeconomic policies 
 
The Swaziland government set up a long-term development plan in 1997, the National 
Development Strategy (NDS), which ends in 2022. The plan has the target of moving 
Swaziland into a medium human development group of countries based on social justice, 
political stability and sustainable economic development (Government of Swaziland 1999). 
 
Mahembe and Odhiambo (2013) noted that Swaziland has a key investment policy, the 
Swaziland Investment Policy of 2009. The goals of the investment policy, among others, are to: 
increase the levels of investment, which would increase economic growth; increase 
employment opportunities; encourage higher levels of productivity in the economy; export 
development; increase levels of management skills; promote new technology; and encourage 
the growth of small enterprises. 
 
Swaziland shortened the administrative processes in starting new business and limited the 
processing period for new business licences (WB 2014). Swaziland also improved investor 
confidence through increasing their protection through corporate disclosure requirements and 
information disclosure to investors thus reducing information asymmetry between managers 
and investors (WB 2013). 
  
Protecting investors 
 
Expropriation and nationalisation are prohibited in Swaziland and there is no report of any 
company that was either nationalised or expropriated (KPMG 2014). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
 Swaziland made trading across borders easier by streamlining the process for obtaining a 
certificate of origin (WB 2014). The WB Doing Business Report (2013) also commended 
Swaziland for making trade across borders faster by implementing an electronic data 
interchange system for customs at its border posts.  
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To circumvent its land-locked nature, its small domestic market and erosion in trade 
preferences, Swaziland needs to develop a new strategy to increase exports. The country 
benefits from the EU, the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and other regional 
preferential trade arrangements. It is actively involved in the SACU, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa 
(COMESA).  
4.4.13 Tanzania 
4.4.13.1 Policies to attract FDI in Tanzania 
 
Public institutions and access to credit  
 
The major policy that attracted substantial FDI in Tanzania was the mineral code of 1998. The 
code was a joint project between the government and the World Bank. It facilitated 100% 
foreign ownership of capital, removed the possibility of nationalisation and removed capital 
controls on repatriation of profits (World Bank 2005). This was meant to improve the 
locational advantage of Tanzania as compared to other countries with similar endowments in 
the region. 
 
Tanzania reduced credit risk in the market by reducing information asymmetry embodied in 
new regulations that require credit bureaus to be licensed and defined the operations of the 
credit reference data bank (WB 2014). The financial system in Tanzania is sound and the 
banking sector has a sound capital adequacy ratio which is above the minimum 10% for most 
banks (AfDB 2012).  
 
The Tanzanian government is also developing a vibrant work-force through improving the 
education system and access to education. According to a report by the AfDB (2012) there is a 
marked improvement in primary school completion levels which in 2010 increased by 9.3% 
from the 2009 figure. Enrolment in secondary schools also increased from 30.8% in 2010 to 
34.5% in 2011. 
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Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
The Africa Competitiveness Report (2013) points out that the Tanzanian government prioritises 
infrastructural growth and in the 2012/13 budget it allocated 498.9 billion Tanzania shillings 
(TSH) for electricity, TSh 1,382.9 billion for transportation, and TSh 4 billion for ICTs. There 
is also a partnership project with the Chinese to construct a gas pipeline worth US$ 1.225 
million from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam. 
 
The World Doing Business Report (2013) noted the effort by Tanzania to make starting a 
business easy by removing health, town and land officials’ inspections before business 
establishment (WB, 2013).  
 
Macroeconomic policies 
Tanzania’s macroeconomic policies are approved by the IMF thus giving confidence to 
external investors (Human Development Trust (HDT) 2009). The government of Tanzania in 
pursuit of FDI concentrates on expansionary macroeconomics. The macroeconomic framework 
used MKUKUTA 2 to target poverty alleviation and improve the general welfare of the citizens 
(HDT 2009). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
Tanzania made trading across borders faster by implementing the pre-arrival declaration system 
and electronic submission of customs declaration (WB 2013).  
 
The importance of a strong domestic market to enhance FDI attraction is important to the 
Tanzanian government hence they adopted an economic policy, MKUKUTA II, to reduce 
poverty and increase income (AfDB 2012). In addition, Tanzania is a member of many regional 
groupings (SADC, COMESA and the East African Community) where free trade agreements 
expand its market base for greater FDI inflows. 
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4.4.14 Zambia 
4.4.14.1 Policies to attract FDI in Zambia 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The Zambian government amended the investment act in 2006 in the Zambian Development 
Agency Act of 2006. The Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) was then constituted with the 
mandate to help private sector investment in the economy (UNCTAD 2011).  
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
The Zambian government has promoted the construction of new hydro-power stations due to 
increased demand for electricity. Thus there is an extension of the Kariba North Bank and also 
massive rehabilitation of small hydro-power stations around the country (SADC 2012). The 
government is also working on building infrastructure to expand the petroleum industry and 
recapitalising the Indeni Oil Refinery.  
 
The African Competitiveness Report (2013) noted that the Zambian government is making 
efforts to improve the railway transport infrastructure for better linkages with its neighbouring 
markets, firstly by improving the operation of Zambia Railways and secondly the government 
is working on improving railways linking Zambia with other regions such as: the TAZARA 
railway to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and from Kapiri and Mposhi in Zambia. Plans are also 
underway to create a new railway linking Zambia and Botswana via the Kazungula Bridge. 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
The Africa Competitiveness Report (2013) revealed that the Zambian 2013 budget prioritised 
infrastructural development, mainly roads, rail, and power generation.  Zambia is also making 
efforts to create fiscal space through local resource mobilisation to improve human and 
physical capital development and improve public service delivery. The Zambian government 
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issued a US$750 million Eurobond to raise funds for infrastructural development to be 
distributed as follows: energy infrastructure (US$255 million or 34.0%) and road and rail 
transport infrastructure US$430 million or 57.3% (World Bank 2013). 
 
The Zambian government embarked on liberal policies in 1990 with the view to boosting FDI 
flows into the country and achieving sustainable economic growth. These policies were 
supported by developmental policies adopted in the new millennium such as the National 
Action Plan; the Public Investment Programmes of 2000-2002 and 2001-2003; the Zambia 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002- 2004; the Five-year Institutional Strategic Plans; the 
Sectorial Investment Programmes; and the three-year rolling Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) (Mwanawina 2007). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
The World Bank (2010) in its report on investing across borders concluded that Zambia is open 
to foreign investment and resource ownership. The surveys conclude that all the 33 active 
sectors in Zambia are fully open to foreign ownership.  
4.4.15 Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe has been commended for making significant progress in economic stabilisation 
since 2009 after the hyperinflation era of 2000-2008 (1MF 2013).  However the reliance of the 
economy on diamonds affected growth in 2012 after a fall in revenue from diamonds which 
affected the fiscal space.  
The UNCTAD (1999) survey on investment promotions in Africa presented a damning report 
on Zimbabwe labelling it the worst business-friendly environment with the situation predicted 
to continue until 2003. Zimbabwe’s ratings on FDI attraction in recent years have been equally 
low due to unclear indigenisation policies which threaten property rights of foreign businesses 
especially in mining and agriculture. The 2013 World Bank Doing Business Report thus rated 
Zimbabwe number 172 out of 183 surveyed countries on ease of starting a business, only better 
than the DRC in the SADC (WB 2013). 
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4.4.15.1 Policies to attract FDI in Zimbabwe 
 
Public institutions and access to credit 
 
The government of Zimbabwe is working on a COMESA assisted investment climate reform 
agenda (COMESA 2013). The reform agenda is aimed at initiating institutional reforms in 
information communications technology (ICT), business monitoring and ensuring ease of doing 
business in the country. 
The government of Zimbabwe is making an effort to stabilise the financial services sector and 
improve investors’ access to credit. The ministry of finance recently introduced policies to 
recapitalise the central bank with the view to returning its lender of last resort status (2014 
Government Budget Statement). 
 
In 2012 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) through its moral persuasion initiatives made an 
agreement with lending institutions to improve access to business funding. The agreement 
required that lenders set lending interest rates of not more than 12.5% and reduce handling fees 
(World Bank Country Report 2013). 
 
The RBZ (2009) reported that in 1989 the government established the Zimbabwe Investment 
Centre (ZIC) to act as a one-stop shop for foreign direct investment (FDI). The ZIC approves 
and registers all investments with foreign holdings. The ZIC has also managed to reduce the 
number of steps in setting up business in Zimbabwe. Though Zimbabwe is ranked one of 
SADC’s most difficult economies in which to start a business, it has in recent years reduced 
registration fees and improved the speed of company and tax registration to improve ease of 
business start-ups (WB 2013).  
 
Infrastructure and access to electricity 
 
The Zimbabwean government has import arrangements with Hydroelectrica de Cahora Bassa 
(HCB) of Mozambique, ZESCO of Zambia and Eskom of South Africa due to electricity 
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generation shortages locally. The government allowed mining firms to have their own direct 
power importation agreements to improve the electricity supply to mines (SADC 2012). 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency regime in 2009 in a bid to reduce inflation and improve 
external competitiveness and thus the economic prospects of the country (SADC 2012). The 
multicurrency system has limited the central bank’s ability to influence monetary development 
in the country which is now determined by the economy’s external performance. Zimbabwe 
also significantly reduced its external debt in a bid to create fiscal space and improve 
infrastructure and lure investment (SADC 2012). 
 
Market size and trade across borders 
 
Zimbabwe has low effective demand due to high levels of poverty. The 2011-2012 PICES 
Survey by ZimStat (2013) in the World Bank report classified 72.3% of Zimbabweans as being 
poor. The majority of the poor population is located in rural areas, where 84.3% of the 
population is poor. More than half of households are deemed ‘poor’ with household poverty 
standing at 62.6% of households and 16.2% of the households are ‘extremely poor’ (WB 2013). 
The Zimbabwean government seeks to expand its market through bilateral agreements with 
China, India, and UAE to alleviate this problem of demand. Zimbabwe is also a member of the 
SADC and COMESA where it enjoys cross-border agreements that seek to create new markets. 
4.5  Summary and conclusions 
 
Most countries in the SADC (except Zimbabwe) seek to establish property rights to encourage 
FDI. There are also great efforts to ensure political stability and high economic standards to 
attract FDI. The SADC countries have also established various strategic legislative acts to 
attract FDI; most of the legislation seeks to reduce red tape in business establishments by 
foreign firms.  
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Though most SADC governments fancy indigenous participation in business enterprises, they 
have authorised moderate indigenisation policies to attract foreign capital. Zimbabwe is the 
only country that has adopted a hard stance by demanding 51% local ownership in mining and 
agricultural sectors; this has, however, affected its ratings on the WB Doing Business Report 
and is rated ‘the most unfriendly business environment’ in the SADC. This shows that 
investors’ value of protection of property rights is high and thus assurances against 
nationalisation of capital is important in attracting investment. 
Infrastructural development is the engine of investment attraction in countries such as South 
Africa, Botswana and Mauritius which have advanced infrastructural establishment rated 
highly in the African Competitiveness Report of 2013. Countries in the SADC region have thus 
adopted various policies to develop infrastructure especially in the energy sector. 
Macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation policies have also been used in the SADC 
region to attract FDI through development of a vibrant local market. Stable economies such as 
South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius perform better on the competitiveness index while 
countries prone to macroeconomic shocks such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and Madagascar perform 
poorly. On the monetary front, most SADC economies realise the importance of a stable 
currency, thus South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland formed a currency 
union, SACU, with the view to maintaining stable currencies and reducing the foreign 
exchange risk in order to attract investors. Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola and the DRC 
chose to adopt highly dollarised economies where businesses are allowed to transact in 
currencies of their choice. 
Establishing wider markets for raw materials and final products is also important in attracting 
FDI. SADC countries are thus forming alliances and signing treaties with individual countries 
and economic blocks to establish these markets. Most the SADC countries are members of 
more than one bloc, for example Tanzania is a member of the East African Community, 
COMESA and SADC. These regional blocs have free trade agreements that help in increasing 
markets. 
Below is Table 3 that summarises the efforts by each of the SADC countries to meet the basic 
competitiveness factors in trying to attract FDI. 
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Table 3: Summary of non-tax FDI attraction strategies by SADC countries 
Country  Public 
institutions 
and access to 
credit 
Infrastructure 
and access to 
electricity 
Protecting 
investors 
Macroeconomi
c policies 
Market and 
trade across 
borders 
Angola  Introduced 
credit bureaus 
to reduce 
information 
asymmetry in 
the credit 
market. 
Mobile phone 
access at 52% 
in 2012 and 
through the 
NESPS 
Angola is 
attracting 
new investors 
into the 
energy sector. 
Ranked 5
th
 in 
the region on 
investor 
protection due 
to effective 
defence and 
monetary 
restitution to 
foreign 
businesses in 
cases of 
expropriation.  
Dollarisation 
reduced 
exchange rate 
risk in the 
economy. 
Benefits 
from free 
trade 
agreements 
in SADC and 
COMESA. 
Botswana BEDIA was 
set to 
facilitate easy 
establishment 
of FDI 
Moropule B 
was 
completed in 
2012 and 
increased 
electricity 
supply. 
Set up law 
that required 
shareholders 
to approve all 
major 
business 
transactions.  
Introduced 
EDD to 
diversify the 
economy away 
from diamond 
industry 
reliance. The 
diamond 
industry 
introduced its 
first sale in 
Gaborone in 
2012 in 
partnership 
Formed 
partnerships 
with India 
and China to 
increase 
access to 
their large 
markets. 
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with De Beers. 
DRC Adopted the 
OHADA 
Uniform Act 
which 
increases 
assets used as 
collateral. 
Entered into a 
number of 
partnerships 
aimed at 
developing 
the electricity 
sector. 
Adopted the 
OHADA 
Uniform Act 
on 
Commercial 
Companies 
and Economic 
Interest Group 
which require 
information 
disclosure to 
protect 
investors. 
Declared the 
economy an 
HIPC which 
increased donor 
contribution to 
the budget and 
Balance of 
Payments 
support 
improving 
economic 
performance. 
DRC is a 
signatory to a 
number of 
conventions 
and is also a 
member of 
the SADC, 
ECCAS, 
COMESA 
and WTO 
free trade 
areas. 
Lesotho Set up the 
IMTT in 
2013 which 
reduces 
bureaucratic 
challenges in 
setting up 
FDI. 
Embarked on 
a massive 
LHWP from 
2013 meant 
to double 
electricity 
production on 
its 
completion. 
A member of 
the SACU 
thus has a 
consistent 
monetary 
policy. 
Working on 
vision 2020 
with the IMF in 
order to 
guarantee 
economic 
diversification 
and improve 
investment 
environment. 
A member of 
SACU and 
the SADC. 
Madagascar  Attracting 
new banks 
into the 
market to 
grow the 
financial 
sector. 
In partnership 
with the 
AfDB is 
working on a 
large-scale 
hydro-
electrical 
Liberalised 
exchange rate 
market to 
reduce 
exchange rate 
risk and 
allows full 
foreign 
Affected by 
political 
instability since 
2009 thus 
experiencing 
high inflation 
rates. 
Introduced 
online 
service 
linking trades 
with 
government 
departments 
and agencies 
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project. business 
ownership. 
in trade. 
Malawi  Introduced 
MIPA to 
facilitate and 
encourage 
FDI. 
Increased 
tariffs in 
energy sector 
by 63.52% to 
raise revenue 
for 
infrastructural 
development. 
A member of 
ICSD which 
allows 
international 
business 
dispute 
arbitration. 
Adopted the 
HIPC initiative 
which 
increased donor 
participation in 
the economy 
and stabilised 
the economy. 
A member of 
the SADC, 
AGOA and 
is a signatory 
to bilateral 
trade 
agreements 
with South 
Africa, 
Zimbabwe 
and 
Mozambique
. 
Mauritius  Liberalised 
the banking 
sector to 
allow easy 
access to 
foreign 
currency for 
investors. 
N/A N/A Moved the 
economy from 
manufacturing 
dominance to 
services sector 
dominance 
increasing 
investors’ 
choices.  
N/A 
Mozambiqu
e  
Established a 
credit registry 
bureau to 
monitor 
financial 
services. 
Construction 
of new 
electricity 
transportation 
and 
distribution 
increase 
Allows free 
transfer of 
dividends to 
investor home 
country. 
N/A Introduced a 
single 
window 
border 
electronic 
system to 
increase easy 
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supply. trade. 
Namibia  Constituted 
the Foreign 
Investment 
Act of 1990 
to promote 
FDI 
establishment
. 
Has grown 
the energy 
sector by 
190.2% since 
2011 at the 
Ruacana 
Hydro 
Electricity 
station. 
Guarantees 
international 
arbitration of 
disputes. 
Fiscal policy 
since 2011 
designed to 
create a 
national buffer 
against external 
shocks. 
A member of 
the SADC 
and the 
SACU. 
Seychelles  In partnership 
with the 
AfDB and 
WB the 
government is 
capitalising 
on the 
Development 
Bank of 
Seychelles to 
increase 
credit. 
Working with 
AfDB to 
increase 
electricity 
infrastructure. 
Passed the 
Investment 
Protection Act 
in 2010. 
Liberalisation 
of exchange 
rate and debt 
restructuring 
has made the 
Seychelles’ 
macro-
economy 
attractive. 
Introduced 
an 
electronics 
customs 
operation. 
South Africa Has an 
advanced 
financial 
services 
sector with 
the JSE 
ranked highly 
in the world. 
Introduced an 
energy 
scrutiny plan 
to implement 
improvement
s in energy 
production. 
Signatory to 
New York 
convention 
and 
implements 
decisions of 
the 
International 
Chamber of 
Introduced the 
NDP to last 
until 2030 in 
order to grow 
the economy. 
A member of 
Brazil, 
Russia, India, 
China and 
South Africa 
(BRICS) 
bloc, SADC, 
SACU and 
AGOA. 
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Commerce.  
Swaziland  Host big 
South African 
Banks. 
Has a 
partnership 
with EU to 
increase 
accessibility 
of electricity 
in the 
country. 
Prohibits 
nationalisatio
n of foreign 
capital. 
Introduced the 
NDS to last 
until 2022 
aimed at 
achieving 
sustainable 
economic 
growth. 
Streamlined 
the process 
of getting 
certificate of 
origin thus 
reducing cost 
of 
establishing 
business in 
the country. 
Tanzania  Reduced 
credit risk 
through new 
regulations 
that govern 
credit bureau 
information 
disclosures. 
Allocated a 
huge fiscal 
budget for 
electricity 
development 
projects in 
2012/2013. 
N/A Economic blue 
print 
MKUKUTA 
aims at poverty 
alleviation. 
Introduced 
pre-arrival 
declaration 
on borders 
and 
electronics 
customs 
clearances to 
ease border 
operations. 
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Zambia  Constituted 
the Zambia 
Development 
Agency that 
assists and 
lures foreign 
investors into 
the country. 
Extended the 
Kariba North 
power station 
to increase 
electricity 
generation. 
N/A The 2013 
budget mainly 
targeted 
infrastructural 
development 
especially road, 
rail and power 
generation. 
A member of 
the SADC. 
Zimbabwe  Working in 
partnership 
with 
COMESA on 
ICT 
development. 
The 
government 
also issued a 
5-year bond 
meant to 
recapitalise 
the central 
bank and 
stabilise the 
financial 
sector 
N/A N/A Adopted a 
multi-currency 
system which 
reduced 
inflation and 
exchange rate 
risk. 
A member of 
the SADC 
and 
COMESA. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DO TAX INCENTIVES MATTER FOR INVESTMENT? THEORY AND EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI remains one of the unsettled concepts in 
public finance. The importance of tax incentives in attraction of internationally mobile capital 
differs with the jurisdiction of the study and the methodology used in drawing conclusions. 
Feld and Heckemeyer (2009) argue that the impact of tax differentials on multinational 
locational decisions remains insufficiently analysed. They conclude that qualitative survey 
analysis gives less convincing results hence most economists have resorted to econometric 
analysis. The methodology of the study is thus critical in the analysis of empirical studies. 
In this chapter the study seeks to make an inquest into the underlying theory on tax incentives’ 
effectiveness in attracting FDI, with special interest in theory that is used to justify the use of 
tax incentives. The empirical findings of the studies on tax incentives for FDI attraction will 
also be explored with the view to establishing conclusions on the importance of tax incentives 
and also building the basis of the model this study is going to use. 
Tax incentives have various definitions; Bolnick (2004) defines tax incentives as fiscal 
measures used by governments to attract investment domestically and internationally in certain 
key sectors of the economy. Zee et al. (2002) defines tax incentives in statutory and effective 
terms. A statutory tax incentive is a special tax provision granted to qualifying investment 
projects and this provision would not be applied to other investment projects outside the 
selected qualifying categories. An effective tax incentive is a special tax provision granted to 
qualifying investment projects with the goal of reducing the effective tax burden.  
A thorough review of the literature on the economics of tax incentives, tax competition and 
harmonisation will help in understanding, firstly, whether tax incentives are or are not the most 
important factor in attraction of foreign investment; secondly, what kind of foreign investors 
are likely to be most responsive to changes in tax policy and which methodology gives more 
convincing results since these areas have retained the attention of many researchers over the 
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years [(see Yelpaala 1985; Rendon-Garza 2006 and Sato 2012)]. The chapter will highlight the 
major ideas from international research to help the study to identify the gaps that still need to 
be filled in the SADC region. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 will briefly deal with the rationale 
for introducing tax incentives, section 5.3 will look at theoretical arguments for introducing tax 
incentives, section 5.4 will discuss the case for and against tax incentives, section 5.5 will deal 
with tax competition and harmonisation, section 5.6 moves to the empirical analysis of findings 
on the effectiveness of tax incentives before the chapter conclusion in section 5.7. 
5.2 Rationale for introducing tax incentives 
 
Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2001) define tax incentives in terms of their effect on reducing the 
effective tax burden for a specific project. Standard international tax policy endorses caution 
against the use of tax incentives for attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Klemm 2009).  
However, tax incentives have remained a popular policy tool for attracting FDI in developed, 
transitional and developing countries. Wilson (1999) argues that given the assumption of 
perfectly mobile capital, when a given government raises its tax rate, net return on capital 
located there falls and capital chooses to relocate elsewhere. Wilson’s (1999) conclusions 
therefore support the use of tax incentives in reducing tax rates and attracting FDI. 
Tiebout (1956) in Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2005) conclude that the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI depends on the tax incentives and public goods provision mix in 
the host nation. Typically FDI location favours nations with the highest public goods provision 
and lowest tax burden mix. This conclusion takes a balanced budget approach in analysing the 
effectiveness of a tax system where taxes are assumed to be the key source of government 
revenue in public goods provision. Reduction in tax revenue through introduction of tax 
incentives might compromise public goods provision thus the government should seek to 
optimise the trade-off between public goods provision and loss in revenue due to tax incentives.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2001) notes that 
governments employ taxation for various political and policy objectives; however, it should be 
mentioned that the major objectives of tax reforms and restructuring have been more similar in 
many economies. The tax systems across the world have been designed to achieve a stable 
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revenue base, to better income distribution and to improve national resource allocation. Tax 
incentives fall in the broad category of governments tax systems, thus they are expected to 
achieve similar objectives, apart from attracting internationally mobile capital. Developing 
countries offer tax incentives for a variety of reasons, chief amongst them being to counter the 
negative effects of a bad tax system (Holland & Vann 1998). Most developing countries have 
poor tax administration structures which inconvenience businesses and also lead to massive 
revenue losses due to tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
Tax incentives are also used to counterweight the effects of poor macroeconomics, poor 
infrastructure and a lack of effective institutions in developing nations, which increase the cost 
of doing business. Thus reducing tax rates will help to cover the losses made by investors. The 
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI is a highly debatable issue with a number of 
studies finding non-tax factors more effective than tax incentives [Onyeiwu & Shrestha (2005), 
Bolnick (2004) and Sudsawasd (2008)], and others view fiscal incentives as central to FDI 
attraction [Hassett & Hubbard (2002) and Sato (2012)]. However, governments over the years 
have made wide use of tax incentives to compete for internationally mobile capital. 
 James (2010) points out that policy makers employ both tax and non-tax incentives to lure 
investment across their borders. He also concludes that the economy’s investment climate is 
critical to the effectiveness of tax incentives. James (2010) defines tax incentives as those tax 
reduction treatments offered to foreign investments and not to domestic investments with the 
view to attracting FDI. Tax incentives increase the after-tax profits on investments and 
generally an investor will prefer a location with a lower tax liability in cases where locations 
have similar resource characteristics (Owens 2004). Thus, tax competition has dominated the 
justification for use of tax incentives over the years where neighbouring nations seek to out-do 
one another in FDI attraction through lowering tax rates.  
Tax incentives are also used to signal ease of doing business in a country as they reduce 
barriers to FDI location and indicate the host nation’s level of acceptance of foreign players in 
markets where incentives are instituted. The major theoretical foundation for this chapter is that 
all fiscal incentives will have an impact on the cost of capital, effective tax rates and, 
ultimately, on where FDI locates.  Holland and Vann (1998) argue that regional development is 
also a common objective for the use of tax incentives. Thus, this chapter will also explain how 
regional blocks use taxes and tax harmonisation to bring development to their regions.  
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5.3 Theoretical arguments for introducing tax incentives 
 
5.3.1 Early theoretical arguments for introduction of tax incentives 
 
Early economic development theorists of the neoclassical era established the importance of 
capital formation on economic growth [Jorgenson (1963), Fei & Ranis (1961)]. Neoclassical 
theorists in their quest to reincarnate classical economics were the earliest theorists to explain 
the link between (tax) incentives and the attraction of internationally mobile capital. This 
section will discuss the theories that support the use of tax incentives to attract capital. 
5.3.1.1 The capital arbitrage theory 
 
The capital arbitrage theory of international capital movement which originated from the 
neoclassical international trade theory argues that capital movement responds to the 
differentials in rates of return (Yelpaala 1985). Hence the theory identifies a strong causal link 
between tax incentives and FDI location. The theory established that capital will move from 
capital-rich countries to capital-scarce countries in search of higher returns and the process will 
continue until the returns on capital are equalised between jurisdictions.  
 
The owners of internationally mobile capital act as arbitragers and move their capital in pursuit 
of highest returns given the risk associated with the investment. The capital arbitrage theory is 
used to explain the location of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in developing countries 
where capital is scarce. Normally capital-scarce locations have high unemployment rates and 
thus provide cheap labour which further enhances the profits from locating capital in such 
regions. 
5.3.1.2 The neoclassical investment theory 
 
Jorgenson (1963) introduced the neoclassical investment theory which suggests that firms will 
continue to accumulate capital as long as the costs of doing so are less than the benefits. Since 
firms experience decreasing returns from additional capital, they will stop when the present 
value of returns from capital equals the present value of costs. 
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Since the before-tax rate of return on capital is viewed as a cost of capital, lower tax rates 
reduce the cost of capital and increase the investment in more capital stock (Van Parys & James 
2010). The neoclassical investment theory thus suggests that tax incentives encourage growth 
of established firms through reinvestments and also lures new investments since it reduces the 
cost of capital. 
5.3.1.3 The neoclassical OLI theory  
 
Dunning (1988) developed the OLI theory also termed the ‘eclectic paradigm of investment’. 
The theory explains how firms choose foreign markets to establish their businesses. The study 
concludes that firms choose locational destinations based on three factors: ownership (O), 
location (L) and internalisation (I). 
 
Tavares-Lehmann, Coelho and Lehmann (2012) classify tax incentives under the locational 
advantages of a host nation in attraction of FDI. Hence tax incentives increase the host 
country’s attractiveness to investment if they lower tax rates below the investor’s home country 
tax rates or if they lower tax rates below those of other competing destinations. 
 
Devereux (2006) in Tavares-Lehmann et al. (2012) conducted a study on the analysis of 
empirical evidence on the effects of taxation on investment location decisions of MNEs and 
concludes that taxation plays a role in affecting MNEs’ choices; however, taxes were found not 
to be equally important in all MNEs’ locational decisions. Efficiency-seeking FDI was found to 
be more responsive to tax incentives than resource-seeking FDI. 
5.3.1.4 Intangible assets theory 
 
Hirsch (1976) in Yelpaala (1985) argues that the costs of the business operation are vital in FDI 
location decisions. The major conclusion of the theory is that FDI takes place as long as there 
are positive gains from investing in intangible assets in a host country after factoring in all the 
costs of operation. Tax incentives lower the operational costs of firms and thus encourage 
foreign investors to invest in more capital. 
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5.3.2 Modern theoretical arguments for tax incentives 
 
Earlier theories on the justification of tax incentives were probed and the conclusions deemed 
the arguments to be inappropriate (Yelpaala 1985). However, tax incentives remain a  key 
policy tool used by governments to lure investment and policy makers have based their 
justifications on factors that are different  from  the earlier theories. The new arguments will 
form the modern theoretical arguments which will be discussed in this section. 
5.3.2.1 New economic geography (NEG) theory 
 
The NEG theory was built on the neoclassical investment theory which concludes that there is a 
direct positive relationship between lowered tax rates and increased investment (Van Parys & 
James 2010). The model introduces the concept of core-periphery. This concept suggests that 
business concentration reinforces itself and thus the world is left with a core region that attracts 
the most FDI. 
 
 NEG models emphasise the role of business concentration that is self-reinforcing leaving the 
world with a core region. Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007) support the theory with their 
findings that lower tax rates are more effective in regions that already have more investment. 
 
This model has however, also been used to discourage FDI attraction through lowering tax 
rates in regions outside the core region. This is because FDI will locate in regions where they 
find many other firms even if those regions have higher tax rates. 
5.3.2.2 Policy arguments 
 
As noted by the OECD (2001) report entitled ‘Corporate tax incentives for FDI’, tax incentives 
are introduced by many developed, transitional and developing countries with the aim of 
achieving international competitiveness, addressing market failures, boosting regional 
development and improving income distribution. Low corporate taxes increase FDI flows by 
attracting new investors, retaining existing investors and encouraging reinvestments of returns 
accrued by existing enterprises (Onyeiwu & Shrestha 2005).   
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International competitiveness tax incentives are regarded as a strong factor in attracting 
internationally mobile capital, encouraging research and development initiatives by 
multinational companies and improving the competitiveness of the export sector of the host 
nation (OECD 2001). Thus, tax incentives are viewed as critical in the locational decisions of 
the multinational companies. Tax incentives act as a relief to locational costs of foreign 
business and increase the competitiveness of an economy against other neighbouring 
jurisdictions with similar locational factors.  
The market mechanism is inherently socially suboptimal, thus tax incentives are also used in 
instances where socially optimal investment has not been achieved by the market system 
(OECD 2001). In this case, tax incentives are used as government intervention mechanisms in 
achieving socially acceptable investment levels.  Due to the positive externalities characterising 
investment, the private sector normally under-produces investment, hence the socially desirable 
level of investment is established through government intervention in the form of subsidies and 
tax incentives. Tax incentives are also used by economic regional groupings to address the 
regional unemployment and poverty problems. OECD (2001) notes that tax incentives are also 
important in improving the host nation’s macro-economy. By moving investment into their 
countries, nations reduce the problems of cyclical unemployment, balance-of-payments (BOP) 
deficits and, in some cases, help to control inflation.  
5.3.2.3 Economic arguments 
 
The use of tax incentives has grown since the 1990s due to a number of world economic 
changes such as globalisation and the creation of common markets (Owens 2004). The process 
of globalisation has increased competition and establishment of production units in different 
locations has increased the amount of internationally mobile capital which can be lured into 
different locations through the use of tax incentives (Owens 2004). The creation of common 
markets through economic integration has reduced the difference between market-oriented and 
export-oriented FDI. Reduced tariffs have reduced the costs of importing and exporting (Owens 
2004). This has created a situation where foreign investment chooses a single location. Thus, 
tax incentives can lure the investors to a preferred destination and supply to markets that do not 
offer investment incentives but share a common market and common tariffs with the preferred 
location. 
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5.4 Merits and demerits of tax incentives 
 
Easson and Zolt (2002) conclude that it is common knowledge that tax incentives for FDI are 
both bad in theory and in practice. Theoretically they find tax incentives bad since they distort 
investment decisions. Practically, tax incentives are deemed to be ineffective and prone to 
corruption thus the conclusion that they are bad (Easson & Zolt 2002). However, almost all 
countries continue to use them for a number of reasons thus in this section the study will 
explore the merits and demerits of tax incentives. Bird (1993) suggests that, “Tax incentives 
improve economic performance only if government officials are better able to decide the best 
types and means of production for an economy than private investors.” 
5.4.1 Merits of tax incentives 
5.4.1.1 Correcting market failure 
 
Bird (1993) argues that governments have a role to play in achieving a socially desirable socio-
economic environment using a variety of tools including taxation. Taxes are used by 
governments for redistribution of income, efficient allocation of resources and to raise revenue 
for government operations. Most taxes distort the economic conditions; income taxes reduce 
returns on factors of production; import taxes distort the level of imports and exports and 
consumption taxes distort expenditure (Easson et al. 2002). 
Governments use taxes to correct market failures. For example, tax incentives are used to 
correct under-production of investment activities by the private sector and thus generate 
positive externalities (Easson et al. 2002). Governments will seek to correct investment 
decisions of the private sector using tax incentives and harness investment that would have not 
occurred without tax incentives. This is because governments want the economy to enjoy the 
benefits of foreign capital which include technological transfer, skills transfer, employment 
creation and economic growth and development.  
5.4.1.2 Externalities 
 
There are investments that create positive externalities which benefit the overall economy and 
governments need to support such activities. These activities include new technology 
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investments, infrastructural development, and environmentally friendly technology (James 
2009). New technology development in production opens opportunities for other firms in the 
same industry to adopt the same new ways of production which improves the economy’s 
overall performance. Infrastructural development has a positive spill-over effect due to the 
public good nature of infrastructure, thus investment in infrastructure benefits the whole 
economy. Environmentally friendly investments which create a clean environment have 
positive externalities due to the public good nature of a clean environment which is non-
excludable to all citizens of an economy. 
 
Investments which bear positive externalities thus benefit the overall economy and should be 
encouraged through tax incentives. 
5.4.1.3 Tax competition 
 
Tax incentives may be used by countries to increase their revenue base by improving their 
competitiveness (Klemm 2009). This is useful in countries that wish to attract mobile capital 
but face revenue constraints. Countries will offer tax incentives to mobile capital and attract 
investment while getting revenue by taxing existing capital and immobile capital.  
5.4.2 Demerits of tax incentives  
5.4.2.1 Revenue loss 
 
Easson et al. (2002) identify two sources of revenue loss due to tax incentives. Firstly, tax 
incentives discourage other investments in favour of the incentive-receiving projects hence 
revenue is lost from the foregone projects. Secondly, revenue is lost since businesses will 
improperly claim incentives and in some instances shift income from taxable activities to those 
that fall under tax incentives thereby avoiding tax. 
5.4.2.2 Misallocation of resources 
 
The success of tax incentive policies means that investment will increase in regions and nations 
within the successful incentive structures thus reducing investment in those that do not have the 
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incentives (Bird 1993). This increase in investment due to tax incentives in some cases will 
correct market failures while in most instances it may lead to too much investment in activities 
that have incentives and reduced investment in those activities without incentives, thereby 
leading to misallocation of resources. 
 
5.4.2.3 Enforcement and compliance challenges 
 
Government tax provision comes with associated costs in enforcing the tax laws and ensuring 
that parties comply. Easson et al. (2002) suggest that tax incentives are difficult to administer 
and enforce which leads to huge losses in revenue to governments that operate them. 
5.4.2.4 Encourages corruption 
 
Tax incentives give bureaucrats the opportunity to engage in corrupt and rent-seeking activities 
(Easson et al. 2002). This is prevalent in cases where tax incentives give the authorities 
discretion to determine which projects qualify for incentives and which do not. Tanzi (1998) 
suggests that corruption is high with tax incentives, due to direct links between investors and 
government authorities who use their discretion in implementing tax incentives. 
The empirical findings by Zelekha and Sharabi (2012) show that tax incentives lead to 
significant corruption. The study employed a large cross-section of European countries and 
two-stage least square analysis to reach the conclusion. 
5.5 Tax competition and harmonisation 
 
Alfano (2001) defines tax competition as actions by countries in reducing their tax bases in 
response to other countries’ reduction in tax bases. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) define tax 
competition as a non-cooperative game, in which countries set tax rate policies in a bid to 
influence the location of internationally mobile capital. Tax competition can thus be considered 
as government’s deliberate reduction in the domestic tax rates for specific economic activities 
by foreigners with the sole purpose of attracting foreign mobile capital and to boost economic 
activity (Rendon-Garza 2006).  
123 
 
 
Tax competition can be categorised as regional or global competition. Regional tax competition 
is competition amongst countries in close geographical proximity and global tax competition 
extends to competition for capital that can locate anywhere in the world (Rendon-Garza 2006). 
Where nations discover that the overall welfare of their nationals is being compromised due to 
tax competition, they collaborate in setting tax systems and uniform tax rates; this is tax 
harmonisation and it is common in most regional states. 
5.5.1 Theories of tax competition 
5.5.1.1 Tiebout, Oates and the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski model 
 
The earliest work on tax competition was coined by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972). The 
model was formally modelled by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). The 
theory’s main thrust is that tax competition amongst regional countries leads to inefficiencies in 
government expenditure and taxation. 
 
The origin of the theory of tax competition comes from Tiebout’s (1956) theory of federalism 
and is also termed the ‘theory of efficient tax competition’. The theory is rooted in the 
competition amongst jurisdictions for households given efficient provision of public goods 
(Rendon-Garza  2006). Tiebout’s (1956) model identifies the fact that with households voting 
with their feet and locating where there is an efficient trade-off between public goods provision 
and taxation, jurisdictions end up with inefficient taxation mixes in their quest to attract more 
households. This model was then extended to the location of firms by White (1975), Fischel 
(1975) and Wellisch (2000) with similar conclusions to the original Tiebout (1956) model that 
firms favour locating to where there are lower tax rates.  
 
The Tiebout (1956) model’s extension to mobile firms’ locational decisions was formulated in 
the same way as that for mobile residents. The model assumes that firms are in infinite elastic 
supply to each country and each country supplies firms with public inputs into their production 
functions. Each firm is taxed using the marginality principle where marginal tax should equal 
the marginal cost of providing the firm with public inputs which constitutes public goods 
(Wilson 1986). Therefore, the models found that under the Pareto efficiency principle, tax 
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competition leads to efficiency since marginal benefits from public goods provision is 
equalised to the marginal cost of paying taxes.  
 
Rendon-Garza (2006) points out that the effectiveness of the Tiebout model in explaining FDI 
location is highly constrained by its simplifying assumptions. The first restrictive assumption is 
that government can institute a fair tax on each individual which is equal to the cost of 
providing the individual with his/her preferred public good. The assumption is unrealistic in the 
attraction of investing firms since they favour taxes which give them competitive advantage 
over existing local firms. This is because foreign firms find it difficult to compete with local 
firms which have easy access to their local markets for inputs and sales; thus they require lower 
production costs in the form of lower taxes. 
 
The second assumption of the classical Tiebout model is that there are no economies of scale in 
public goods production and the third is that there are a large number of jurisdictional 
authorities or countries meant to achieve an efficient sorting of individuals. The second 
assumption contradicts economic theory which has identified that provision of public good 
requires a large capital set-up which in the long-run creates economies of scale. The third 
assumption makes the model difficult to apply to the concept of FDI location competition since 
most regional economies are made up of a small number of countries. 
 
The fact that the location of internationally mobile capital requires taxation that favours certain 
activities over others makes the analysis of tax competition more relevant in the analysis of FDI 
locational decision. The departure from the principles that lead to efficient tax setting in the 
Tiebout model means that tax competition in FDI attraction leads to fiscal externalities amongst 
competing economies (Rendon-Garza 2006). The effect of these externalities is the basis of the 
modern analysis of tax competition. 
 
Oates (1972) extends the Tiebout (1956) model but concludes that the use of tax competition 
can lead to inefficient provision of public goods. This emanates from the fact that in a bid to 
attract investment authorities will keep tax rates at low levels. This low taxation may lead to 
authorities providing inefficient levels of public services due to funds constraints. 
 
Oates (1972) argues that if the business offered a low tax rate does not confer social benefits, 
the social inefficiency of tax incentives will be large. This is because tax competition leads to 
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low wages; low employment; capital losses on homes and reduced tax base (Oates 1972). The 
conclusion of welfare loss due to taxation in Oates’ (1972) theory emanates from the fact that, 
when all governments lower their tax rates in a bid to attract internationally mobile capital, no 
one benefits from the competitive advantage and thus the resultant resource allocation will be 
sub-optimal (Wilson 1999). 
 
Thus, the origin of the modern race-to-the-bottom theory in tax competition is that tax 
competition lowers government spending and tax revenues to inefficient levels (Rendon-Garza 
2006). The empirical support for the theory was pioneered by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986) through theoretical model formulations based on Oates’s (1972) tax 
competition theory.  
 
The Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model also termed the ‘standard Z-M model of tax 
competition’ has a number of simplistic assumptions. Firstly, the model assumes a fixed 
number of homogeneous regions; secondly, it assumes that each region has an immobile factor 
of production labour and a mobile factor capital. The immobile capital is supplied by residents 
of the region and is inelastic in supply. The assumption of perfectly mobile capital implies that 
residents can choose to locate their capital wherever they want. The residents of each region 
have a fixed capital endowment. The model also assumes perfect competition in production and 
constant returns to scale technology. Due to fixed capital endowments in each region, adding 
the capital in all regions gives a fixed supply of capital in the world economy (Rendon-Garza 
2006). 
 
The Z-M model further assumes that the government seeks to achieve socially optimal mixes of 
public goods and taxation. The major conclusion of the model is that, given the fixed world 
economy capital, a rise in the capital tax rate in one region will increase the outflow of capital 
in that region due to the reduced returns on capital. The capital moving from the region with 
higher tax rates will move to the regions with lower tax rates and this is the basis of tax 
competition where regions compete for the limited world capital stock (Rendon-Garza 2006). 
 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) show that within a large number of jurisdictions competition 
leads to abandonment of property tax in all jurisdictions, thus all jurisdictions will rely on head 
taxes. As the number of jurisdictions increase it becomes difficult for a jurisdiction to influence 
the after-tax returns of investors. Eventually the Z-M model concludes that the tax competition 
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will shift the tax burden to immobile factors of production Thus, any tax on mobile capital will 
be shifted to the immobile factor of production labour. 
5.5.1.2 Extensions of the standard Tax Competition Z-M Model 
 
Most of the models based on the standard tax competition Z-M model are based on relaxing the 
basic assumptions of the original model. 
 
Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991) were the initial theorists to extend the Z-M model. They 
argued that in real situations tax competition is among countries of different sizes so they 
relaxed the assumption on the size of the jurisdiction. Their conclusion was that given two 
countries with different sizes and equal per capita endowments, the smaller country is likely to 
lower tax rates to attract a greater proportion of internationally mobile capital and achieve a 
higher per capita utility level than the larger country. 
 
Haufler and Wooton (1997, 1999) also relaxed the size of jurisdiction assumption and obtained 
different results from the Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). Wilson (1991) shows that 
given a large difference in the country sizes, tax competition is more preferable to a smaller 
nation since it reduces head taxes on individuals. Haufler and Wooton’s model extends the Z-M 
model and analyses tax competition between two countries of different sizes but adds trade 
costs and multiple tax instruments. They consider two taxes; profit-tax and consumption-tax. 
They conclude that, when regional countries have only a lump sum profit-tax at their disposal 
and face equal transport costs for imports, then both countries will always subsidise the 
business and the subsidy will be larger in the larger region than in the smaller region (Rendon-
Garza 2006).  The equilibrium outcome will be that firms locate to the larger markets paying 
profit-tax at an increasing rate with the market size. This illustrates that while tax competition 
may be generally bad it may benefit other countries. 
 
Kennan and Riezman (1988) analyse tax competition between countries in a model of tariff war 
between two countries. They model their analysis using Nash’s equilibrium in tariff rates and 
conclude that given large size differences between nations the large countries benefit more 
from tax competition. This is because the introduction of tariffs will change the terms of trade 
from the other country in an unfavourable way. Thus, this has its roots in the inter-regional 
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externalities which will create favourable changes in terms of trade to large jurisdictions than to 
smaller ones (Wilson 1999). 
5.5.1.3 Trade and tax competition 
 
Wilson (1987) launched the concept of trade in tax competition by introducing many   countries 
in the analysis of tax competition. The model introduced two private goods, a capital intensive 
and a labour intensive good. Due to the concept of comparative advantage, the eventual effect 
of trade is that low tax rate regions will end up producing capital intensive goods and the high 
tax regions will produce labour intensive goods.  
 
This distorts the original comparative advantages structure between jurisdictions before the 
introduction of tax incentives which reduces the overall welfare of the trading partners, because 
production in capital intensive sectors is shifted to inefficient producers owing to lower tax 
rates. 
5.5.2 Wasteful tax competition 
 
Harmful tax competition originates from diverting from the Tiebout (1956) model of efficient 
tax competition. This occurs when the actions of one nation in lowering tax rates to increase the 
welfare of its citizens lead to a fiscal externality in the form of reduction in welfare in other 
nations (Wildasin 1989). The process occurs when a region lowers its tax rate to attract 
internationally mobile capital; its attraction of capital away from other regions lowers their tax 
bases and tax revenues. 
5.5.3 Tax harmonisation 
 
Tax harmonisation emerged to counter the effects of harmful tax competition (Gaigné & Riou 
2004). Tax harmonisation is defined as a process by which countries in the same economic 
region equalise their corporate income tax rates and standardise corporate tax bases (Bond, 
Chennells, Devereux, Gammie & Troup 2000). When countries do not adopt tax harmonisation 
strategies this leads to suboptimal taxation (Gaigné et al. 2004). However, tax harmonisation 
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removes the autonomy of a nation’s tax system and thus nations will be constrained in their use 
of fiscal policy to deal with economic shocks (Fourcans & Warin 2001). 
 
Tax competition like every competitive market will lead to efficient tax systems which 
competing countries can use to better their tax administrations (Boss 1999). Harmonisation can 
lead to an increase in the tax rates in a region and discourage innovation and growth in the tax 
system which may reduce FDI flows into a region. Lack of tax harmonisation has the following 
negative impact on economies: 
5.5.3.1 Loss in revenue 
 
 Tax incentives lead to loss in revenue through two channels. Firstly, tax competition lowers 
tax rates and thus reduces revenue and, secondly, companies in their tax planning strategies will 
seek to exploit opportunities presented by tax incentives to lower their tax burden through tax 
avoidance (Bond, Chennells, Devereux, Gammie & Troup 2000). 
5.5.3.2 Change of economic behaviour 
 
The structure and operation of corporate income taxes can affect the operational decisions of 
firms on location, production, pricing and market conduct (Bond, Chennells, Devereux, 
Gammie & Troup 2000). Efficiency in production and economic integration and trade requires 
that production should take place in locations where an activity has comparative advantage 
over other locations. Thus use of taxes to influence location can lead to overall inefficiencies in 
production in the region.  
5.6 Empirical analyses on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI 
 
The theoretical analyses of tax incentives have opened a debate on whether tax incentives 
should be central in policies meant to attract FDI in the SADC. It is now important that the 
study turns to empirical findings on the effectiveness of tax incentives in achieving their 
objectives in attracting FDI and improving the economy’s competitiveness. 
 
Zee, Stotsky, and Ley (2002) argue that there is little evidence of the effectiveness of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI especially in developing countries. They questioned the importance 
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of tax incentives in attracting FDI compared to non-tax factors that increase the attractiveness 
of an economy to FDI.  Beyer (2002) also finds no relationship between tax concessions and 
FDI attraction in transitional economies. While other studies such as Klemm and Van Parys 
(2012) find tax incentives to be vital to attracting FDI in low income countries. Van Parys and 
James (2010) also find tax concessions to have a positive impact in the Caribbean islands. 
5.6.1 Country-specific empirical studies 
 
Bolnick (2004) in a SADC technical report suggests that evidence from other developing 
nations including those in the SADC show that tax incentives are not enough to convince 
foreign investors to choose their locations. The study cites Mauritius, Costa Rica, Ireland and 
Malaysia as economies that have successfully used non-tax incentives to lure FDI. These 
countries implemented successful economic reforms, ensured political stability, educated their 
work-force, built good infrastructure and instituted investment promotions to increase their 
appeal to investors. 
 
Kransdorff (2010) in a study on the effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI attraction in South 
Africa concludes that taxation is important in attracting efficiency-seeking FDI. In the study 
Kransdorff reckons that given the effectiveness of taxation in attracting FDI, the low FDI flows 
in South Africa are due to a poor tax incentive structure. The study thus recommends that there 
is need for tax incentive regime reform in South Africa if the economy wishes to attract 
meaningful FDI. However, the study is qualitative and lacks quantitative proof to substantiate 
the arguments. It would be difficult to rely on Kransdorff’s study for policy reform so this is 
where the present study looks forward to filling in the quantitative gaps. 
 
Tax incentives were also found to be effective in improving firm performance in Uganda 
(Mayende 2013). Using firm level data in the manufacturing sector, the study concludes that 
tax incentives improve the firm’s ability to increase gross sales and value addition. The study 
thus recommends that tax incentives be used to increase firm performance. This positive impact 
of tax incentives on firm performance can be observed in the increase in the number of 
investors in an economy. However, the Tax Justice Network Africa & Action Aid International 
(2012) concludes that tax incentives in Uganda have led to harmful revenue losses. Tax Justice 
Network Africa & Action Aid International thus recommends that the Ugandan government 
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remove tax incentives, especially tax holidays since they have led to harmful tax competition in 
the East African region. 
 
Miller, Webster and Yanti (2013) in a study on the effects of indirect taxes on US inward FDI 
state that taxes are one of the determinants of FDI attraction in the US. Their study used a large 
sample of industries using gross operating surplus as a measure of indirect taxes. Using this 
unique tax measure the study analysed the composition of inward FDI in the US. The study 
concludes that the coefficient for indirect tax is both statistically significant and negative, 
indicating that higher indirect taxes reduce FDI flows into the US. 
5.6.2 Global empirical studies 
 
Klemm and Van Parys (2009) sought to establish the effectiveness of tax incentives in 
attracting FDI and whether tax incentives are used in competing for FDI. They used data on tax 
incentives from 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985–2004. 
They applied panel econometric techniques in their study and concluded that lower tax rates are 
important in FDI attraction. Their use of spatial panel econometrics aided their second finding 
that tax holidays as well as lower corporate taxes are used in tax competition for FDI. 
 
Biggs (2007) surveyed twenty-one developing countries from across the world. The study 
concludes that given a well-structured tax policy, tax incentives can be effective in attracting 
foreign mobile capital. The study probes the fiscal regimes in developing countries and 
concludes that developing countries use the wrong tax incentives like tax holidays and 
accelerated depreciation which does not work in their economies. The study also recommends 
that policy makers focus their incentives on small domestic corporate players which are more 
responsive to incentives than large multinational corporations which require other non-tax 
incentives. 
 
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2009) in partnership with Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers conducted a survey of 85 countries. The survey used effective corporate rates which 
were applied in 2004 for the sampled countries. It emerged that corporate tax rates have an 
adverse impact on gross investment, FDI and entrepreneurship. Corporate taxes were found to 
attract investment in the manufacturing sector but not in the services sector.  
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These studies took data from countries across the globe which do not belong to a specific 
region. The conclusions show divergent views on the effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI 
attraction. This shows that effectiveness of tax incentives depends on the sampled economies. 
5.6.3 Regional empirical studies 
 
Chai and Goyal (2008) in a study to compare the benefits and the costs of tax concessions 
reckon that the cost of tax incentives is larger than the benefits. They used data from small 
island states in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. By comparing the costs of tax 
concessions (also termed tax incentives in terms of revenue lost and the benefits in the form of 
FDI attracted) they concluded that the region needed to move away from using tax concessions 
since they were found to be costly. 
 
Šimović and Žaja (2010) performed a review of tax incentives used in Western Balkan 
countries, that is, in Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The 
survey-based study concluded that like other transitional economies, the Western Balkan 
countries use tax incentives in under developed regions to attract investment and to develop the 
regions.  
 
Kinda (2014) used firm-level data from 30 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. The review 
revealed that infrastructure, human capital, and institutions, are influential in attracting FDI and 
taxes are not. Taxes were found to be ineffective in attracting both vertical FDI (that is export 
sector FDI) and horizontal FDI (where foreign firms will be producing for the host market). 
 
 Van Parys et al. (2010) did an enquiry into the effectiveness of tax incentives in twelve 
Western and Central African countries over the period 1994-2006. Using panel data 
econometrics, controlling for fixed effects, they found no robust positive relationship between 
tax holidays and investment attraction. 
 
Bellak and Leibrecht (2005) in a study on Central and East European Countries found that 
corporate tax rates were lowered in the region in a quest to attract international capital. Using 
panel data econometrics of 35 bilateral country relationships in the period 1995-2002 the study 
revealed that the semi-elasticity tax rates on capital movement between trading countries was -
2.93. This shows that lowering tax rates has been successful in attracting FDI in the region. 
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These studies in different economic regions show that there is no solid conclusion on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives and results differ according to the regions and methodology used 
in the study. It is thus important that the SADC region’s data set be put to the test and results on 
the effectiveness of tax incentives in attraction of FDI in the region be produced to help policy 
makers. 
5.6.4 Methodological issues in regional studies 
  
Methodological issues have been significant in the kind of conclusions reached in the study of 
tax incentives for FDI (Sato 2012). Country-specific studies are less effective since tax issues 
are mostly regional and most regions either use taxes for competition or for harmonisation. 
Regional studies which employ panel data econometrics apart from considering many 
economies in one model also have the theoretical power to separate effects of specific actions 
from more general policies (Hsiao 2003). Thus the effects of tax incentives and other incentive 
policies can be separated and bold conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Feld and Heckemeyer (2009) state that most economists have resorted to empirical studies to 
draw conclusions on the effectiveness of tax incentives on FDI attraction. They looked at the 
problem of heterogeneity in the study of taxation, especially the effects of factors such as 
public spending that may moderate the impact of tax differentials. The outcome of their study 
of European countries was that taxation is important in FDI locational decisions.  
 
It is thus imperative that every study that seeks to give instructive results affords careful 
consideration of the methodology to be used. Below is a summary of studies that looked at tax 
incentives for FDI attraction with a focus on regional studies. Emphasis will be on the 
effectiveness of the methodologies that were used. 
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Table 4: Summary of empirical findings on tax incentives and investment and analysis of 
effectiveness of methodologies used 
Author Finding Analysis 
Hassett and Hubbard 
(2002) 
Using 
microeconomic data 
from firms they 
concluded that a 1% 
increase in user cost 
of capital lowers 
investment by 
between 0.5% - 1%. 
Thus since taxes 
increase the user cost 
of capital, tax 
incentives lower the 
cost of capital and 
thus increase 
investment 
The use of microeconomic data limited the 
study from including other locational 
characteristics which attract FDI such as 
macroeconomic environment, infrastructure 
and institutions. Thus, the result cannot be 
relied on for policy formulation. 
Sato (2012) Main conclusion was 
that current 
investment is 
influenced by 
previous year 
investment and taxes 
were found to 
negatively affect 
investment thus 
incentives help 
increase investment. 
The study used a panel of 30 OECD 
countries over the period 1985-2007. The 
study used the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation of panel 
method recognising that current investments 
are affected by previous year investments 
and concentrated on macroeconomic 
variables as other determinants, ignoring 
effects of infrastructure and institutions. A 
long-panel series is also spurious thus panel 
unit roots could have improved the reliability 
of estimators. Testing for unit roots in panel 
data is important for assessing whether the 
first-differenced GMM estimator is identified 
or other estimators need to be considered 
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(Baltagi & Kao 2000). 
Bolnick (2004) The study concludes 
that the costs of tax 
incentives are larger 
than benefits in the 
SADC. Tax 
incentives were also 
found to be more 
effective in some 
SADC countries than 
in others. Non-tax 
factors were found to 
be more effective 
than tax factors in 
FDI attraction in the 
SADC. 
The study does not use quantitative 
econometrics analysis to draw conclusions 
on the effectiveness of non-tax incentives. 
Conclusions on tax incentives’ effectiveness 
were drawn using the marginal effective tax 
rate (METR) formula which does not capture 
fully the complexity of tax systems and the 
effect of non-tax factors. Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2005) argue that due to a variety of 
factors that influence FDI it is not practical 
to make deductions from a model that has tax 
incentives and FDI as the only variables. 
This study fills this gap by applying panel 
data econometric models which captures all 
theoretical factors that influence FDI in 
developing countries and addresses 
individual country’s tax effects. 
Sudsawasd (2008) The findings indicate 
that corporate income 
tax rates of East 
Asian countries do 
not have a significant 
impact on the level of 
FDI inflows from the 
30 OECD countries. 
The analysis used the gravity model of 
investment between home and host nation 
and is limited in giving reliable conclusions 
on tax incentives since it relates tax systems 
between countries and ignores the impact of 
lowered tax rates on an individual firm’s 
decision to invest. 
Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha (2005) 
They conclude that 
tax incentives 
influence FDI flows 
into Middle Eastern 
and North African 
(MENA) countries 
and also found 
The study employed a fixed effects model. 
The model included important factors that 
improve the economic competitiveness of a 
country cited in various World Development 
Reports. The model has the shortcoming of 
ignoring the use of Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), which works in a similar 
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infrastructure, 
macroeconomic 
variables, 
institutional variables 
and government 
expenditures to be 
effective in FDI 
attraction. 
way to the Two Stage least squares in 
overcoming problems of endogeneity 
(Baltagi & Kao 2000). However, most of the 
variables were used in this study’s model 
since the SADC region has similar growth 
characteristics to the MENA region. 
  
As noted by Klemm (2009) studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI are 
limited especially in developing countries. The little work that exists is basically descriptive 
and qualitative in nature and based mainly on small sector case studies and thus is not reliable 
to use in policy formulation. This study’s econometric study of tax incentives and FDI 
attraction in the SADC thus goes a long way in establishing bold conclusions about the impact 
of taxation on investment in the broader developing world.  
5.7 Summary and conclusion 
 
The chapter discussed the impact of tax incentives in attracting foreign mobile capital. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that there is no clear conclusion on the effectiveness 
of tax incentives on FDI location; however, the results differ within the delimitation of the 
study.  
 
Most of the empirical studies that this study explored concluded that though tax incentives 
might be important in attracting FDI they are more effective when combined with other non-tax 
factors. Macroeconomic conditions, infrastructure and strong institutions were found to be 
important non-tax factors that improve the attractiveness of an economy to FDI. Recent 
empirical work found tax incentives to be effective in FDI attraction, given that with massive 
globalisation; locations are becoming more and more similar (Šimović & Žaja 2010). Regional 
integration has necessitated harmonisation and coordination of economic policies in regional 
groupings such as the SADC, the European Union, ECOWAS and the African Union. The 
convergence in economic policies and economic growth has made regional countries perfect 
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substitutes for investors, thus fiscal incentives are becoming increasingly important in 
competing for investment.  
 
The major weaknesses of using taxes in attracting FDI were discussed using the tax 
competition and tax harmonisation framework. Here it was noted that the use of tax incentives 
to attract FDI might improve the welfare of individuals in the jurisdiction that apply the 
incentives, but have external cost implications for residents in other competing jurisdictions 
that do not adopt tax incentives. Thus, tax incentives were seen to reduce the overall welfare of 
residents in a region. Tax harmonisation has thus dominated the order in regional integration 
economics, where regions seek to collectively lure internationally mobile capital. 
 
This study thus sought to find answers for the SADC economies on if and how tax incentives 
help in attracting FDI. The study also sought to use panel econometrics to find the factors that 
influence FDI flow into the SADC by including tax and non-tax factors in the model. Panel 
data was able to include all stylised factors that impact FDI flows into developing countries. 
This reduced the size of the error term in model estimation and at the same time established a 
number of factors that impact or do not impact FDI flows in the SADC. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TAX INCENTIVES FOR INVESTMENT IN THE SADC 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Bird (2008) argues that for one to assess the effectiveness of a tax system and give meaningful 
suggestions for improving a national tax process it is important to study the environment in 
which it operates and the institutional and legal systems that govern the tax process. There are: 
three important factors that determine the success of a tax system. These are political will in tax 
administration, a clear strategy of achieving results and enough resources to administer the tax 
process (Bird 2008).   
Šimović and Žaja (2010) state that although a significant number of studies have concluded that 
tax incentives are not important in attracting investment, the importance of effective tax 
systems cannot be over-emphasised and thus countries should seek to institute good tax 
systems if they wish to attract investment. The importance of tax systems is highlighted by the 
effects of globalisation which indicate that investment locations are becoming more similar and 
competitive. 
 
Tuomi (2011) argues that empirical evidence shows greater economic growth in East Asian 
economies that are open to FDI than in Latin American countries that run protected economies. 
This evidence has caused a paradigm shift in economic policies towards more open FDI 
initiatives in most economies. It has also prompted the establishment of investment promotion 
agencies in most countries that run a variety of incentives that seek to attract investors, chief 
amongst them being tax incentives (Tuomi 2011). 
 
This chapter provides an overview of investment tax incentives throughout the SADC region, 
based on country-specific information from the SADC tax database, IMF staff reports and other 
up to date sources.  There are a number of tax incentives that countries can use which are: 
value-added tax, corporate income tax, property-tax, royalty payments, import-tariffs, sales-
taxes, tax-holidays, grants, depreciation allowances, enhanced deduction and special 
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investment allowance (Boura, Koumanakos & Georgopoulos 2006). Thus, this chapter will also 
conduct an analysis of the incentive structure employed by each SADC country. 
 
Šimović and Žaja (2010) state that there are many tax incentives used across the world 
implemented within the framework of different tax reforms. Public sector economists refer to 
lowering corporate income taxes (CIT) as tax incentives. Šimović and Žaja (2010) give three 
broad classes of tax incentives, namely: tax holidays, reduced CIT and investment incentives. 
Investment incentives include commonly used incentives such as accelerated depreciation, 
investment allowances and investment tax credits. 
 
The rest of the chapter will be structured as follows: section 6.2 will discuss various tax 
incentives used across the world economies, section 6.3 will look at those tax incentives used in 
the SADC economies and how they are implemented in these countries and section 6.4 will 
look at the major factors that have affected effective implementation of tax incentives in the 
SADC. Section 6.5 will present the conclusions from the chapter analysis. 
6.2 Tax incentives used across the world
2
 
 
Governments across the world have used various types of tax instruments to reduce the 
effective tax rates faced by investors in a bid to attract investment [United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2000]. 
6.2.1 Tax holidays 
 
Tax holidays are the most widely used tax incentive in the developing world, including the 
SADC region. (UNCTAD 2000) defines tax holidays as an incentive whereby governments 
exempt new foreign establishments from paying CIT for a specified period of time, in most 
cases for five years. The tax holiday provision may be applied to other tax liabilities the firm 
faces, for example VAT and import duties on raw materials. Exemptions on tax holidays are 
temporary and in most cases the firms’ tax administration is waived during the period of the 
holiday (James 2009). Governments can also issue partial holidays with reduced obligation 
rather than full exemption. 
 
                                                          
2
 This section instructs policy makers in the SADC on alternative tax incentives to explore in cases where current 
tax incentives are not viable. 
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The advantages of tax holidays are that they are simple to administer, have low compliance 
costs and reduce the tax liability (Clark, Cebreiro & Böhmer 2007). Tax holidays also give the 
business a chance to minimise interaction with the government. Interaction with the 
government increases the cost of doing business especially if the public employees are corrupt 
(Fletcher 2002). However, the tax holiday may signal to investors that the government’s tax 
administration is corrupt (Keen & Mansour 2009). 
 
Tax holidays, however, have the disadvantages of discriminating new investments from old 
investments and they also allow for tax planning where firms can shift capital from old 
investments into new investments which have the tax holiday treatment (Clark, Cebreiro & 
Böhmer 2007).  Flechter (2002) notes that tax holidays encourage short-term investments and 
give an unfair competitive advantage to new establishments over existing firms.  
 
Tax holidays described as the worst tax incentive in terms of benefits to the host nation are only 
attractive if they are long-term, otherwise they attract footloose industries (Keen & Mansour 
2009). Tax holidays have a big revenue-reducing effect since they promote transfer pricing and 
other financial arrangements, where firms shift taxable income to where it is not taxed (Keen & 
Mansour 2009). For their optimal effectiveness, tax holidays require double tax agreements 
between the host nation and investors’ home nation to avoid double taxation, otherwise tax 
holidays will shift revenues from the host nation to the investors’ home nation (Keen & 
Mansour 2009). Tax holidays also have the major disadvantage of exempting profit tax without 
considering the size of the profit. Governments may suffer huge revenue loss as businesses 
with high returns which encourages production even without a tax holiday will be exempted 
from paying tax (Easson & Zolt 2002). 
 
Tax holidays are attractive only in their initial years otherwise towards the end they are not 
attractive. They also signal the untrustworthiness of a government and firms with long-term 
investment intentions that extend beyond the holiday offer prefer a constant low CIT over a 
longer period to a tax holiday (Keen & Mansour 2009). Tax holidays that target specific sectors 
or regions such as Export Processing Zones (EPZs), may cause huge revenue losses especially 
if targeted areas have existing businesses (Clark 2000). 
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6.2.2 Reduction on CIT rate to specific sectors 
 
Under this tax incentive governments levy lower tax rates in specific sectors or regions with the  
view to attracting FDI into those economic sectors or regions  (UNCTAD 2000). Reduced CITs 
are used in Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Ireland, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Cambodia and Estonia. The incentive may also be used to reward foreign investors who meet 
certain set criteria. Its use in Malaysia in the 1980s however, was unsuccessful (UNCTAD 
2000). 
 
Reduction in CIT in selected sectors has the advantage of reducing the rate of tax on profits.  
The other advantage of this tax incentive is that it benefits large firms who invest in large 
businesses that make a profit even without tax incentives (Fletcher 2002). The disadvantages 
include discriminating against other businesses and increasing the after-tax cost of debt 
financing on government (Clark, Cebreiro & Böhmer 2007). It also has the disadvantage of 
encouraging tax avoidance by investors shifting tax on profits to low taxed investments 
(Fletcher 2002). 
 
The other advantage of reducing CIT in selected activities is that when properly planned by tax 
administrators it acts as a preventative measure to financial planning and repatriation behaviour 
by investors which reduces the host country’s tax base (Clark 2000). Lowering CIT in specific 
regions is common in the SADC and other Sub-Saharan African regions in the form of Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) which have the advantage of providing quality internationally 
competitive infrastructure for the export sector (Keen & Mansour 2009).  
 
EPZs also reduce challenges faced by exporters in obtaining permits and also Value Added Tax 
(VAT) refunds. However, EPZ companies when offered a number of incentives encourage 
pressure groups in other sectors to press government for similar incentives thus affecting the 
revenue collection base (Keen & Mansour 2009).  Lowering CIT in specific sectors has also 
been found to be problematic in terms of tax administration and compliance especially if the 
income targeted is a subset of activities or foreign investment (Clark 2000).  
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There is also the disadvantage of leaking untaxed goods into the economy. This reduces the tax 
base in the economy, therefore lowering CIT in specific sectors that have high revenue loss 
effects (Fletcher 2002). 
6.2.3 Exemption of CIT for export companies 
 
This is a common tax incentive in developing countries as they seek to promote their export 
sectors and improve their external balance. Under this incentive firms producing an export 
product are exempted from paying CIT. Countries such as Mauritius give greater preference if 
the firm produces a product that was formally imported by the country (SADC 2014). 
This form of tax incentive has the advantage of encouraging investors in a host nation to seek 
new markets and improve the host country’s external balance (Clark, Cebreiro & Böhmer 
2007). However, this tax incentive is against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) protocol 
which seeks to ensure fair competition on the international market.  It has the disadvantage of 
discriminating against non-exporters who also have an important role in the economy’s growth 
and development. 
6.2.4 Accelerated capital (investment) allowances 
 
These are deductions offered in the first year of operation to lower the cost of capital hence 
they help to ease the liquidity challenges of an investor (Clark, Cebreiro & Böhmer 2007). Its 
major advantage is that of encouraging industrial growth and investment in new equipment but 
in some cases it has been seen to cause excessive investment in fixed capital leading to ‘white 
elephants’ or unutilised buildings (UNCTAD 2000). 
 
Investment allowances normally lead to revenue losses which are directly related to the amount 
of investment into the economy (Easson & Zolt 2002). Therefore, governments have the 
flexibility to not set minimum investment funds threshholds for qualifying capital.  
 
The disadvantages of this tax incentive is that it distorts the choice of capital in favour of short 
lived capital at the expense of long-term investments which are more beneficial to the economy 
in achieving sustainable growth (Klemm 2010). Capital allowances also favour capital 
intensive investment which compromises employment creation in the economy (Easson & Zolt 
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2002). Investors will also be biased in their choice for physical capital rather than financial. 
Where there are no refunds the incentive is only attractive to highly profitable investments 
(Klemm 2010). 
6.2.5 Investment tax credits 
 
Investment tax credits can operate in two ways flat and incremental (UNCTAD 2000). A flat 
investment tax credit is applied in the form of a fixed percentage on expenditures incurred by 
new investments in a year. In contrast, an incremental investment tax credit has a moving 
average base which is the minimum amount that is not eligible for tax exemption and tax 
exemption is applied to the amount in excess of the base amount as a fixed percentage.  
 
The rationale behind incremental tax credit is to award a tax exemption to additional 
expenditure by the investor that they would have incurred without the tax relief (UNCTAD 
2000).  An investor’s unused tax credits can be carried forward. Most developing countries 
only allow firms to carry forward credits for one year. In some cases the tax credits can be 
converted into cash claims instead of carrying them forward for future tax relief.  
 
The use of tax credits on new investment has the advantage of reducing the marginal effective 
tax rate on new investment by reducing the cost of buying new capital. The reduction in the 
marginal effective tax rate occurs at a minimum loss of tax revenue to government which is 
technically termed “bang-for-the-buck” (Clark  2000). Tax credits benefit both new and old 
capital because they increase the present value of the future income flows from the invested 
capital and so increase the share value of investments (Clark 2000).  Investment tax credits 
have the major plus of not favouring businesses that earn quick profits after set-up (as is the 
case with tax holidays) thanks to the facility for firms to carry forwards tax credits (Easson & 
Zolt 2002). 
 
Tax credits also allow tax authorities to have flexibility in targeting specific economic areas 
(Clark, Cebreiro & Böhmer 2007).  Tax credits as up front tax incentives help to ease the cash 
flow challenges of investors in their early stages of establishment in the host market (Clark 
2000). Fletcher (2002) argues that tax credits are used in areas that have the highest spill-over 
benefits to the economy.  
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Tax credits have disadvantages which include discriminating between old and new investment 
and have a greater impact on short-lived assets which can offset a larger percentage of tax 
revenues on a given stream of earnings.  Tax credits are also subject to abuse by investors in 
cases where earned credits may be converted into monetary earnings (UNCTAD 2000).  
Investors will concentrate on short-lived investments since credits will be given on new 
equipment. Investments that do not qualify may cheat the system by reselling equipment and 
making multiple claims (Fletcher 2002). 
6.2.6 Losses carried forward 
 
This is one of the methods used by governments whose focus is on reducing the corporate tax 
burden on investors. The mechanism gives investors the opportunity to carry forward or 
backward the losses incurred for the purpose of tax accounting for a given number of years 
(normally five years) (UNCTAD 2000). The government under this arrangement will only 
allow a fixed ratio of losses to be carried forward or backwards to discourage inefficiency and 
incompetence on the part of investors.  
 
Loss carried forward tax incentive is given on the assumption that in most cases investors incur 
losses in the initial years due to high set-up costs and market penetration costs thus they need 
tax relief (UNCTAD 2000). Investors then have the advantage of sustaining new investments in 
their early years of establishment where they face challenges and high market penetration costs. 
 
However, this mechanism is at risk of promoting inefficiencies as businesses that make losses 
are rewarded with a subsidy to cover the losses in the form of the tax incentive. This behaviour 
discourages vigorous innovation and strategic behaviour in firm growth culture thus affecting 
growth and development that is inherent in firms that fear loss making.  
6.2.7 Enhanced deduction and accelerated depreciation  
 
Enhanced deductions involve governments deducting from the taxable income an amount based 
on some percentage of the new investment, also called depreciation (UNCTAD 2000). The 
eventual price to the investor investing in new capital will be lowered through the arrangement. 
Enhanced deductions are applied to the tax base thus the benefit to an investor depends on the 
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ratio of CIT to tax base. If the tax rate to tax base ratio is higher, then tax relief due to 
investment allowances will also be higher.  
Enhanced deductions have the advantage of providing firms with a faster and larger write-off 
on qualifying capital (UNCTAD 2000). Enhanced deductions have the disadvantage of 
allowing firms to claim deductions on qualifying capital which are multiples of the actual cost. 
For example the claim can be twice the cost (UNCTAD 2000). 
 
Accelerated depreciation involves a situation where firms are allowed to write-off capital costs 
in a shorter period than the length of the capital’s useful economic life (UNCTAD 2000). This 
is the accounting basis for the depreciating costs.  The effect of this tax incentive is that, while 
it does not change the value of the depreciating cost of capital, it increases the present value of 
the claim by shifting the claim to the time of the investment, while actual capital depreciation 
occurs during the production process. 
 
The advantage of accelerated depreciation is that it does not discriminate against long-lived 
assets (Fletcher 2002). It moves CIT towards consumption taxes thereby reducing distortions 
that are inherent in regular CIT. The revenue loss under accelerated depreciation is very low 
since it is only the timing of the tax payment and not the amount of tax that changes (Easson & 
Zolt 2002). 
 
Since the depreciation costs are claimed on the inception of the investment project before the 
actual depreciation occurs, it has the disadvantage of allowing firms to make a cost claim that is 
above the actual costs they will face with capital depreciation  (UNCTAD 2000). The benefits 
of accelerated depreciation are reduced by inflation (Fletcher 2002). They are therefore not 
effective in developing countries that have high average annual inflation rates. 
 
6.2.8 Preferential treatment of long-term capital gains 
 
This form of tax incentive occurs when the host country offers preferential tax treatment to 
capital held by investors for a specific period of time say six months (UNCTAD 2000). Here 
long-term capital gains will be taxed normally on a half rate compared to short-term capital 
gains. The intention here is to encourage long-term investments which increase the benefits to 
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the host nation, since long-term capital investments promote employment creation and 
sustainable growth. 
 
The preferential treatment of long-term capital has the effect of lowering costs for this form of 
capital, creating economies of scale for the firm who move early into the host nation’s 
industries that require long-term capital. These economies of scale act as a barrier to entry for 
other new competitors in the long-run. The disadvantage is that early movers will enjoy a 
powerful monopoly in the industries that demand long-term capital. The later can have a 
negative impact on the welfare of that society. 
6.2.9 Deductions for qualifying expenses 
 
Once investment is established in a country, governments try to maximise the benefits from the 
investment, hence they try to influence the behaviour of the investors through manipulation of 
the tax system (UNCTAD 2000). This involves reducing the tax burden on activities that confer 
positive externalities to the economy such as research and development (R&D), job training 
expenses and export marketing expenses. 
 
The advantage of this tax incentive is that it promotes innovation through R&D and job training 
and also encourages firms to seek new markets which promote further investments from 
established firms. The disadvantage, however, is that the classification of activities under this 
incentive are too broad and hence subject to manipulation by corrupt public employees.  
6.2.10 Zero or reduced tariffs 
 
Governments can use preferential tariff application to attract investment (UNCTAD 2000). 
This comes in two forms. The first one is when governments reduce or remove tariffs on 
imported capital equipment and spare parts for selected investments. This reduces the cost of 
investment thus encouraging increased investment in selected sectors. Secondly, governments 
can increase tariffs on certain products to protect local infant industries from foreign 
competitions (UNCTAD 2000). In many countries, however, tariff protection has been found to 
encourage inefficiency in protected industries. 
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6.2.11 Employment-based deductions 
 
Employment-based deductions are mainly used by governments seeking investment in certain 
geographic areas where the social security contributions of investors are reduced and their 
overall tax burden lowered (UNCTAD 2000). Bulgaria extended this deduction to employers 
who engage the disabled in an attempt to increase their participation in the economy. 
 
The advantage of this tax incentive is that if employers extend the benefit to their employees it 
increases domestic demand and benefits the overall economy. However, when it is only 
targeted at certain regions, it disadvantages the growth of regions that do not benefit from the 
tax incentive. 
6.2.12 Tax credits for value addition 
 
Most developing countries discourage the export of raw material products and they seek to 
encourage value addition (UNCTAD 2000). Governments offer tax deductions on value 
addition processing with a view to creating capacity for value addition. 
 
The advantage of promoting value addition is that it increases the export earnings and thus 
improves the economy’s external balance. The tax credits have the disadvantage of 
discriminating against businesses that fail to add value to their products, pushing them out of 
the market, leading to job losses. 
6.2.13 Tax reductions/credits for foreign hard currency earnings 
 
Governments encourage inflows of foreign currency in their economies so they may offer 
incentives to firms on earned foreign currency (UNCTAD 2000). The advantage of this tax 
incentive is that it encourages businesses to channel their earned foreign currency through the 
formal market which benefits the growth of the whole economy. The disadvantage is that it 
discriminates against businesses that transact in local currency or that trade with countries with 
weaker currencies. 
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6.3 Tax incentives in the SADC 
 
Section 6.2 described the number of tax incentives used in different economies in order to lure 
foreign investment. These can, however, be categorised into similar incentive structures for 
easy analysis (Šimović & Žaja 2010). For SADC countries this study used four broad 
categories. The first was tax holidays and exemptions, the second category comprised reduced 
CIT in specific sectors, the third tax allowances and tax credits and the fourth accelerated 
depreciation and tax loss relief. These are the incentives familiar to most of the SADC 
countries. A few countries do indeed offer some special incentives.  
 
Based on recent statistical data from the SADC tax database and other recent sources over the 
past 10 years, this section discusses how various tax incentives are used in the SADC. Due to 
the dynamic nature of tax legislation in developing countries it is important to rely on the most 
recent information about SADC countries’ tax developments, thus the key source will be the 
SADC tax database. The following section has aims to reach solid conclusions about the use of 
tax incentives in the SADC. It will look at the similarities or differences in application and the 
areas that receive tax incentive treatments and those that do not. To achieve this chapter’s 
objectives the study will present its findings in the form of tables for easy comparison of the tax 
incentive used in the SADC. 
 
The SADC tax database, the main source of data on cooperation in taxation and related issues, 
was instituted in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between fourteen member states 
excepting Madagascar. Article 2 of the understanding constituted the tax database with 
requirements that every year every member state submit any changes in tax laws for purposes 
of updating the database. Thus the SADC tax database is the most reliable source of recent 
developments in tax incentive issues in the region since section (b) of article 2  of the MOU 
requires that all member states provide data on all tax incentives offered, including 
implementation dates and conditions imposed (SADC 2002). 
6.3.1 Tax holidays and exemptions 
 
Despite criticism, tax holidays remain the most dominant tax incentive, in the SADC due to 
lack of alternative incentives to lure investment, especially non-tax incentives. As we saw in 
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Chapter 2 most foreign investments in the SADC,  are in the primary resources sector which 
receives medium to long-term investments, thus tax holidays are useful in the initial stages of 
establishment. 
Tax holidays are tax exemptions to specific sectors in a given period of time so the study 
analysed them together with other tax exemptions which might not be limited over time. The 
analysis of tax holidays was made difficult mainly because of their similarity with other tax 
incentives that lower CIT (Šimović & Žaja 2010). Thus, combining them with other tax 
exemptions reduced the difficulty. 
Table 5: Tax holidays and exemptions 
Country Type of tax holiday, exemptions and similar incentive 
Angola  Tax holidays: investment in agriculture, health, education and 
transformative industries enjoy a tax holiday of up to 20 years 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). There are exemptions from import duty 
for investments in industrial development (SADC 2014). 
Special zones: these get total exemption from CIT for 5 years 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014).  
 
Botswana  Companies that acquire a development order showing that they 
are critical to economic development enjoy tax holidays 
(Collins Newsman & Company 2013). 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) 
Special zones: the DRC government has three categories of 
investment zones with different tax holidays which have a total 
exemption from paying CIT. Zone A covers the city of 
Kinshasa with a maximum of a 3-year holiday; Zone B  
includes the province of Bas-Congo and the towns of 
Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and Likasi and has a maximum 4-year 
holiday; Zone C is constituted with all the other areas which are 
not categorised in Zones A and B and investments in these 
regions enjoy a tax holiday of up to 5 years (SADC 2014). 
Export incentives: the DRC in seeking to create a favourable 
Balance of Trade (BOT) offers export duties and tax 
exemptions to companies that export semi-finished or finished 
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products (SADC 2014). 
Lesotho  No tax holidays (SADC 2014). 
Madagascar  Export Processing Zones (EPZ): companies under EPZ 
classification enjoy import duty and VAT exemptions for 15 
years (IMF 2007). 
Malawi  No tax holidays (SADC 2014). 
Mauritius  The Mauritian government offers tax-free dividends to 
investors and there are no capital gains taxes. Investors are also 
exempted from paying customs duty and levies on imported 
raw materials (IMF 2013). 
Companies registered under the Mauritian Board of Investment 
enjoy a 5-year tax holiday if engaged in health services (Imara 
Trust 2013). 
Mozambique  
 
Industrial Zones: to foster industrialisation Mozambique offers 
a tax holiday of 10 years to firms in the industrial zone and a 
60% reduction in income tax (SADC 2014). 
 
Namibia  Export Processing Zone (EPZ): industries classified under EPZ 
are exempted from paying taxes and levies in Namibia. 
Manufacturing: enjoys 50% abatement on taxable income for 5 
years, and a linear phasing out of abatement over the following 
10 years (SADC 2014). 
 
Seychelles  No tax holidays in Seychelles (SADC 2014). 
South Africa  No tax holidays in South Africa (SADC 2014). 
Swaziland  Tax holiday: the Minister of Finance is mandated to approve 
tax holidays to new investments in the manufacturing sector. 
These industries must be non-existent in Swaziland and a 
dominant exporter to the economy. Under the tax holiday 150% 
of the tax written down value of fixed assets owned and 
employed by such business at the year-end will be removed 
from CIT (SADC 2014).  
Development enterprises: these are entitled to a tax incentive 
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for 10 years which comprises exemption from withholding tax 
on dividends on approved developmental businesses in 
manufacturing, mining, the export sector and tourism (SADC 
2014). 
Tanzania  Special Zones: Export Processing Zone (EPZ) and the Zanzibar 
Free Economic Zones Authority (ZAFREZA), established to 
promote the export sector. The EPZ and the ZAFREZA were 
established to diversify the Zanzibar economy and thus it is 
dominated by manufacturing industries. It offers a 10-year tax 
holiday followed by a 25% reduction in CIT thereafter. There is 
also exemption from withholding tax and import duty on 
machinery for 10 years. Sales tax/ Value Added Tax (VAT) 
laws do not apply in these zones. They are also exempted from 
paying local authorities levies and taxes (SADC 2014). 
   
Zambia  Special priority investments: investments of more than US$ 10 
million and no less than US$500,000 in the Multi Facility 
Economic Zones (MFEZ) under the Zambian Development 
Agency (ZDA) Act are given a tax holiday. The holiday 
constitutes a zero per cent import duty, no tax on dividends and 
a zero per cent profit tax for 5 years. There is also a deferment 
of VAT (SADC 2014). 
Small enterprises: these are entitled to a 3-year holiday if the 
investment is in an urban area and a 5-year tax holiday for rural 
investments (SADC 2014). 
Agriculture: dividends paid to investors are exempt from tax 
for 5 years (SADC 2014). 
Zimbabwe  Export sector: investments in the export industry are entitled to 
a 5-year tax holiday of zero CIT while a 15% tax rate will be 
applied to the investors’ CIT over following 5 years (SADC 
2014). 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ): holders of the EPZ licence 
receive a 5-year income tax exemption, and 15% will be 
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applied to all taxable income over the following 5 years. They 
are also exempted from capital gains tax. There are duty-free 
import and VAT refunds for EPZ industries (SADC 2014). 
  
Source: prepared by author from various sources cited. 
Tax holidays are widely used in the SADC except in Lesotho, Malawi and Seychelles. Most 
SADC countries use tax holidays in special investment zones, mainly EPZs. The DRC has gone 
a step further and uses tax holidays to attract investments to those regions that are remote or 
under-developed. Zambia also extends holidays in order to develop small to medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Tax holidays in the SADC range from 3 to 20 years. Angola offers the 
longest holiday 20 years to the social services sectors including education and health. The 20-
year tax holiday in Angola also extends to the agricultural sector. The trend in tax holiday 
applications in the SADC clearly shows that governments fight to avoid abuse of this tax 
incentive facility. Tax holidays are thus dominant in the export sector where economies seek to 
benefit in improving the external balance.  The health sectors in Mauritius and Angola are also 
incentivised with tax holidays. 
 
Industrialisation is also an important consideration to most SADC countries offering tax 
incentives. Thus, tax holidays are offered for the development of the manufacturing sector in 
countries such as Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia. Zambia offers tax holidays in the 
agricultural sector to improve food security and increase economic diversification after years of 
reliance on copper mining. 
6.3.2 Reduction in CIT, royalties and VAT rate to specific sectors 
 
Reducing CIT, royalties and VAT in strategic sectors is common in developing countries, 
especially in sectors that have positive economic externalities to other sectors of the economy. 
Due to similarities in the resource endowments (see Chapter 2) of most countries in the SADC 
a reduction in CIT would attract investment away from neighbouring competitors. Reduced 
CIT has long-term benefits and is favourable to investments that last for a long period 
especially in the primary resources sector which constitutes common investments in the SADC. 
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The SADC region has vast mineral resources and thus most investments would benefit from 
reduced CIT, royalties and VAT in the mining sector. 
Table 6: Reduced CIT, royalties and VAT rate to specific sectors 
Country CIT rates in specific sectors  
Angola Industrial tax rate: Angola grants a 50% reduction in industrial tax 
for 5 years, applied at the beginning of the financial year following 
the inception of the operation of the investment (SADC 2014). 
Botswana  Manufacturing rate: Botswana government established the 
manufacturing development approval order in 1995 which sought to 
develop manufacturing through low CIT. Under the scheme 
companies defined as manufacturing firms are taxed at a rate of 15% 
of all taxable income (SADC 2014). 
General CIT rates: Botswana in a bid to develop its private sector, 
levies low tax rates, which is meant to encourage reinvestment by 
established firms. For example, companies classified under the 
International Financial Services Centre are taxed at a rate of 15% of 
their worldwide income and are exempted from withholding tax 
distribution (SADC 2014). 
 
  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
Mining tax rate: DRC has lowered tax rates in mining and dividends 
paid to shareholders of a mine are taxed at a rate of 10%, instead of 
the rate of 20% applicable in common right. Taxes on profits from 
mining are taxed at a rate of 30%, instead of the rate of 40% 
applicable in common right (SADC 2014). 
Income tax: income earned from the new investments is exempted 
from business tax (SADC 2014). 
 
Lesotho  
Manufacturing tax rate: manufacturing activities are exempted from 
withholding tax on dividends (SADC 2014).  
Agriculture: agricultural activities have a concessional tax rate of 
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15% which is also extended to manufacturing activities (SADC 
2014). 
Madagascar  EPZ companies enjoy a reduced statutory tax rate of 15% (IMF 
2007). 
Malawi  Export Processing Zone: Malawi offers a 0% CIT for industries in 
the EPZ, 100% duty free imports on raw materials is also extended. 
EPZ companies also do not pay dividend tax and surtax (SADC 
2014). 
Industrial sites: enjoy a 15% investment allowance (SADC 2014). 
Mauritius  Mauritius gives foreign businesses an option of a lowered CIT of 
15% instead of the standard 25%. This was constituted to start in the 
sector after the termination of the tax holidays law in June 2008 
(Bolnick 2004). 
Mozambique New technologies: investments into new technologies enjoy an 
income tax rebate of up to 15% (SADC 2014). 
 
Namibia Manufacturing: registered manufacturing industries are taxed at 18% 
(SADC 2014). 
Seychelles Agricultural and Marine Resources Investment, industrial and 
manufacturing investment, professional services investment, small 
scale industrial development and tourism industry are taxed at 15% 
in excess of 24, 000 Seychelles Rupee (SADC 2014).  
South Africa Small to medium enterprises development: these enjoy an 
establishment grant payable for three years, worth 10.5% of 
qualifying assets; profit/output incentive, calculated at 25% of profit 
before tax, payable for an additional year; an additional two-year 
profit/output incentive provided the industrialist can meet or exceed 
the human resource remuneration to value-added ratio of 55% 
measured in the fourth financial year. 
EPZ: industries under EPZ classification are exempted from VAT on 
inputs of Industrial Development Zone (IDZ) companies sourced 
from the domestic economy and for export processing purposes. 
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They are also exempted from property tax and have unrestricted duty 
free inputs (SADC 2014). 
Swaziland Development companies: a tax concession on corporate tax at the 
maximum rate of 10% (SADC 2014). 
Tanzania  Agricultural development: there is a VAT exemption, reduced CIT, 
taxed at a rate of 30%; withholding tax on interest on foreign sourced 
loan is 0% (SADC 2014). 
Mining: VAT exemption and 30% CIT; mines do not pay capital 
gains tax and diamond mines pay a royalty of 3% instead of the 
standard 5% (SADC 2014). 
Economic infrastructure and tourism: import duty is zero and VAT is 
deferred (not paid); Corporation tax is 30% (standard rate); Capital 
allowance is 100%; withholding tax on interest on a foreign sourced 
loan is 0%; withholding tax on dividends is 10% (SADC 2014). 
Petroleum gas: a tax exemption on all petroleum investment 
expenditure (SADC 2014). 
Zambia Agriculture: enjoys a VAT deferment on equipment imports, income 
is taxed at a reduced rate of 15%. Import duty on irrigation 
equipment is 0%. Customs duty for vitamin additives for animal 
feeds is 5% (SADC 2014). 
Manufacturing: income from chemical manufacturing of fertilizers is 
taxed at a reduced rate of 15%. Income from fertilizer manufacturing 
is taxed at 15%. Import duty on various textile products is 0%. 
Import duty on the equipment used in assembling motor vehicles, 
trailers, motorcycles and bicycles is reduced (SADC 2014). 
Mining: any mining company which holds a large-scale mining 
licence to mine base metals is taxed at 30%, whilst other mining 
companies are taxed at 35%. Dividends paid by a company in large 
scale mining of base metal are not taxed (SADC 2014). 
General: registered businesses are allowed to re-claim 20 per cent of 
input VAT paid on petrol. Income from non-traditional exports is 
taxed at a reduced rate of 15% (SADC 2014). 
Tourism: no VAT payment for accommodation in Livingstone and 
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all tour packages in the country. VAT refunds to tourist on selected 
items (SADC 2014). 
 
Zimbabwe Industrial park developer: The CIT rate of tax on such operations is 
zero for the first five years of operation and is 15% thereafter (SADC 
2014). 
Source: prepared by author from various sources cited. 
The SADC database and other recent sources testify to all the SADC countries offering reduced 
CIT, royalties and VAT in specific sectors. The reduction of tax in specific sectors is preferred 
in the SADC because countries seek to attract long-term investments that last beyond the 
standard tax holiday period of 5 years. 
SADC countries offer reduced CIT, royalties and VAT with the view to developing the mining 
and manufacturing sectors in particular. These are sectors that have greater benefits to 
developing economies in terms of employment creation and economic growth. South Africa 
also uses the incentive to develop the SMEs’ sector.  
Tanzania and Seychelles also use lowered CIT in agricultural development with Seychelles 
concentrating on developing marine agriculture. Zambia encourages tourism development 
using the reduced CIT incentive while Botswana extends the tax incentive to the financial 
development sector. 
Royalties are charges by the host nation’s government to compensate for the depletion of 
natural resources. The mining sector in the SADC region charges royalties. The standard rate of 
royalties on minerals in the SADC is 5%, while Tanzania charges a royalty fee of 3% on 
minerals as an incentive to the industry. 
6.3.3 Tax allowances, tax credits or similar incentives 
 
Tax allowances and tax credits are incentives that target selected investments (Šimović & Žaja 
2010). However, since they are costly to administer they are more common in developed 
countries than in developing countries. Thus, tax holidays and reduced CIT are the more 
dominant tax incentives in developing countries. However, some aspects of these tax incentives 
156 
 
are used in the SADC. Table 7 below describes how some SADC countries apply these 
incentives. 
Table 7: Tax allowances, tax credits or similar incentives 
Country Type of tax allowances, tax credits or similar incentives 
Angola Taxes incurred abroad enjoy tax credits in Angola (NexiaSAB&T 
2014). 
Botswana Industrial development: Botswana offers a tax allowance of 25% for 
construction or purchase of any new industrial building. The 
allowance is also extended to any improvements or repairs to an 
existing industrial building (SADC 2014). 
Employment deductions: to encourage on-the-job training Botswana 
allows 200% deduction on companies’ training expenses (SADC 
2014). 
DRC Investment promotion: an investment promotion tax is used in DRC to 
promote foreign investment; it provides credits and credit facilities to 
businesses (SADC 2014). 
Research and Development (R&D) allowances: R&D expenditures 
are allowed tax concessions which are redeemable after two years; 
however, they are actualised on the day of R&D initiation. The 
allowance involves a provision for tax credit on an amount not 
exceeding 5% of taxable income which has a provision of use in 5 
years (SADC 2014). 
Employment credits: holders of mining rights have an employment 
credit on expatriate staff whose earnings are taxed at a rate of 10% 
instead of 33% applied on common right. Firms under small to 
medium enterprises (SMEs) are allowed to deduct from their taxable 
income expenditures incurred in undertaking on-the-job training 
(SADC 2014). 
 
Lesotho  Start-up costs: an amortisation deduction is allowed for expenditure 
incurred in starting up a business to produce income subject to tax as 
if it were incurred for a depreciable asset (SADC 2014). 
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Research and experimental costs: a deduction is allowed for research 
and development expenditure (SADC 2014). 
Approved training expenditure: a deduction of 125% incurred for 
training or tertiary education is allowable (SADC 2014). 
Investment incentives: a dividend paid by a resident company shall 
not be included in the gross income of a resident shareholder. 
Expatriate taxpayers: are not taxed on property income derived from a 
foreign source or from disposal of an investment asset generating 
foreign-source income (SADC 2014).  
Madagascar   New investments are granted a tax credit of 75% (IMF 2007). 
Malawi  Manufacturing development: manufacturing exporters under bond 
enjoy a transport tax allowance of 25% on all international transport 
costs (SADC 2014). 
Capital costs are deducted from taxable income on manufacturing 
investment in the first year of operation (Nsiku 2013). 
100 % investment allowance is granted to manufacturing companies 
deducted from operation costs for initial 25 months (Nsiku 2013). 
Mauritius  Tax allowances include annual allowances and investment allowances 
(Ocraworldwide 2014). Manufacturing companies are offered 
additional allowances for acquiring new technology equipment 
(SADC 2014). 
Mozambique  A tax credit on investments of 5% is offered for 5 financial years until 
the investment becomes competitive. Investments in new technologies 
are given a tax rebate of 15% of the tax base (SADC 2014). 
Purchase of fixed assets: to register a sale or purchase of fixed assets 
for industrial development, an agro-industrial establishment or the 
hotel industry a 50% reduction is given on transfer duty in the first 3 
years of the start of an investment (SADC 2014). 
Namibia  Namibia allows tax deductions on EPZ industries expenditure in 
international trade costs (SADC 2014). 
Manufacturing firms: enjoy a 25% tax deduction of training expenses 
and wages and an 80% allowance on taxable income derived from 
export manufacturing. A manufacturer earning income from its 
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product abroad is entitled to an additional 25% tax relief 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Tax allowance is given to buildings used for trade and manufacturing 
at the rate of 20% per annum (NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Special building allowance: tax on building expenditure is written off 
at 20% in the first year and the balance at 8% for 10 years (SADC 
2014). 
Seychelles  Has no tax concessions for FDI but has export incentives (Goyal & 
Chai 2008). 
South Africa  Industrial development: South African government awards a tax 
allowance on new investments up to a maximum of R900 million. 
There is also a training allowance up to a maximum of R30 million 
per project. The allowances are deducted from taxable income (SADC 
2014). 
Swaziland Industrial development: there is an annual allowance of 4% of the 
total cost of renovating or constructing an industrial building deducted 
from the total taxable income per annum. The 4% is in addition to the 
initial allowance of 50% allowed on newly constructed buildings or 
improvements, provided the building is for an industrial setup (SADC 
2014). 
Hotels: enjoy an annual allowance of 4% on capital expenditure. This 
is in addition to the initial allowance of 50% on a new set-up. 
Employee housing: an initial 20% allowance can be claimed on 
building employee dwellings and an additional 10% for 8 years. 
Exporters: can claim deductions of up to 150% for expenditures on 
export products (SADC 2014). 
Tanzania  Agriculture: capital allowance is 100%; withholding tax on interest on 
foreign sourced loans is 0%; withholding tax on dividends is 10%. 
Mining: capital allowance is 100% and residential and non-residential 
withholding tax on technical services is 3% (SADC 2014). 
An initial tax allowance of 50% is granted to businesses in farming, 
mining and tourism (NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Zambia  Industrial development: capital allowances on industrial buildings 
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used for the purposes of manufacturing shall be entitled to a deduction 
of 10% in case of low-cost housing and 5% for other industrial 
buildings, calculated on the cost of the building capital expenditure. 
Capital expenditure on an industrial building is entitled to an 
investment allowance at 10% of such expenditure in the first year 
used for manufacturing purposes (SADC 2014). 
Tourism:  capital allowances at 50% of the cost of plant and 
machinery.  Investment allowance at 10% of the cost of an extension 
to a hotel (being an industrial building). 10% initial allowance on an 
extension to a hotel (being an industrial building) in the year the 
building is first brought into use (SADC 2014). 
Zimbabwe  Tax-payer carrying trades at growth points enjoy a tax deduction of 15 
% (SADC 2014).  
Source: prepared by author from various cited sources. 
Tax allowances and tax credits are used extensively in all SADC countries except Seychelles 
which only extends the incentive to the export sectors (as shown in Table 7). This is so because 
they may be easily applied to selected investments. Tax allowances are mainly extended to the 
industrial sectors of the SADC, because they are more effective than tax holidays in lowering 
the effective tax rate over a longer period. 
Botswana and the DRC extend tax allowances to employment creation while Swaziland has tax 
allowances for employee housing. Thus, these tax incentives are for the social benefits of the 
population. In Zambia and Swaziland tax allowances are used in the tourism sector with 
emphasis on hotel construction, thus they are mainly capital allowances. SADC (2004) 
suggested that tax credits in the region be used to fulfil the double taxation treaties.  
6.3.4 Accelerated depreciation and tax loss relief 
 
Accelerated depreciation is calculated in accordance with the standard accounting procedures 
(Šimović & Žaja 2010). Thus, tax loss relief is more dominant in developing countries than the 
accelerated depreciation which is complex to operate. Bolnick (2004) suggests that the pattern 
and depreciation rate is not known and arbitrary. However, the straight line method is 
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commonly used on assets over a long period of time. Bolnick (2004) proposes the use of the 
declining balance model as the standard in their tax code and conclude that a write-off which is 
faster than the declining balance model can be considered as a tax incentive. 
Table 8: Accelerated depreciation and tax loss relief 
Country Accelerated depreciation & 
method 
Tax loss relief 
Angola Depreciation of fixed assets for tax reduction is 
done using the straight line method 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Losses incurred are 
carried forward for tax 
purposes for 3 years 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Botswana  To cushion companies whose business is capital 
intensive, 100% of the mining capital 
expenditure made in the year in which such 
expenditure was incurred is allowed as a 
deduction from the assessable income of the 
business (SADC 2014).  
Agriculture: with regard to farming, any works of 
a capital nature that are incurred in the 
development of farming business is claimable in 
the year in which that expenditure is incurred 
(SADC 2014). 
Unlimited carry forwards 
of losses (SADC 2014). 
DRC The holder of mining rights is allowed to apply 
an accelerated depreciation method where 60% 
of the cost prices of permanent assets are 
deducted, from the first year, on condition, 
however, that it was about tied-up capital whose 
service life is at least 4 years and at most 20 
years (SADC 2014). 
Investments in socio-economic infrastructure 
such as schools, hospitals, sports installations and 
roads, made in addition to the approved projects, 
are depreciable using the sliding scale method 
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(SADC 2014). 
 
Lesotho The depreciation is applied as follows: 
25% on automobiles, taxis, light general purpose 
trucks, tractors for use-over the road, special 
tools and devices. 
20% on office furniture, fixtures and equipment; 
computers and peripheral equipment and data 
handling equipment buses; heavy general 
purpose trucks; trailers and trailer mounted 
containers; construction equipment. 
10% on any depreciable asset not included in 
another group. 
5% on railroad cars and locomotives and railroad 
equipment; vessels, barges, tugs and similar 
water transportation equipment; industrial 
buildings; engines and turbines; public utility 
plants (SADC 2014). 
 
Madagascar  Offers various deductions and allowances under 
accelerated depreciation (Deloitte 2014). 
Losses are carried 
forward for five years 
(Deloitte 2014) 
Malawi  Accelerated depreciation is done as an outright 
deduction of certain capital costs (SADC 2014). 
Losses carried forward 
up to seven years (Nsiku 
2013). 
Mauritius  Accelerated depreciation is on acquisition of new 
plant and machinery in industrial growth and 
development. 100% accelerated depreciation rate 
in the first year for aircraft companies 
(Ocraworldwide 2014) 
Losses are carried 
forward for 5 years 
(Deloitte 2014). 
Mozambique  New buildings enjoy accelerated depreciation as 
tax benefits for investment (SADC 2014). 
Resident companies are 
allowed to carry forward 
capital losses for 5 years 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
162 
 
Namibia  No depreciation is allowed for taxation in 
Namibia (Hills 2013).  
 
Seychelles  Accelerated depreciation on new investment is 
applied as follows: 
Industrial and manufacturing, small scale 
industries and tourism development, year 1 is 
45%, year 2 is 40%, year 3 is 30%, year 4 is 25% 
and year 5 is 10%. 
Agricultural and marine resources investment 
and professional services, year 1 is 45%, year 2 is 
40%, year 3 is 20% year 4 is 15% and year 5 is 
5% (SADC 2014). 
 
South Africa EPZ: Companies under EPZ enjoy accelerated 
depreciation allowances (SADC 2014). 
Losses are carried 
forward to the next year 
in the trade industry 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Swaziland A 50% allowance is given on the cost of 
machinery used in manufacturing in addition to 
deductions of wear and tear; this is also extended 
to infrastructural development (SADC 2014). 
The other accelerated depreciation is under tax 
holidays for new investments in the 
manufacturing sector where 150% of the tax 
written down value of fixed assets at the year-end 
owned and employed by such business is 
removed from CIT (SADC 2014).   
 
Tanzania  Wear and tear: this applies to capital used for 
business and the accelerated depreciation applies 
as follows: 
Class I: Heavy, self-propelled machinery 
calculated at 37.5% per annum. 
Class II: Light, self-propelled machinery 
Agriculture: losses are 
carried forward for 5 
years. 
Mining: losses are 
carried forward for an 
unrestricted period. 
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including aircraft is calculated at 25% per 
annum. 
Class III: Non self-propelled machinery 
including ships is calculated at 12.5% per annum 
(SADC 2014). 
 
Economic infrastructure: 
losses are carried 
forward for 5 years 
(SADC 2014). 
 
Zambia  Normal wear and tear deductions apply (SADC 
2014). 
 
Zimbabwe   Export development 
expenditure gets a 15% 
deduction during 
exploration. Losses in 
manufacturing are 
carried forward to the 
following year 
(NexiaSAB&T 2014). 
Source: Prepared by author from various sources cited. 
Table 8 shows that accelerated depreciation is more widely used in the SADC region than tax 
loss relief. The period allowed for losses to be carried forward ranges from one year to an 
unlimited period. Botswana and Tanzania offer mining sector investments unlimited time to 
carry losses incurred forward. Zimbabwe and South Africa’s trade industry have one-year 
losses carried forwards while Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania in their agriculture and 
financial infrastructure have five-year losses carried forward. Losses carried forward are 
common in the mining sector which attracts huge capital in the initial set-up period thus 
government should allow losses carried forward to be offset by future profits (SADC 2004).  
Namibia and Zimbabwe do not have accelerated depreciation while many sectors in Lesotho, 
Tanzania and Seychelles do, in order to attract FDI.  
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6.4 Challenges faced by SADC countries in operating tax incentives 
 
Tax policies across the world are an important for ensuring fiscal stability. Tax incentives fall 
into the tax policy category and thus their design and implementation are constrained by the 
need to achieve best tax policy practices by nations.  Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002) argue that the 
increased use of tax incentives in developing countries reduces tax revenue; this has affected 
effective implementation of tax incentives especially in the SADC. This is so because in most 
SADC countries corporate income tax is a major source of revenue in the wake of high 
unemployment rates in the region. 
The other major challenge in SADC member states in tax incentives design and implementation 
is the need to achieve cooperation in economic policy operation in the region including tax 
cooperation and macroeconomic convergence (Chipeta & Schade 2007). The SADC 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) of 2002 sought to achieve cooperation in taxation 
issues. It requires that countries design their tax incentives with set requirements. The 
requirements include avoiding harmful tax competition, avoiding policies that prejudice 
another member state’s economic policies, activities or the regional mobility of goods, services, 
capital or labour (SADC 2002). Thus, the need to achieve tax cooperation in the region has 
limited the application of tax incentives by member states.  This has been successful especially 
in the mining sector where tax incentives in the SADC countries are in the same range showing 
that there is no competition for foreign capital (Mthega & Oshokoya 2011). 
 
The implementation of most tax incentives in the SADC has been affected by the lack of 
political will which is largely the result of earlier attempts to use tax incentives in FDI 
attraction to EPZ areas. The Development Policy Research Unit (2000) reports that most SADC 
countries sought to attract FDI to the export sector using the EPZ concept which was a 
monumental failure in all countries except Mauritius. 
 
Governments in the SADC have also been under pressure from their citizens to give priority to 
local businesses over foreign businesses. In Zimbabwe, the indigenisation law has made the 
application of tax incentives to FDI difficult as it requires locals to own 51% shares in all 
investments that exploit natural resources. In Zambia, the state participation in the mining 
sector is huge which affects the entry of foreign firms to the industry. In South Africa and 
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Namibia there are Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies which encourage increased 
participation of the indigenous black majority in economic activities. 
 
We have seen that the SADC countries face challenges in administering and implementing tax 
incentive policies effectively. Table 9 below will discuss implementation challenges individual 
SADC countries face in operating tax incentives laws. Information on these challenges is not 
publicly available but the facts in Table 9 indicate the extent of the challenges.  
 
 Zee, Stotsky and Levy (2002) identify three pillars that guide the successful use and 
implementation of tax incentives which are: their objectives, cost effectiveness and 
transparency. An analysis of these challenges will be conducted according to the conditions 
countries face in operating the tax incentives which limit the ability to achieve these conditions 
especially transparency in administration of tax incentives and cost effectiveness. The 
aforementioned pillars assist governments in amassing the maximum benefits from tax 
incentives in terms of minimising loss in revenue by lowering tax rates and at the same time 
attracting more investment. 
 
Table 9: Individual SADC country challenges in implementing tax incentives 
Country  Bottlenecks in implementation of tax incentives 
Angola  Conflicting objectives: whilst the Angolan government 
prioritises incentives that attract FDI, the need to increase 
no-oil revenue has affected the implementation of tax 
incentives (Fjeldstad, Jensen & Orre 2012). Furthermore, 
the tax base is under developed and there is an over reliance 
on tax revenue by government (Anderson 2013). 
Procedure: the effectiveness of tax incentives in Angola is 
affected by the cumbersome procedures of obtaining 
licences which lead to red tape and corruption (Fjeldstad, 
Jensen & Orre 2012). Angola is rated 172 out of 185 in the 
2013 Doing Business Report (World Bank 2013), indicating 
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that starting business operations in Angola is a challenge. 
The Angolan National Agency for Private Investment 
(ANIP): the agency has the discretion to offer tax incentives 
to investments that are considered to have high economic 
and social impact (United States Department of State 2014). 
This exposes the process to corruption since those with the 
discretion to offer incentives can demand bribes before they 
process the benefits. 
Botswana Botswana is a success story in tax incentive administration 
with the lowest tax rate of 19.5% in Sub-Saharan Africa 
where the average was 68% in 2012 (AfDB 2012). The 
implemented tax incentives in Botswana are: a lowered CIT 
rate of 15% on profit; tax exemption on withholding tax on 
interest, VAT, capital gains tax, dividends, management 
fees and royalties paid to a non-resident, and a 200% tax 
training rebate (AfDB 2012).  Botswana is one of the SADC 
countries that has strong institutions and has implemented 
tax incentives successfully (KPMG International 2012). 
Corruption in Botswana is very low due to restrictive 
legislation and also government employees are paid on time 
and a living wage. This helps in maintaining efficient 
administration and the implementation of tax incentives 
(KPMG international 2012). 
DRC The major challenge in the DRC is a shortage of institutions 
to govern tax incentives (Fossat & Bua 2013). Investors 
who wish to benefit from tax incentives apply to the 
National Agency for Investment Promotion (ANAPI) who 
then submits the application to the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning (KPMG 2014). This creates red tape in tax 
incentive applications and thus investors will not easily 
benefit.  The DRC also has a weak public sector tax 
monitoring and design unit which renders the tax system 
complex and opaque (AfDB 2013). 
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Lesotho Lesotho is one of the SADC countries that has well 
organised structures for FDI attraction. The Lesotho 
National Development Corporation (LNDC) is responsible 
for designing policies to attract investment. The US 
Department of State (2010) reports that public sector 
corruption, including bribery of public officials, remains a 
minor challenge for US firms operating in Lesotho. The 
strong anti-corruption legislation has helped the efficient 
operation of tax policies. However, Lesotho has institutional 
constraints in the management of fiscal issues (AfDB 2008). 
Madagascar Madagascar is reported to have a weak tax administration 
which affects revenue collection and incentives 
implementation (IMF 2007). Corruption is high in 
Madagascar and tax administration is one of the areas with 
high corruption which limits the effectiveness of tax 
incentive implementation (US Department of State, 2014). 
Malawi The implementing agents of tax incentives in Malawi are 
ministries that administer the sectors (Nsiku 2013). This 
creates red tape and corruption in tax administration and 
there is a need to centralise the system for uniformity in tax 
incentives application. The US Department of State (2014) 
notes that tax incentives in Malawi which are based on the 
principle of spending first and claiming later are hardly 
beneficial due to an inefficient public service and corruption 
in tax administration.  
Mauritius  Investments enjoy a lowered CIT rate in Mauritius and firms 
with a Global Business Licence are exempt from taxation to 
avoid double taxation (Moore Stephens International 2014). 
Mauritius has vibrant institutions to manage foreign 
investments and is one of Africa’s success stories in FDI 
attraction using EPZs (Moore Stephens International 2014). 
The Doing Business Report ranks Mauritius 1
st
 in Africa 
and 20
th
 in the world on ease of doing business (World Bank 
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2014). 
Mozambique  There are accountability challenges in the management of 
tax incentives which limit their effectiveness (Fjeldstad and 
Heggstad 2011). Institutional capacity to implement tax 
incentive policies is constrained and the multiplicity of 
investment agencies with overlapping roles also present a 
challenge (OECD 2013).  
Namibia  The implementation of tax incentives is affected by the 
government objective to broaden the tax base (IMF 2013).  
Tax incentives in Namibia are constrained by the fact that 
tax revenue is the main source of revenue to the government 
(AfDB 2014). Thus, Namibia has one of the highest 
corporate tax rates (over 30%) in the SADC (AfDB 2014). 
The public administration in Namibia has skills shortages 
and there is excessive bureaucracy which affects policy 
implementation and administration (Odhiambo & Honde 
2014). 
Seychelles  Seychelles is one of the SADC countries with strong 
institutions to allow FDI into the country. The US 
Department of State (2014) notes that Seychelles investment 
policies encourage development of infrastructure and 
exploitation of natural resources in an environmentally 
friendly manner. The Seychelles economy depends heavily 
on fisheries and tourism and the tax incentive structures in 
these sectors are well designed under the Fisheries 
Incentives Act and the Tourism Incentives Act (US 
Department of State 2014). 
Swaziland Swaziland is beset with the problem of fiscal imbalances 
which has over the years constrained the nation’s fiscal 
space hence the need to improve the revenue base 
(Basdevant, Forrest & Mircheva 2013). This affects the 
wide application of tax incentives. High levels of corruption 
in Swaziland also impact on their overall investment 
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performance (KPMG 2012). The performance and 
implementation of tax incentives is ineffective with a 
corrupt bureaucracy (OECD 2011). 
South Africa  There is a heavy tax burden on investors hence low FDI in 
South Africa (Kransdorff 2010). The problems in 
implementing tax incentives are caused by a confusing large 
number of implementing agents which include: National 
Treasury, Department of Trade and Industry, South African 
Revenue Services and a number of semi-autonomuos 
government agencies such as Khula, Industrial Development 
Coorporation, National Research Foundation and 
International Trade Administration Commission (Kransdorff 
2010).  
The Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003, 2007) 
which seeks to improve black population participation in the 
economy also reduces the effective implementation of FDI 
attraction incentives (Tuomi 2011). 
Bureaucracy and lack of political will to implement policy 
changes are just some of the factors investors identified as 
affecting the South African tax system (Tuomi 2011). 
Tanzania Tanzania offers many tax incentives but faces challenges in 
establishing administration and evaluation institutions 
(Ndunguru 2012). Tanzania also has an agreement in the 
East African Block to prevent the problem of ‘race to the 
bottom’. Their tax incentive implementation is thus 
constrained by the dictates of the agreement. Tax incentives 
are also awarded using discretion which promotes 
corruption (Ndunguru 2012). However, there are efforts to 
ensure simplicity of tax incentive application to avoid the 
abuse of the system (UNCTAD 2011). 
Tax incentives are also poorly managed and in 2010, tax 
incentives were estimated to account for 6% of GDP 
(Fjeldstad & Heggstad 2011). This has exposed the tax 
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system to manipulation by large organisations who benefit 
from tax incentives for which they do not qualify. 
Zambia  The Zambian Development Agency (ZDA) Act provides for 
the formulation and implementation of tax incentives in 
Zambia thus there has been relative success in their use 
(NEPAD/OECD, 2011). However, Zambia in its annual 
budget presentations shows that there are substantial 
revenue losses emanating from tax incentives 
implementation (NEPAD/OECD 2011). Companies which 
have investment licences go through cumbersome 
procedures to be granted the tax incentives. There is also 
lack of coordination between the ZDA and the Zambian 
Revenue Authority (ZRA) in tax incentives administration 
which makes their implementation difficult (NEPAD/OECD 
2011). Tax administration is weak in Zambia due to 
breakdown in authority which weakens their efficiency 
(Fjeldstad and Heggstad 2011). 
The ZDA Act provides for a lengthy bureaucratic process 
which includes two tedious steps to firms that qualify for tax 
incentives (OECD 2011).  
Zimbabwe The major drawback in tax incentive implementation in 
Zimbabwe is its investment policy that requires 51% local 
ownership of business investments by locals. The 
Zimbabwean tax implementing agent, the Zimbabwe 
Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), is weak and there is 
corruption in its operations (African Forum and Network on 
Debt and Development (AFRODAD) 2011). 
Zimbabwe has experienced a long period of economic 
meltdown since the late 1990s. This has affected the 
modernisation of ZIMRA hence its inefficiency. There are 
also widespread tax distortions in the use of tax incentives 
(Kramarenko, Engstrom, Verdier, Fernandez, Oppers & 
Hughes 2010). 
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Table 9 shows that the major problem faced by SADC countries in implementing tax incentives 
emanates from the poor institutional set-up. Therefore, there is need for institutional reforms in 
tax administration if the full benefits of lowering the tax rate are to be enjoyed. 
 
 The conflicting objectives of increasing tax revenue and offering tax incentives is also a major 
challenge in the region. This requires governments to seek ways of increasing their tax bases so 
that they will be able to implement tax incentives without losing revenue. 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The chapter has shown that there are many tax incentives available to countries who wish to 
attract FDI. The incentives range from the commonly used tax holidays in developing countries 
to complicated accelerated depreciation and enhanced deductions used in industrialised 
countries. Tax allowances and tax credit are also widely used tax incentives to target sectors 
that face revenues losses. Reduced CIT in specific sectors is favoured due to its simplicity in 
application. There are also a large number of incentives common to developing countries such 
as exemptions from VAT payment, import duties and withholding taxes. Some incentives are 
specific to an economic sector such as, exemption of taxes on the export sector such as the EPZ 
industry, and tax exemptions on foreign currency earning. This study has shown that most of 
the tax incentives occur in sectors of the economy that have trickle-down effects to many 
sectors of the economy. Government thus deems these sectors as strategic for economic 
development. 
SADC countries use many forms of tax incentives to attract of FDI as evidenced by the most 
recent tax statistics from the SADC database and other institutions reviewed. Although it is 
standard practice for tax holidays to dominate in developing countries, most of the SADC 
countries still offer the different tax incentive mixes with accelerated depreciation and tax 
credits and allowances used in most countries. 
Though tax incentives in the SADC are used in the bid for FDI attraction, their application 
faces a number of challenges. Most of the challenges are concentrated around the 
implementation of tax incentives due to issues such as: corruption, lack of resources to 
administer taxes, skills shortages and bureaucratic procedures in claiming the benefits. 
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Government intervention in the form of government mines and indigenisation policies in the 
SADC mining sector also hampers the effective application of tax incentives to lure foreign 
capital. The Cooperation in the mining sector has also reduced its use of tax incentives. 
Therefore, given the wide use of tax incentives in the SADC it is important that this study 
empirically establish their usefulness in attracting FDI. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the theoretical framework, methodology and data used in 
arriving at conclusions on tax incentive effects in attracting FDI. The theoretical foundations of 
the model used in this study are described in section 7.2. Section 7.3 describes econometric 
methods employed in the study and their justifications. Data analysis is done in section 7.4 
where derived variables that were employed in the study are discussed and section 7.5 
concludes the chapter. 
7.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The main objectives of this study are to establish the importance of tax incentives in 
determining the locational decisions of FDI in the SADC region and to establish other factors 
important in attracting FDI into SADC. The model includes all factors important in determining 
the final locational decision of foreign capital.  
Most studies on FDI attraction in the host countries conclude that government policies are a 
major factor in FDI attraction (see Klemm et al. 2009; Shrestha & Onyeiwu 2005). The 
argument is that the instituted policies meant to attract FDI will ease the cost of doing business 
to investors and thus encourage their establishment in the host nation. 
Theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of FDI inflows in developing and 
developed countries points to policy and non-policy factors
3
 (Mateev 2008). Policy variables 
are those that the government can influence directly such as: tax incentives, labour market 
regulations, trade policies, and infrastructure and governance policies. Non-policy variables are 
market size, political and economic stability and natural resource endowments. 
                                                          
3 The theoretical chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 give greater detail on these policies. 
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The study on factors that influence the locational decisions of MNEs using panel data has 
attracted various methodologies based on different theoretical underpinnings. The most 
prominent models are the gravity and Dunning’s (1993) OLI models (Mateev 2008).  
The theoretical model adopted in this study is the eclectic paradigm initiated by Dunning 
(1977, 1993). The model offers a conceptual framework for micro and macro level factors that 
influence an investor’s decision on the final investment destination (Anyanwu 2011). The 
model suggests that firms invest abroad based on three types of advantages: ownership (O), 
location (L) and internalisation (I) thus it is also called the OLI paradigm. 
The ownership advantage entails that a firm investing in a foreign market expects to compete 
with local firms in taking advantage of its peculiar benefits such as patent rights, expertise and 
intangible assets. The ownership advantage inspires the investors to exploit foreign markets and 
resources, overcoming the competitive disadvantage they face from local firms who enjoy 
better market knowledge (Dunning & Lundan 2008).  
The locational advantages are those attributes the host nations have that makes it more 
attractive to investors than other destinations (Anyanwu 2011).  The locational advantages 
include the macroeconomic environment of the host nation, government policies that enhance 
ease of doing business in an economy and the protection of property rights.  
Internalisation arises from exploitation of international market imperfections by reducing 
uncertainties and transaction costs (Anyanwu 2011). Internalisation of costs generates 
knowledge efficiently there-by reducing government created costs such as exchange controls, 
trade tariffs and taxes. Dunning and Lundan (2008) futher develop the OLI theory by 
identifying four broad motives that encourage multinational companies’ foreign production. 
The categories are natural resoure-seeking FDI, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and 
strategic asset-seeking FDI. Resource-seeking FDI is motivated by raw materials, physical 
infrastructure and labour force availability in the host nation (Anyanwu 2011).  Market-seeking 
FDI looks at the host nation’s market potential and seeks to expand its market influence by 
locating abroad. Efficiency-seeking FDI takes advantage of low labour costs in host markets to 
lower production costs and increase profits. Strategic asset-seeking FDI looks at gaining 
advanced technology, innovation and better production methods by establishing itself abroad.  
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An attempt to modify and improve the OLI paradigm was made by Guisinger (2001) in his 
evolved eclectic paradigm. The model makes two important improvements on the OLI model. 
Firstly, it added the ‘M’ factors to replace the ‘I’ factor in the OLI model; the ‘M’ factors 
represent the mode of entry. This action provoked research on various factors that influence the 
mode of entry investors choose to enter foreign  markets (Stefanović 2008). Secondly, 
Guisinger (2001) added another group of factors, the ‘A’ group representing the firm’s 
adaptation to operating in the international market. These ‘A’ factors consider the home 
country  and the host country’s institutional factors which determine the suitability of the 
investment environment. 
In combining the tenets of this OLI theory Fedderke and Romm (2006) identify policy and non-
policy factors that determine the locational decisions of MNCs. Policy factors are identified as 
those that governments can influence such as: tax rates, tax incentives, trade barriers, 
infrastructure, openness, product regulation and labour market regulations. Non-policy factors 
are identified amongst other factors, as: market size, and political and economic stability. 
The OLI has largely been used to explain the locational decisions by firms and its analysis 
varies across regions, countries, industry and firms. This study has concentrated on the regional 
perspective, looking at locational FDI pull and push factors to establish policy factors that can 
help SADC countries in attracting FDI. 
Dunning (1988) concludes that the locational advantages in FDI motivation determines where 
production must take place and is of paramount importance in this study. The locational 
advantages identify the peculiar characteristics of a location which makes it attractive such as: 
natural resources, market size, infrastructure, governance, legislation that support FDI, tax 
policies, exchange control policies, patent rights laws and licencing legislation. 
Stefanović (2008) argues that most of the locational advantages that host nations have are 
economic factors, though in international business theory, political factors (focused centrally on 
institutional determinants) are gaining greater prominance. The focus on natural resources is 
shifting to man-made resources such as knowledge based assets, infrastructure and institutions 
of the host country. 
The economic factors that have been prominent in attracting FDI are labour costs, natural 
resource availability, market size and growth, macroeconomic stability and openess to FDI and 
trade (Stefanović 2008).  
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Against this theoretical background, the study specifies the following theoretical models: 
Model A 
(hol, gov, mrkt, infr, natr, open, finG, EP). 
Model B 
(CIT, gov, mrkt, infr, natr, open, finG, EP). 
Model C 
(Lossescf, gov, mrkt, infr, natr, open, finG, EP). 
Model D 
(RedcdCIT, gov, mrkt, infr, natr, open, finG, EP). 
 is the foreign investment component,  are tax holidays, CIT is corporate income tax, 
lossescf are losses carried forward, redcdCIT is reduced CIT in specific sectors, gov is 
governance, mrkt represents market potential, infr is infrastructure index, natr are natural 
resource endowments, open is trade openness, finG is financial globalisation and EP is an index 
for economic policy. 
Since tax incentive variables are highly correlated, for example, some of the incentives such as 
lower CIT, losses carried forward and investment allowances; they may be part of the package 
which falls under tax holidays. Therefore, the effects of each tax incentive are estimated in 
independent models.  Model A will estimate tax holidays, model B - CIT, model C - losses 
carried forward and model D will estimate reduced CIT in specific sectors. 
7.3 Econometric methodology 
 
The study estimates four panel data equations for each model, Panel 1 has the six highest 
resource-rich SADC countries according to the World Bank natural resource indicators, Panel 2 
includes seven least resource-rich countries, Panel 3 consists of all the SADC countries except 
South Africa (which is an outlier in resource richness and growth) and Panel 4 includes all the 
SADC countries. 
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7.3.1 Panel data econometrics technique 
 
This study adopts the panel data econometric technique. Hsiao  (2005) defines panel data or 
longitudinal data as data containing time series observations recorded for a number of 
individuals. Frees (2004) states that panel data is a group of individual units surveyed 
repeatedly over time. Thus, the panel data series involve two dimensions: the cross-sectional 
component shown by the -subscript and the time series dimension indicated by the -
subscript. The choice of panel data econometrics in giving robust conclusions on effects of tax 
incentives in attracting FDI for this study was inspired by the number of advantages the 
methodology poses. 
The existence of two data measurement components in panel data econometrics (the time and 
cross-sectional dimensions) has led to several advantages for the method over time series and 
cross-sectional data analyses (Hsiao 2005). Panel data gives more accurate inferences of model 
parameters. This is due to the fact that panel data allows for more degrees of freedom and 
reduced variables multicollinearity. Baltagi (2005) argues that panel data also gives more 
information and is more efficient. 
Panel data models thus enjoy the advantages of both time series and cross-sectional data 
models. Panel data models have the ability of the time series data to solve dynamic models. 
However, because time series data generally requires at least thirty observations to make 
reliable inferences, using the same model to draw conclusions of about an economic system is 
not reliable (Frees 2004). Panel data models overcome this by repeated time series observations 
from many individual units.  
 
Panel data econometric techniques control for individual heterogeneity. Baltagi (2005) argues 
that panel data methods cater for the fact that individuals, firms or countries have heterogenous 
characteristics. Time series and cross-sectional data assumes individuals are homogenous and 
thus run a risk of giving biased results. Panel data models use observations of different 
subjects. In the case of this study, countries were modeled over time. The countries are 
heterogenous thus panel data is modeled differently from cross-sectional and time series data to 
cater for the heterogeneity (Frees 2004). This can be illustarated using this study’s general 
model: 
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 Where  is the foreign investment, is a vector of tax incentive variables, is the 
vector of macroeconomic and social variables, captures any country-specific effects that are 
time-invariant, t captures specific year effects and  is the disturbance term, with i denoting 
countries (cross-country dimension), and t denoting years (time-series dimension). Thus 
 
is a 
subject specific parameter that controls for country heterogeneity. The panel data technique 
thus yields efficient results for a study on SADC countries with different characteristics. 
Dynamic adjustment of economic variables is easy to study using panel data (Baltagi 2005). It 
helps to explain changes on long panel data models of economic states such as inflation, 
unemployment and economic growth. Panel data surveys, unlike time series and cross-sectional 
data surveys, yield data changes on individuals and households (Deaton 1995). Thus, this study 
benefits from these attributes due to the dynamic nature of tax incentive variables. The model 
allows us to see which economies benefit from tax incentives and how. 
Panel data yields efficient estimators in ommited variable models (Wooldridge 2002). Panel 
data is useful in improving estimation results in models with misspecified, misused, 
mismeasured or unobservable variables which are correlated to the explanatory variables 
(Hsiao 2003). Panel data, in utilising the micro dynamics of a model and the individual effects 
of independent entities in the model, has a natural power to overcome the missing variable 
problem. This can be illustrated using a simple model: 
 
Where  is the foreign investment, and are  and vectors of exogenous 
variables, ,  and are  ,  and vectors of constants respectively. The error 
term is independently and identically distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. 
The least squares regression of on  and  yields efficient estimators for, ,  and . 
However, suppose that variables are unobservable and their correlation with   
is nonzero.  
Then least square estimates of on  are biased but repeated observations of the 
variables in a panel data model allows for the elimination of the effects of .  
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 7.3.2 System GMM estimation  
This study’s panels have a small number of years (2004-2013), therefore efficient estimators 
are found using the Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS GMM estimator. Baltagi (2005) reports that 
there is a need to utilise the initial conditions in generating efficient estimators when using 
dynamic panel data estimation, given the small time series in the data. The estimation of 
dynamic panel data models, specified below in equations A-D, poses two major challenges 
using macroeconomic data (Okodua 2011). The first one is the existence of endogenous and 
predetermined covariates. The is that, there is a problem of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity in dynamic panel data models due to the use of lagged dependent variable as 
an explanatory variable.  
  
Due to the complicated nature of tax laws especially the complicated nature of formulating and 
implementing statutes, there is difficulty in changing tax laws. Thus tax rates and laws run for a 
long period before they are changed. Current tax law affect investment decisions and portfolio 
choice in an economy. This may in turn affect future tax law formulation which leads to 
dynamic endogeneity in the data. Thus, the observed cross-sectional differences in the 
countries’ data are due to unobserved heterogeneity and country tax law history. Efficient 
estimators must therefore cater for country endogeneity to produce accurate estimators, hence 
the choice of the SYS GMM method.  
 
Endogeneity in panel data analysis is solved by the choice of SYS GMM Estimator (Okodua 
2011). Thus to estimate the relationship between tax incentives and FDI the study employs the 
SYS GMM Estimator to overcome the endogeneity problem. 
The models took the form: 
Model A  
itti
itiit
EP
finGInopenInnatrInrmrktgovInholFDIFDI



 
7
6543211, ___inf_
 
Model B 
itti
itiit
EPfinGIn
openInnatrInrmrktgovInCITInFDIFDI



 
76
543211,
_
__inf__
 
Model C 
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Model D 
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Where captures country-specific effects that are time-invariant, t  captures year-specific 
effects and  is the disturbance term, with  denoting countries (cross-country dimension), 
and t denoting years (time-series dimension). 
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables in the panel 
data demands that the GMM estimation technique be used. The study estimates four panel data 
equations for each model (A-D) in 7.2. Panel 1 has the six highest resource-rich countries 
according to the World Bank natural resource indicators, Panel 2 has the seven least resource-
rich countries, Panel 3 consists of twelve SADC countries excluding South Africa (which is an 
outlier in resource richness and growth), and Panel 4 includes all thirteen SADC countries. The 
study utilises data from thirteen SADC countries since Swaziland and the DRC were dropped 
from the study due to missing tax incentive data. The study uses a balanced panel from 2004 to 
2013.  
Therefore, the estimations follow the leads of Blundell and Bond (1998) SYS GMM estimator; 
the autoregressive panel data model is specified as: 
 
 
Where-   . In the model  is decomposed into unobservable 
individual specific effects so that + t  where  + t

  
is the usual fixed effects 
decomposition of the error term. The following conditions hold: 
    is a stochastic disturbance term with the assumption that . 
N is large, T is fixed and . This has the corresponding ‘common factor’ restricted 
and  forms with
. 
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The focus is on initial conditions therefore it is assumed that and  are independently 
distributed across  and with the familiar error components structure in which: 
 
, and for and …..……….3 
 
Here  for and ………………………………………………..4 
 
In addition, there is the standard assumption concerning the initial conditions , 
for  and …………………………………..5 
Conditions 3, 4 and 5 imply that moment restrictions are sufficient to identify and estimate 
for . 
 
The SYS GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is considered to utilise all 
moment ( ) conditions for the difference (DIF) GMM estimator and a non-redundant subset 
of the moment conditions for the level equation (Sun & Ashley 2014). In the absence of futher 
restrictions, the autoregressive model in equations 2-5 implies that , being 
orthogonality conditions linear in the parameter  with a condition that:  
, for and ……………………………………….6 
Where , here the model assumes that there is no serial correlation in the time 
varying error term . Combined with the model restriction in equation 5, the moment 
restriction in equation 6 can be expressed as . Here is the matrix given 
by omitting the subscripts. 
 
 
, is the vector . 
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The GMM estimator constructed from the moment conditions above minimises the quadratic 
distance  for some metric , where is the matrix  
and is the vector . This gives the GMM estimator for as: 
…………………………………………7 
Where is the vector ,  is the vector
, and  and  are stacked across individuals in the 
same way as . 
 
Alternative choices for the weights give rise to a set of GMM estimators based on the 
moment conditions in equation 6, all of which are consistent for large  and finite , but 
which differ in their asymptotic efficiency. In general the optimal weights are given by: 
 
, where  are residuals from an initial consistent estimator. This is 
referred to as the two-step GMM estimator. In the absence of any additional knowledge about 
the process for the initial conditions, this estimator is asymptotically efficient in the class of 
estimators based on the linear moment conditions. 
 
Using STATA 12 software the results are derived from the one-step with Windmeijer (2005) 
corrections (Roodman 2009).  The post estimation Sargan test is used to determine the validity 
of instruments.   
7.3.3 Justification of techniques 
 
This section justifies the use of the SYS GMM estimator adopted by this study to solve the 
possible endogeneity problem that could arise in a dynamic panel data model. In order to justify 
the methods used, all possible panel econometric methods and their shortcomings are analysed. 
There are basically five panel econometric estimators that can be used to estimate the models 
used in this study, namely: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, fixed and random 
effects, DIF GMM, level GMM and SYS GMM estimators. 
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7.3.3.1 Pooled OLS estimation 
 
The model is of the basic form ………………………..8 
Where ; ;
; ; and  
 
The estimates of coefficients and are obtained using pooled OLS regression which makes 
the following orthogonality assumptions: ;  
Therefore ; ; . 
The pooled OLS estimator is calculated as: ……9 
In estimation of dynamic panel data models the pooled OLS estimator faces two major 
shortcomings (Chen 2014). Firstly, the model suffers an inconsistency problem in dealing with 
dynamic models due to correlations between explanatory variables and the errors: 
 ; If  then the endogeneity problem 
emerges, with probability limits failing to approach the true value that is  
      0.      
 
Secondly, there is the problem of asymptotic bias in pooled OLS estimation (Baltagi 2005). 
That is: , with ; therefore the estimator 
becomes biased upwards, with . 
7.3.3.2 Fixed and random effects estimations 
 
These allow for individual specific effects to be captured (Cameron & Trivedi 2005). The 
model takes the form . 
Where over  and ; are random variables which shows unobserved heterogeneity. 
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When is treated as a random variable potentially correlated with the regressors, then the 
model is a fixed effects model. Alternatively, when are random variables independently 
distributed from the regressors then the model is a random effects model with the following 
additional assumptions:  and . 
 
The fixed effects estimator can be performed using the least square dummy variables 
method. The model, however, suffers similar shortcoming to the pooled OLS estimator when 
dealing with dynamic panel models (Chen 2014). According to Arellano and Bond (1991) it is 
the endogeneity problem that leads to inconsistencies in estimators. 
 
There is also the problem of asymptotic bias (Arellano & Bond 1991) shown by:  
; Therefore when . 
7.3.3.3 Difference (DIF) GMM estimation 
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) pioneered the model with an argument that additional instruments 
can be obtained in dynamic panel data models by utilising the orthogonality properties that 
exist between lagged values of the dependent variable and the error term . To illustrate 
this Baltagi (2005) autoregressive model without regressors is adopted. The model takes the 
form: ……………………11. . 
Where  with ……………11.1. 
To obtain consistent estimates of as with fixed Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed 
first differencing to eliminate individual effects. 
………………………12 
The model assumes that components have the familiar assumptions that:  
 , , for and …..12.1 
And for  and …………….12.2 
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There is a further assumption regarding the initial conditions of the dependent variable that 
for and …………………….12.3 
The conditions (12.1), (12.2) and (12.3) ensure that the model estimates for . 
 
Without any further restrictions on the conditions determining the initial conditions, the 
autoregressive component model (11)-(12.3) imply orthogonality condition 
 linear in (Blundell, Bond & Windmeijer 2012).  
. For and ………………….13 
 
Where . Here the model assumes the absence of serial correlation in the time 
varying disturbance term , together with the restriction (12.3). The moment restriction (13) 
can be expressed as , where is the matrix given by  
 And is the  vector of
. The GMM estimator based on the conditions above minimises the 
quadratic distance for some metric , where is the  matrix 
 and is the  vector . Thus the model 
calculates the GMM estimator for as: 
, where  is the  vector (
),  is the  vector ( ), 
in addition and are stacked across individual cross-sections the same way as  
(Blundell, Bond & Windmeijer 2012). 
 
The DIF GMM estimator may yield a large bias and poor precision in simulation and empirical 
work (Chen 2014). Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that the bias in DIF GMM estimator 
emanates from the fact that lagged levels of variable series provide weak instruments in the 
first differenced variables under the following conditions. First, the value of  the 
autoregressive parameter increases towards one and second, when the variance of the 
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individual effect  increases relative to the variance of the error term . These shortcomings 
in the estimators thus led to the introduction by Blundell and Bond (1998) of the SYS GMM 
estimator. 
 
The existence of weak instruments in the difference-GMM estimator prompted us to choose the 
SYS GMM estimator. This is because weak instruments cause an increase in variance of 
estimates asymptotically which leads to small sample bias (Vieira & MacDonald 2012). The 
system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) is meant to counter the weaknesses of the DIF GMM by Arellano and Bond (1991). The 
SYS GMM model is a system of regression in differences and in levels. The SYS GMM model 
uses lagged levels of explanatory variables as instruments for the regression model in 
differences and lagged differences of explanatory variables as instruments for the model in 
levels (Vieira & MacDonald  2012). The instruments are efficient under the assumptions of the 
model though there may be existence of correlation between levels of explanatory variables and 
cross-section specific effects, with no correlation of the explanatory variables and the cross-
section specific effects in differences (Vieira & MacDonald 2012). 
7.3.3.4 SYS GMM estimation 
 
As described above, the SYS GMM estimator has a number of advantages which are discussed 
in this section. 
 
Dynamic panel data econometric methodology is the method most suited to this model since it 
has the lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables. This methodology is 
important in solving models where unobserved variables affect both the dependent variable and 
the independent variables and also where some independent variables depend on the past values 
of the dependent variables (Baltagi 2005). 
 
The dynamic panel data model has three estimation techniques. The first one is the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) first difference GMM, the second one is the Arellano and Bover (1995) level 
GMM estimator and, finally, the third is the SYS GMM estimator pioneered by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). The SYS GMM estimator combines the moment conditions of the first two 
estimators thus it is the most efficient estimator (Youssef, El-sheikh & Abonazel 2014). 
i it
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Estimation of dynamic panel data models proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is based on 
first differencing the model to remove unobserved heterogeneity and to make use of the 
moment conditions in situations where endogenous differences of variables are instrumented by 
their lagged level (Sun & Ashley 2014). This became the widely used Arellano-Bond estimator 
or first difference (DIF) GMM estimator. 
 
The DIF GMM estimator, however, was identified by Ahn and Schmidt (1995) as having a 
number of shortcomings. Firstly, its inability to utilise all available moment conditions was 
found to be a weakness in its ability to produce reliable results. Secondly, it has poor finite 
sample properties in highly autoregressive models that have a small time series component, as 
in this study’s model (Blundell & Bond 1998).  To overcome the weaknesses of the DIF GMM 
estimator, the SYS GMM estimator was proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This method 
incorporates extra moment conditions from the equation in levels. This method is popular in a 
finite sample with small time series models and so this method was chosen for this research. 
 
The SYS GMM estimator also allows for more explanatory variables to be used without 
worries about the endogeneity problem (Chen 2014). The SYS GMM estimator removes the 
bias caused by weakened instruments in DIF GMM estimation.  The bias in the DIF GMM 
estimator emanates from variations in data and is corrected through getting the level data back 
into the regression system in the SYS GMM estimator (Chen 2014). Blundell and Bond (1998) 
conclude that finite sample bias in DIF GMM estimator is corrected using the SYS GMM 
estimator. 
 
The use of SYS GMM estimator in dynamic models is also empirically supported by Klemm 
and Van Parys (2009) in a study that estimates four panel data model types namely: Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), within groups, DIF GMM and SYS GMM. The results show that SYS 
GMM is the model that produces consistent results. This is also confirmation that dynamic 
panel models lead to upward bias and downward bias for OLS and fixed effects models 
respectively. Therefore, this study will use the SYS GMM estimation method which gives 
consistent results for the model. 
188 
 
7.3.4 Diagnostic property: Endogeneity  
 
Endogeneity refers to the inconsistencies in estimators due to the existence of correlations 
between explanatory variables and error terms (Chen 2014). The problem of endogeneity is 
central to the choice of the SYS GMM method for this study. Thus, this section addresses the 
issue in detail and helps to justify the choice of the SYS GMM estimator in this study. 
 
The existence of endogenous explanatory variables is a problem in most empirical studies that 
use panel data methods, including regional determinants of FDI studies which are similar to 
this study. The main focus of this study is to detect the effects of tax incentive variables on FDI 
location. Thus, to get reliable results the problem of endogeneity has to be controlled on non-
tax variables and on tax incentive variables.  
 
Walsh and Yu (2010) state that the problem of endogeneity is common in regression models of 
FDI as the dependent variable and macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita, GDP 
growth and openness as explanatory variables are mostly correlated.  
 
The SYS GMM estimator removes the problem of endogeneity since it uses variables in levels 
as instruments to first differences of the individual specific effects (Chen 2014). The choice of 
the system GMM estimator in this study is also inspired by its ability to produce an efficient 
estimator given a small cross-section (N).  
7.3.5 Diagnostic property: One-step versus two-step estimation 
 
Soto (2009) concludes that in small samples the SYS GMM estimator,  given some persistency 
in the model, has the lowest estimation bias and greatest efficiency of all the alternative 
estimators (including its predecessor the DIF GMM estimator). The one-step estimation in 
small sample GMM estimation was also found to have the same accuracy and efficiency as the 
two-step estimation technique in a model comparative study by Soto (2009). Thus, this study 
adopted the one-step GMM estimation procedure to reduce the ommited variable bias common 
in the two-step estimation method. 
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7.3.6 Diagnostic property: Unit root tests 
 
The use of macroeconomic data in the model requires that the study considers a possible 
random walk data property. The chosen test method considers a test that renders more efficient 
results given a short time series in the panel model. The study employs two unit root testing 
techniques, the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test (2003) and the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test 
(2002). 
 
7.3.6.1 Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS) 
 
The analysis uses the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (IPS). Hall and Mairesse (2001) conclude that the 
IPS method is the best for handling short time series panel data because it considers the panel 
data as a system of N individual regressions and conducts N individual Dickey-Fuller tests for 
these panels, where N is the number of cross-sections in the model. Hall and Mairesse (2002) 
add that the IPS model also ensures that the trend and the serial correlation coefficient differ 
across cross-sections as do the mean and variance. 
 
The IPS method put forward by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) allows for more heterogeneity and 
the heterogeneous model takes the form: 
  
In the model  is the deterministic part. If  then the  processes contain a unit root for
, and if then there is a stationary process.  
 
The IPS model combines information from the time series dimension and the cross-section 
dimension in testing for unit roots thus its testing power does not diminish due to a small time 
series dimension (Im, Pesaran & Shin 2003). 
 
Hall and Mairesse (2002) note that the IPS model performs unit root tests for each individual 
cross-section separately. The results are then averaged across the cross-sections using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The average t-statistic for from the individual cross-
section ADF tests is given by: 
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The standardised -bar suggested by IPS (1997) converges to a normal distribution as N and T
 thus it performs better when N and T are small.  
7.3.6.2 Levin, Lin and Chu test (LLC) 
 
The LLC test has an assumption of a common auto-regressive (AR) process, thus it is a 
homogeneous process. LLC (2002) noted that small samples encounter problems when 
individual unit root tests have limited power over the alternative hypothesis in the presence of 
deviations from the steady state. 
The null hypotheses in the LLC test is that each time series is not stationary against the 
alternative hypothesis that each time series does not contain a unit root. The hypotheses mean 
that: 
  ……..*     
Where ;  is a vector containing deterministic variables and  is a vector of 
coefficients in the model . Particularly,  and . Given 
that the lag order of is not known, the LLC uses three steps in testing for unit roots (Baltagi 
2005). 
The first step performs augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for each cross-section 
independently; 
            
Lag is permitted to vary across individual cross-sections. Given any the model selects the 
maximum lag order and utilising the t-statistic of the estimation determines whether 
the smaller lag order is more preferable.  
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After establishing the preferred lag order, two regressions are performed to obtain 
orthogonalised residuals: 
Equation 1 runs on  and  to get residuals . 
Equation 2 runs on  and  to get residuals . 
To control for different variances across the cross-sections the residuals are standardised; 
 and , where  is the standard error for each ADF regression for 
the cross-sections. 
The second step estimates the long-run to short-run deviations. With the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity the long-run variance of equation * is given by: 
 
Here is a truncation lag that can be data dependent and must be calculated using methods 
that guarantee consistency in  estimates. 
The third step estimates the panel test statistic. This is obtained through running a pooled 
regression: 
 
The model is based on observations, given , that is shows the mean number 
of observations per each cross-section in the panel and .  measures the lag 
order of the ADF regression for each cross-section. The t-statistic for: 
is , where: 
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 and is the variance of  
LLC (2002) declare their model to be most efficient in moderate size panels, with cross-
sections between 10 and 250.  Baltagi (2005) argues that the panel unit root test in the LLC 
model improves the estimation power of the model over the model that estimates separate unit 
root tests for each cross-section. However, the model cannot be applied in cases where cross-
sections are correlated. 
7.3.7 Diagnostic property: Cointegration test 
 
Karaman (2009) defines cointegration as the long-run relationship between non-stationary 
variables. The concept was coined by Engle and Granger in 1987, based on the argument that if 
variables are integrated then their linear combination can be integrated of a lower order. For 
example, if the K-dimensional process  are integrated of order one and the linear 
combination of components of  are stationary then the variables are cointegrated. 
Panel cointegration techniques were pioneered by the research of Pedroni (1997) and 
McCoskey and Kao (1998), and the field has grown enormously in recent economic research 
(Karaman 2009). Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1997) introduced the panel cointegration test under 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Pedroni (1997) proposed two test statistics with the 
earlier testing cointegration in the homogeneous panel and the later extended to heterogeneous 
models. Kao (1999) tests concentrated on homogenous models. 
The tests for panel cointegration therefore, are also like unit root tests which are still 
concentrated on finding a more powerful test. 
7.3.7.1 Kao test 
 
Introduced by Kao (1999), the test has two types: the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Using the panel data model:  
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Where  and  are integrated of order 1 and not cointegrated. When , Kao 
suggested DF and ADF unit root tests for as the test for a no cointegration null hypothesis.  
7.3.7.2 Pedroni tests 
 
The Pedroni (1997) tests consider heterogeneous panel models. The models propose several 
tests for a cointegration null hypothesis. Pedroni uses the model:  
 
Where  and  variables take values over time periods .  in an 
m-column vector for each member and  is an m-dimensional column vector for each value 
.  and  are assumed to be integrated of order 1. Under the null of no cointegration 
will also be I (1),  and  to allow for individual effects and time trend respectively. The DF 
and ADF test are then performed from the fixed effects residuals. 
7.3.8 Diagnostic property: First order serial correlation test [AR (1)] and second order 
serial correlation test [AR (2)] 
 
The dynamic panel model suffers a problem of autocorrelation caused by the lagged dependent 
variable (Okodua 2011). The AR (1) test for the model of equation; 
ittiitittiit YXFDIFDI   1,  is mean-stationary. Thus, the first differences 
itFDI  will not be correlated to individual country effects i .  Therefore, in the absence of first 
order serial correlation 1,  tiFDI can be used as a suitable instrument for the level equation 
(Blundell and Bond 1998). AR (1) and AR (2) tests are used to show the consistency of GMM 
estimators. The null hypothesis for the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation (AR) test is no 
autocorrelation. The presence of autocorrelation indicates that lags in the dependent variable 
are exogenous and thus form bad instruments. 
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7.4 Data Analysis
4
  
 
This section looks at the variables that are employed in the estimations and the type and source 
of data used. However, due to unavailability of data two SADC countries the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland were dropped from the analyses. The data used in 
this study has been obtained from World Bank Databank, African development indicators, 
Ernst &Young’s global tax data and Worldwide Governance Indicators. The data covers 
thirteen SADC countries over the period 2004 to 2013. The study chose this time period since 
the recent tax incentive data from Ernst & Young captures this period. The data is derived from 
individual country tax statutes and from reports which recorded consistent and similar tax 
structures for SADC countries. All data is expressed in natural logarithms
5
 except for data with 
negative values. 
7.4.1 Dependent variable 
 
The study uses net FDI inflows as a % of GDP as the dependent variable; this is a measure of 
FDI as a share of GDP. Since the study seeks to establish the factors that affect the 
attractiveness of a destination in enticing new foreign investment and retaining it, net FDI 
inflows as a % of GDP are found to be the most appropriate measure. FDI by established 
investors has two important components that host nations seek to attract; firstly, there is new 
capital stock also known as green field investment and, secondly, expansionary investments 
which come from the reinvestment of profits (Bellak & Leibrecht 2005). Thus, outflows of 
these investments show deterioration in the competitiveness of a destination. 
 
Bellak and Leibrecht (2005) argue that using FDI flows as a measure of real capital 
overestimates or in some cases underestimates the true measure. This is because overvalued 
services or debt may be viewed as reinvestments in FDI flows and underestimation may 
emanate from the fact that internal financing by the investors is excluded from measures of FDI 
flows.  
                                                          
4 Data trends analyses is in Appendix A and descriptive statistics in Appendix C. The data does not show any 
structural breaks in 2002 and 2006 where major investment protocols were signed in SADC this is due to policy 
lags in policy implementation which affected the policies immediate effects. Hence their effects were gradual. 
5 Log transformation of the data in time series data analysis is important to stabilise the variance. However 
because there are no logarithms for negative values log transformation of data with negative values will cause loss 
of data points. 
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The use of tax incentives in attracting FDI in the SADC region is mainly targeted at bringing 
long-term capital that brings sustainable growth to the economies. Therefore, the net FDI flows 
will give credible conclusions as to the role of taxes in attracting foreign investment and 
retaining it. The incentives in the SADC countries are also extended to the local investors to 
reduce investment outflows. Thus, the ability of tax incentives to attract investment and prevent 
capital from moving out is of paramount importance to policy makers, hence the choice of net 
FDI flows as a % of GDP as the dependent variable. 
7.4.2 Explanatory variables  
 
The study seeks to explain the locational advantages which attract internationally mobile 
capital in the SADC region. The explanatory variables are grouped into tax incentive variables 
and non-tax variables which SADC countries use to attract FDI.  
7.4.2.1 Tax incentives variables
6
 
 
Tax incentive data is not readily available since it is contained in statutory instruments which 
are not standardised (Klemm & Van Parys 2009). Therefore, in defining variables the study 
standardised the data and established a trend of how each tax incentive was applied in each year 
throughout the study period. The main source of tax incentive data were the Ernst & Young’s 
worldwide corporate tax guides published between 2004 and 2014. The summaries give similar 
detailed tax data on individual countries and thus important tax incentive data was drawn from 
these summaries. Data for most SADC countries is available in the tax guides (except for the 
DRC and Swaziland which were dropped from panel econometric analysis). 
7.4.2.1.1 Tax holidays  
 
To measure tax holidays the study follows the lead of Klemm and Van Parys (2009) in using 
the maximum tax holiday given to investors in the economy in a given year. The length of a tax 
holiday is important in attracting FDI as longer holidays ensure longer periods of a lighter tax 
burden on the investor.  
                                                          
6 The study measures individual tax incentives to help policy makers in choosing the actual tax incentives to use 
in FDI attraction. This adds to literature on SADC countries (see Calitz (2013) and Bolnick (2004) that have used 
METR and AETR which lumps all tax incentives together and fails to separate each tax incentive’s contribution to 
FDI attraction.  
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Tax holidays are derived from various tax relief measures given to investors. They are 
predominantly found under corporate tax rates. The study uses the maximum period offered to 
an investor as tax relief in a given year; it could be a full exemption, reduced rates or other 
allowances offered by the country.  
The study chose the longest tax holidays offered in a year because tax holidays indicate how 
much an economy is willing to accommodate foreign capital. Thus, a country that offers tax 
holidays in its strategic sectors is probably going to offer incentives in other sectors since most 
economic sectors have linkages. 
7.4.2.1.2 Corporate income tax rate (CIT) 
 
The statutory CIT rate was used as a measure for this variable. Shrestha and Onyeiwu (2005) 
conclude that the CIT rate measures the extent to which corporations are taxed and measures 
tax on income, profits and capital gains. A low CIT rate is expected to attract and retain foreign 
investment as it increases returns. 
There are various rates of corporate taxes recorded in the Ernst & Young’s worldwide 
corporate tax guides offered in different sectors. This study used the ordinary industrial tax rate 
as it is the rate that covers more sectors and has a bigger influence in determining investment 
decisions.  
7.4.2.1.3 Losses carried forward 
 
The variable is recorded as relief for losses in the Ernst & Young’s worldwide corporate tax 
guides. It measures the number of years a company is allowed to carry forward tax losses.  
In cases where multiple rates exist in different sectors, the study used the least carried forward 
years used in the manufacturing sector. For the sake of consistency in this study, where the 
carried forward years are unlimited, it has declared 10 to be the maximum number of years for 
the claim to be valid.  
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7.4.2.1.4 Reduced CIT in specific sectors 
 
The lowest tax rate offered to specific sectors was used to measure this variable. This follows 
the lead of Klemm et al. (2009) in measuring investment allowances which are similar to 
reduced CIT in specific sectors. 
This variable is derived from the tax rate offered in different sectors and the lowest rate offered 
in the sectors covered by this study. This shows how an economy treats strategic sectors which 
it wants to grow for the benefit of the whole economy. This measure is used as a proxy to 
indicate how the policy makers treat strategic sectors. 
7.4.2.2 Non-tax factors that attract FDI
7
 
 
As we saw in chapter 3 and Chapter 5, these are factors that have been theoretically and 
empirically considered to be important in attracting FDI in other regions. The data source for 
these variables is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and World Governance 
Indicators. 
7.4.2.2.1 Governance 
 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Matstruzzi (2010) discuss the origin of the worldwide governance 
indicators (WGI) that have been adopted in this study. In 1996, the WGI (which embraces 200 
countries and measures six governance indicators) was initiated. The indicators are: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al. 
2010). The six indicators are important in ensuring ease of doing business and are thus likely to 
affect the investor’s decision to invest in a location. The data is obtained from 31 different data 
sources including governance perceptions by survey respondances, non-governmental 
organisations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organisations 
worldwide. 
 
                                                          
7 These are control variables in the study on the efficacy of tax incentives to attract FDI. They were carefully 
chosen to avoid the omitted variable bias in the models which affects reliability of results (Woodridge 2002). 
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Kaufmann et al. (2010) define ‘governance’ as “the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them.” These processes, if they are 
implemented positively in a country, give investors property rights and security in their 
investments and thus attract further investment. 
The first measures which cover the process by which countries conduct their public choice 
mechanisms have two indicators (i) voice and accountability and (ii) political stability and 
absence of terrorism. This captures how interviewed experts view the extent to which a 
country’s citizens contribute to choosing their government, the freedoms citizens enjoy in 
association, expression and media freedom. The measure also includes how constitutionally 
elected governments are safe from violent dethronements.  Political freedom and peace in a 
country is important to FDI attraction as evidenced by FDI flows in North Africa which rose 
steeply after 2006 and then fell sharply after 2010 due to the political unrest in most of the 
North African countries. The uprisings in the Arab world that started in Egypt and spread to 
Tunisia and Libya led to a dramatic fall in FDI in the region (World Bank Report 2012). The 
SADC region has, however, been relatively peaceful compared to other regions with civil war 
problems such as Angola, the DRC and Mozambique. Thus, most political challenges emanate 
from the violation of human rights by state security organs. 
Secondly, there are measures that probe the effectiveness of a government in policy 
formulation and implementation. These measures are centred on the quality of public 
employees. The two indicators in this category are government effectiveness and regulation 
quality. 
Thirdly, there are measures that cover the respect state institutions give to the citizens they 
govern. These are measured by the rule of law and corruption. Corruption and public 
employees’ red tape increases the cost of doing business and the time required to establish 
operations (World Bank Doing Business Report 2013).  
Following the lead of Akanbi (2015) the study measures governance in a broad sense by 
averaging the six measure in the WGI.  
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7.4.2.2.2 Market potential 
 
Dadzie (2012) argues that market-seeking FDI strongly considers market potential in its 
locational decision. A growing market attracts more investors as it seeks physical presence in 
the economy to increase its competitive advantage (Porter 1990). According to Shrestha and 
Onyeiwu (2005) nearly all studies on FDI attraction have found a positive relationship between 
market potential measured by economic growth and FDI flows. This is attributed to the fact that 
high growth economies implement effective macroeconomic policies which enhance better 
earnings from investments. 
As with most studies, market potential was measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate. 
7.4.2.2.3 Infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure such as road networks, telephone connections, electricity, water and internet 
services help to ease the cost of doing business. Countries with a good infrastructure network 
attract more investors since good infrastructure increases the return on investment and lowers 
the cost of transacting (Shrestha & Onyeiwu 2005). 
Measuring infrastructure is multi-dimensional with availability and quality of the infrastructure 
being important to growth (Calderón & Servén 2010). Most studies on determinants of FDI 
have captured a single dimension measure of infrastructure, mainly the availability measure 
proxied by telephone lines per 100 people in the country. The availability of telephone lines 
indicates a good road network and information delivery through internet services since they are 
related in their operations.  
The study’s efforts in seeking robust conclusions on the factors that determine investors’ 
locational decisions in the SADC, adopts the Calderón and Servén (2010) principal component 
analysis (PCA). This measure produces a synthesis index which captures both the quality and 
quantity dimensions of infrastructure measurement. The index built from the analysis combines 
information from the three basic infrastructure measures: telecommunication, power and roads 
(Calderón & Servén 2010). This removes the problem of multicollinearity in using the variables 
separately in the model. 
200 
 
This method (also adopted by Akanbi (2015)) develops a model for the study that measures 
both the quality and quantity of infrastructure. The model will construct an infrastructure model 
for the SADC using the  PCA method. Following the lead of Akanbi (2013), the study will 
represent infrastructure stock through a composite index, the physical infrastructure index (PII). 
Calderón and Servén (2004) state that the stock of physical infrastructure varies across nations 
based on demographic and geographic factors. 
The PCA process involves converting high-dimension groups of indicators into new indices 
that incorporate information on a different dimension which makes them mutually uncorrelated. 
Due to the unavailability of data, telephone lines per 100 people is used to proxy road 
networks. Internet user per 100 people shows the effectiveness of telecommunication networks. 
Electric power consumption which measures the production of power plants and combined heat 
and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat 
and power plants is used to measure the electricity infrastructure stock. Due to the absence of 
data on the electricity stock for individual countries, the study uses the measure of output for 
poor countries to represent SADC countries that do not have data since they all fall into that 
category.  
The aggregate infrastructure stocks index is derived by using the first eigenvectors from the 
PCA as the weights to establish a linear combination: 
 where and are eigenvectors from the PCA and and 
are the three infrastructure stocks. 
Table 10: Construction of infrastructure index 
Method of 
construction 
variables 
PCA 
Component 1 
PCA  
Component 2 
PCA  
Component 3 
Telephone 
Electricity 
Internet 
0.6797 
0.2264 
0.6976 
-0.2423 
0.9671 
-0.0778 
0.6923 
0.1161 
-0.7122 
Notes: The table values were constructed using the eigenvalue transformation.  
332211 XaXaXaPII  21,aa 3a 21, XX
3X
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The infrastructure index was constructed from the principal component eigenvalue (Table 10 
above). Using the stata command “predict pc1 pc2 pc3” the principal components are generated 
from the equations: 
 
PC1, PC2 and PC3 are the principal components 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
The infrastructure index was obtained by summing the principal components as infrastructure 
index = PC1+PC2+PC3. 
7.4.2.2.4 Natural resource endowments 
 
The analysis of FDI flows in Africa in Chapter 2 showed that natural resource endowments are 
central in the attraction of FDI to developing countries. UNCTAD (2012) data shows that the 
oil rich African countries, Angola and Nigeria, receive relatively high FDI inflows despite 
political instability. In this study, total natural resources rents as a % of GDP was used to 
measure natural resource availability.  
Most SADC countries rely on their natural resources to raise revenue, thus government rents 
from the natural resources indicates the availability of resources in a country. This is preferred 
to the use of natural resources reserves as a measure of natural resources due to continuous 
discovery of new natural resources in the region in recent years, for example gas in 
Mozambique in 2010, and diamonds in Zimbabwe in 2008. 
7.4.2.2.5 Trade openness 
 
Many of the developing countries, including those in the SADC, adopted Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s which sought to open economies to trade and FDI inflows. 
Onyeiwu (2005) argues that trade openess attracts export-oriented FDI; this form of investment 
is highly fauvored by SADC countries for improving their external balances. This variable was 
measured as trade as a % of GDP. Calculated in World Bank statistics as the sum of exports 
and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
     
     
     ernetyelectricittelephonePC
ernetyelectricittelephonePC
ernetyelectricittelephonePC
int*7122.0*1161.0*6923.03
int*0778.0*9671.0*2423.02
int*6976.0*2264.0*6797.01
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7.4.2.2.6 Financial globalisation 
 
Financial services are important for investment since they provide a medium for access to 
investment funds. FDI thrives in economies that are financially open to foreign players. 
Financial openness involves reducing capital controls and capital flow restrictions (Stoianov 
2007).  The neoclassical theory suggests that financial globalisation encourages the flow of 
capital from capital rich countries to capital poor countries in anticipation of higher returns 
(Stoianov 2007).  
Theoretically, financial globalisation leads to financial market development, institutional 
development, better governance in the financial sector and macroeconomic discipline (Stoianov 
2007). However, this view may be affected by other factors that support investment such as 
institutions that support FDI establishment. Thus this study seeks to establish to what extent 
financial globalisation influences investors’ decisions in the SADC. 
 
The measure ‘financial openness’ has two important dimensions, the first one is legal or de jure 
factors based on elements that restrict or allow capital flows in and out of an economy 
(Stoianov 2007). The second set of measures are de facto indicators which show the extent of 
trade volumes, capital flows in the economy and the amount of capital foreigners hold in an 
economy, accessibility of financial services, amongst many others. The two measures are 
highly correlated; the legal measures indicate government policy towards capital flows and the 
de facto indicators show the results of the policy and thus a choice should be made as to which 
indicators to use (Stoianov 2007).  
Financial globalisation is estimated using the de facto measure which looks at access to 
financial services in the economy. The study uses the number of commercial banks per 100, 
000 adults in the economy, as a measure of financial globalisation. 
7.4.2.2.7 Economic policy 
 
Ojeaga (2012) argues that investors strongly consider government economic policy when 
taking investment decisions. The government economic policies are important in ensuring a 
stable investment climate that attracts FDI. This study adopts Ojeaga’s (2012) single index 
measure for economic policy. The government’s economic policies are regulations set by 
203 
 
government to achieve its economic goals and are thus in most cases correlated with each other. 
Therefore, there is a need for a single index that represents the policies, since using one proxy 
variable normally gives biased estimates. In this study economic policy was captured using 
government consumption expenditure and inflation and a single index was developed using 
principal component anlysis (PCA). Government policies are the various fiscal and monetary 
policies aimed at macroeconomic stability and inflation and government expenditure covers 
these policies effectively. The PCA model is flexible and has been used to create other indices 
such as infrastructure index ( see Akanbi 2015). 
Ojeaga (2012)  in his creation of a single index for economic policy uses trade openness, 
government expenditure and inflation. In this study, trade openness was used independently 
because FDI attraction theory argues that trade openness affects FDI inflows independently 
(Dadzie 2012). Niskanen (1971) argues that bureaucrats seek to maximise their own personal 
benefits by demanding a huge budget from their sponsors, thus bureaucracy is cited as a major 
cause of growth in government expenditure. Increasing government expenditure, therefore, 
indicates a country’s self-serving bureaucracy, which in turn indicates red tape and corruption 
tendencies amongst public employees. The uncontrolled increase in government expenditure 
can crowd out private investment. 
The PCA is a statistical tool that is used in creating a single index for a measure with many 
dimensions. The  model was constructed using the STATA command for PCA “pca inflation 
government expenditure”. Inflation is the rate of change in prices which shows monetary policy 
and government expenditure reflects government fiscal discipline.  
Table 11: Construction of economic policy index using eigenvectors 
Method of construction 
Variables 
PCA 
Component 1 
PCA 
Component 2 
Government expenditure 
Inflation 
-0.7071 
 0.7071 
0.7071 
0.7071 
Source: Generated by author using eigenvalue transformation, using the command “pca 
government inflation”. 
The economic policy index is constructed from the principal component eigenvalue Table 11 
above. Using the stata command “predict pc4 pc5” principal components are generated from 
the equations: 
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Where gvtexp is government expenditure and infl is inflation. PC4 and PC5 are the principal 
components 1 and 2 respectively. 
The economic policy index is obtained by summing the principal components as economic 
policy index = PC4+PC5. 
7.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The chapter looked at the theoretical foundation of the models used in this study to answer the 
major research questions of the research. The research’s theoretical underpinnings are based on 
the Dunning (1977) OLI theory. The theory explains why international capital ends up in the 
destinations where they are located. The research’s choice of econometric method is the SYS 
GMM estimator since it best addresses the estimation problems associated with dynamic panel 
data models. The shortcomings of other panel models are found in their failure to address the 
endogeneity problem due to the existence of a lagged dependent variable as one of the 
regressors and an asymptotic problem in efficient estimation.  
The data sources for tax variables are the Ernst & Young’s worldwide tax summaries and the 
macroeconomic variables are found in the World Bank Databank, African Development 
Indicators and Worldwide Governance Indicators. The problem of unit roots in macroeconomic 
data was addressed using the IPS unit root test and the LLC tests. The study also established 
that if the data is found to be non-stationary then cointegration tests must be conducted to 
establish the long-run relationships of variables. The Pedroni and Kao cointegration tests were 
considered most suitable for the study. 
Data on infrastructure and economic policy was derived using the PCA model which helps in 
delivering clean data for the variables. This method improves the quality of data. The 
governance data was derived from the World Governance Index. 
 
 
 
   
   lgvtPC
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inf*7071.0exp*7071.04
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CHAPTER 8 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The estimations involve a total of thirteen SADC countries since Swaziland and the DRC were 
dropped from the panels due to a lack of tax data for the countries. Panel 1 includes the seven 
highest resource-rich countries using the World Bank natural resource indicators, which are 
total natural resources rents as % of GDP. Panel 2 has the six least resource-rich countries, 
Panel 3 consists of twelve SADC countries in the study (the panel excludes South Africa which 
is an outlier in resource richness and growth) and Panel 4 includes all thirteen of the SADC 
countries in the study. 
 
Using the total natural resources rents as a % of GDP data, Panel 1 consists of Angola, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and Panel 2 consists of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles. Panel 3 consists of 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and Panel 4 includes Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 8.2 analyses the descriptive statistics, section 8.3 
moves to unit roots tests, section 8.4 gives the system GMM test results and interpretation 
before the chapter is concluded in section 8.5. 
8.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics displayed in Appendix C Tables 24, 25, 26 and 27 for Panels 1 to 4 
show huge differences between Panel 1 and 2 where there are different resource categories for 
SADC countries. Net FDI inflows as a % of GDP have a minimum of -5.98 in Panel 1 and 0.22 
in Panel 2. The difference in the maximum values is also huge for the two panels with Panel 1 
having a maximum of 42.11 and Panel 2, a maximum of 19.81. Panels 3 and 4 have a minimum 
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value of -5.98 and a maximum value of 42.11. The dispersion for FDI in Panels 1 and 2 also 
reveals huge differences with Panel 1 demonstrating a huge data dispersion shown by a 
standard deviation of 8.06 compared to a standard deviation of 4.76 in Panel 2.  
 
Tax holidays have significant differences in the mean and standard deviation values in the four 
panels. Panel 1 has the highest mean and standard deviation of 6.26 and 6.42 respectively and 
Panel 2 has the least mean and standard deviation values of 4.33 and 4.91 respectively. Losses 
carried forward have the highest mean in Panel 2 and least in Panel 3. CIT data displays 
descriptive statistics that are different from other tax variables, with Panel 2 having the least 
mean and highest standard deviation and Panel 1 having the highest mean and least data 
dispersion. 
 
Macroeconomic variables show interesting variations as shown in Appendix Table 27 which 
combines all thirteen countries in the analysis contained in Panel 4. The governance index 
ranges from -1.58 to 0.83 and a standard deviation of 0.63 indicates that the values are close to 
the mean. Market potential measured by GDP growth rate, indicates huge differences in the 
regional economies’ growth rates with a minimum value of -17.95 and a maximum of 18.51.  
Infrastructure index ranges from -1.53 to 4.73 and has a mean value of 0.01. The Economic 
policy index ranges from -2.64 to 10.17.  The SADC economies exhibit significant differences 
in natural resource availability shown by log natural resources variables which range from -
5.75 to 4.27. 
 
Log trade openness has the least standard deviation value among macroeconomic variables of 
0.31. This shows that the trade policies of the SADC countries are similar. Financial 
globalisation data shows different levels of financial development in SADC countries 
demonstrated by a minimum value of -0.076 and a maximum of 3.90 on log financial 
globalisation. 
8.3 Unit root tests results
8
 
 
Testing for panel unit roots is important in applied research (Baltagi & Kao 2000). Regression 
panel data models with non-stationary data are found to have misleading results (Entorf 1997). 
                                                          
8 Hall & Mairesse (2002) and Blundell & Bond (1998) pointed out that use of non-stationary data in GMM 
estimations invalidates model specifications. 
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Entorf (1997) found out that in fixed effects models, spurious regression gives misleading t-
values with high R
2
 values. In GMM estimation the presence of unit root invalidates the model 
specification (Hall & Mairesse 2002). This study adopts the IPS and LLC unit root tests 
because they give best results in small cross-sections (Sen, Senturk & Ozkan 2012). The LLC 
considers the unit root for all cross-sections at once, as opposed to the IPS model test unit root 
process for each cross-section. 
8.3.1 IPS tests 
 
The IPS panel unit root tests test the null hypothesis - that the series is non stationary against 
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The tests are based on the assumption that takes a 
particular state for each cross-section (Sen et al. 2012). The model estimations for the IPS test 
include panel means and time trends. 
 
Table 12: Summary of IPS unit root tests results 
Variable                                    Order of integration 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
FDI I(0) 
[-3.1899] 
(0.0105)**
 
I(0) 
[ -2.1195] 
(  0.0578)* 
I(0) 
[-2.7589] 
(0.0225)** 
I(0) 
[-2.7805] 
(0.0128)** 
Tax holidays I(0) 
[-4.0734] 
(0.0065)*** 
I(0) 
[-4.2691] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-5.3447] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-5.4970] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log CIT I(0) 
[-1.8973] 
(0.0787)* 
I(2) 
[-1.4484] 
(0.3936) 
I(1) 
[-1.5676] 
(0.2213) 
I(1) 
[-1.6310  ] 
(0.1822) 
0H
i
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Log losses 
 carried forward 
I(0) 
[-8.9681] 
(0.0017)*** 
I(0) 
[  -2.2394] 
(0.0364)** 
 I(1) 
[-1.7118] 
(0.1065) 
I(0) 
[-2.9273] 
(0.0099)*** 
Reduced CIT I(0) 
[-2.6025] 
(0.0164)** 
I(0) 
[-2.4010] 
(0.0848)* 
I(0) 
[-2.4355  ] 
(0.0099)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.4652 ] 
(0.0066)*** 
Governance  I(2) 
[-1.7986  ] 
(0.5615) 
I(1) 
[-1.7637] 
(0.1415) 
I(1) 
[-1.9193] 
(0.1426) 
 I(1) 
[-1.8980] 
(0.1224) 
Market potential I(0) 
[-2.5144] 
(0.0087)*** 
I(0) 
[-3.7825] 
(0.0020)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.8097] 
(0.0002)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.8387  ] 
(0.0001)*** 
Infrastructure  
Index 
Non-stationary
9
 
[-1.6380] 
(0.2516) 
I(0) 
[-2.5273] 
(0.0093)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.5551] 
(0.0021)*** 
I(0) 
[-3.0773] 
(0.0006)*** 
Log natural 
 Resources 
I(0) 
[-2.2032] 
(0.0642)* 
I(0) 
[-2.2348] 
(0.0455)** 
I(0) 
[-2.2024] 
(0.0169)** 
I(0) 
[-2.2750] 
(0.0086)*** 
Log trade 
 Openness 
I(0) 
[-2.0726] 
(0.0630)* 
Non-stationary 
[-2.0684] 
(0.1072) 
I(0) 
[-2.2729  ] 
(0.0253)** 
I(0) 
[-2.1973] 
(0.0226)** 
                                                          
9 Variables indicated non-stationary, fail to be stationary until the time series data points becomes insufficient for 
IPS test. 
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Log financial 
Globalisation 
I(0) 
[-2.8858] 
(0.0024)*** 
I(0) 
[  -2.5174] 
(0.0220)** 
I(0) 
[-3.0644  ] 
(0.0002)*** 
I(0) 
[-3.5242] 
(0.0010)*** 
Economic Policy 
Index 
I(0) 
[-2.7040] 
(0.0025)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.6064] 
(0.0075)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.5524] 
(0.0003)*** 
I(0) 
[-3.1941] 
(0.0001)*** 
Source: Author’s calculations using stata 12. P-values are in parentheses () and t-statistic [], 
unit root hypothesis is rejected at ***1%, **5% and * 10% levels of significance. The 
estimation includes the trend. 
 
Table 12 shows the unit root results using the IPS method. Most variables are I (0) thus 
stationary in levels in all panels. These include: FDI, tax holidays, reduced CIT, market 
potential, natural resources, financial globalisation and economic policy index. Infrastructure 
index, trade openness and losses carried forward are integrated of order zero in three panels 
each. CIT and governance show I (0) result in one panel each. Therefore, most of our variables 
are I (0) using the IPS test. The final conclusions on stationarity of variables combine the 
findings of the IPS and LLC test. 
8.3.2 LLC tests 
 
The LLC panel unit root tests test the null hypothesis  that the series results are non-
stationary against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. The tests are based on the 
assumption that is that same parameter for all cross-sections (Sen et al. 2012). The results of 
the LLC test offer the least distortions in small panels (Hlouskova & Wagner 2005). 
  
Table 13: Summary of LLC unit root tests results 
Variable                                    Order of integration 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 
0H
i
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FDI I(0) 
[-5.0859] 
(0.0000)***
 
I(0) 
[-3.3150] 
(0.0005)*** 
I(0) 
[-7.0279] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-7.0072] 
(0.0000)*** 
Tax holidays I(0) 
[-6.0271] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.3451] 
(0.0095)*** 
I(0) 
[-21.6465] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-23.6154] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log CIT I(0) 
[-16.4584] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.4996] 
(0.0062)*** 
I(0) 
[-26.5265] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-25.9188] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log Losses 
 carried forward 
I(0) 
[-17.8769] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.7889] 
(0.0026)*** 
I(0) 
[-1.2e+02] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-1.4e+02] 
(0.0000)*** 
Reduced CIT I(0) 
[-16.4584] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-7.7002] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-16.2225] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-15.2987] 
(0.0000)*** 
Governance I(0) 
[-7.3746] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-7.7860] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-10.4855] 
(0.0000) 
I(0) 
[-10.1376] 
(0.0000)***  
Market potential I(0) 
[-6.1938] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-2.1707} 
(0.0150)** 
I(0) 
[-9.0229] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-8.4529] 
(0.0000)*** 
Infrastructure  I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
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Index [-3.3429] 
(0.0004)*** 
[-2.4051] 
(0.0081)*** 
[-3.2407] 
(0.0006)*** 
[-4.9329] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log Natural 
 Resources 
I(0) 
[-3.2143] 
(0.0007)*** 
I(0) 
[-9.7277] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-11.0277] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-11.0013] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log Trade  
Openness 
I(0) 
[-2.9974] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-3.7547] 
(0.0001)*** 
I(0) 
[-6.5702] 
(0.0032)*** 
I(0) 
[-6.5595] 
(0.0000)*** 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
I(0) 
[-6.8246] 
(0.0014)*** 
I(0) 
[-25.5131] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-4.5162] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-5.4169] 
(0.0000)*** 
Economic policy 
Index 
I(0) 
[-4.4094] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-4.7763] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-5.4894] 
(0.0000)*** 
I(0) 
[-6.1998] 
(0.0000)*** 
Source: Author’s calculations using stata 12. P-values are in parentheses () and adjusted t-value 
[], unit root hypothesis is rejected at ***1%, **5% and * 10% levels of significance. The 
estimation includes the trend. 
 
Table 13 above indicates that using the LLC test, all variables are stationary in levels for all the 
panels. Thus, the variables are I (0) at 1% level. The study therefore concludes that all the 
variables are stationary in level based on the IPS and LLC results. Therefore, since all the 
variables are I (0) the model does not indicate long-term relationships in the variables, thus the 
cointegration tests will not be carried out. 
8.4. System GMM estimation 
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In modelling system GMM models there is a bias constraint in estimation emanating from too 
many instruments (Mehrhoff  2009). The estimators produce efficient results if the lagged 
levels and lagged differences in a SYS GMM model are valid instruments for the lagged 
variable by being independent from the transformed error term. 
 
There are two methods of reducing an instrument count in the SYS GMM model; the first one 
is by constraining the lag depth and the second one is by collapsing the instrument set 
(Mehrhoff  2009). This study adopts the instrument collapsing method in determining the 
efficient instrument count level.  
 
The system GMM estimation used in this study has the individual year effects to increase 
instruments in estimation and improve the efficiency of estimates
10
. 
 
8.4.1 Diagnostic tests 
 
Tables 14 to 17 contain diagnostic results from a system GMM estimation of Panels 1 to 4. The 
estimation results from the four panels were gained from using one-step GMM estimation with 
constants as specified in econometric models A to D. The model also contains individual year 
specific effects. These additional ten-year dummy variables are included to increase the 
instruments and thus improve the efficiency of estimates (Stoinov 2007).  
 
Table 14: Panel 1 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument  
Count 
          58 58 58 58 
F(stat) Wald 
 
      321.10 315.90 313.21 335.96 
F(stat) p-value      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                                                          
10 The ten year dummies are used to increase the instrument count given the small samples. 
2
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Sargan test  
p-values 
     (0.4380) (0.5113)  (0.5315) (0.5641) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1335) 
(0.1363) 
(0.1539) 
(0.1432) 
(0.1276) 
(0.1234) 
(0.0697) 
(0.0897) 
 
Table 15: Panel 2 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument  
Count 
          55 55 55 55 
F(stat) Wald 
 
      165.06 171.17 173.54 179.21 
F(stat) p-value      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test  
p-values 
     (0.7158) (0.6907)  (0.6406) (0.7271) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.0937) 
(0.0983) 
(0.0763) 
(0.0765) 
(0.0827) 
(0.0926) 
(0.0761) 
(0.0973) 
 
Table 16: Panel 3 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument  
Count 
          60 167 163 166 
F(stat) Wald 
 
      323.35 862.35 810.53 837.35 
F(stat) p-value      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2
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Sargan test  
p-values 
     (0.4508) (0.2648)  (0.3954) (0.2438) 
     
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1230) 
(0.1264) 
(0.1342) 
(0.1437) 
(0.1209) 
(0.1318) 
(0.1386) 
(0.1425) 
 
Table 17: Panel 4 tests 
Test Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Instrument  
Count 
          174 175 172 175 
F(stat) Wald 
 
      853.31 890.50 831.67 876.58 
F(stat) p-value      0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test  
p-values 
     (0.3074) (0.1654)  (0.2775) (0.1415) 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
(0.1672) 
(0.1724) 
(0.1549) 
(0.1690) 
(0.1452) 
(0.1524) 
(0.1673) 
(0.1739) 
 
 
The diagnostic results analysis begins with the model specification test shown by the F-statistic 
which is highly significant for all four panels at 1% level as shown by the p-values. This 
indicates that the regressors in the four panels jointly explain the significant variation in the 
FDI inflows across the selected SADC countries in each panel.  
 
The next important estimation test is the post-estimation Sargan test which tests for over-
identifying restriction in the panels. The Sargan test compares the number of instruments used 
and the parameters in the model. In one-step estimation the Sargan test is considered superior to 
2
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the alternative Hansen J-test (Okodua 2011). In cases where the model fails the Sargan test it 
indicates a misspecification error (Chavali  2014). This is because it minimises the value of the 
GMM one-step model. The null hypothesis for the Sargan test is that over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. The Sargan test rejects the validity of instruments when the probability p-
value is less than 0.05 (Chavali 2014). 
 
Thus, the Sargan test in all the four panels using p-values does not reject over identifying 
restrictions since all four panels have p-values above 0.05. The diagnostic result, therefore, 
concludes that the instruments’ over-identification restrictions set in each panel are valid. 
 
The models used two differenced lags as instruments to address the problem of short time 
periods and small cross-sections in the models. The reported AR (1) and AR (2) tests show p-
values above 5% in the one-step estimations. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation at 5% level of significance. Therefore, the instruments are not endogenous and 
estimates are consistent. 
8.4.2 Estimated empirical models
11
  
 
Table 18 shows the estimation results from the four estimated models of Panel 1 using one-step 
GMM estimation with constants as specified in econometric models A to D in Chapter 7. The 
model also contains individual year dummies for the ten years in the model to increase the 
instrument count and improve results efficiency
12
. The results show the effects of tax incentives 
and other control variables on FDI inflows into the SADC’s resources-rich countries in Panel 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The models contain a combination of linear-linear and linear-log relationships. For linear-linear relationships a 
unit change in the independent variable leads to a change in the dependent variable which is equal to the 
coefficient of the independent variable. For linear-log models one unit increase of log independent variable leads 
to a change in the dependent variable by the value of the coefficient of the independent variable. Thus a 1% 
increase in the independent variable changes the dependent variable by 0.01 times the coefficient of the 
independent variable.  Since the dependent variable is measured as a % of GDP the interpretations of the variables 
for linear-log models have to consider the variables measurement. 
12 Year dummies are reported in the Appendix D 
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Table 18: Estimated empirical results of the SYS GMM Panel 1 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Independent 
Variable 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.7508288 
(0.000)***   
0.7813831   
(0.000 )***     
 
0.7313236 
(0.000)***   
 
0.69201174 
(0.000 )***     
 
Tax holidays -0.0453303   
    (0.819 )    
 
     
 
 
Log CIT  -0.32456 
 (0.006)***    
 
  
Losses 
Carried  
Forward 
  -6.457257 
(0.259) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.257379   
    (0.040 )**    
 
Governance  11.37773 
  (0.076 )*    
 
9.958844 
(0.101)    
 
8.679832 
  (0.029 )**    
 
  5.945349 
  (0.008 )***    
 
Market -0.1198403 -0.0899106 -0.1302812 -0.1598241 
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potential (0.262 )    
 
(0.430 )    
 
(0.171)    
 
(0.139)    
 
Infrastructure -4.434885 
(0.005)*** 
-3.327424 
(0.065)* 
-3.412898 
(0.058)* 
-5.075188 
(0.004)*** 
Log Natural  
Resources 
-1.345016 
(0.000)*** 
-1.36202 
(0.000)*** 
-1.451677 
(0.000)***  
-1.306214 
(0.000)*** 
Log Trade 
Openness 
1.543197 
(0.0056)*** 
1.518772 
(0.010)**  
1.593977 
(0.007)*** 
2.07522 
(0.001)***  
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
1.432874 
(0.059)* 
1.451487 
(0.504) 
0.1210353 
(0.962)  
2.471988 
(0.032)** 
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1802605 
(0.517)  
-0.2629364 
(0.085)*  
-0.1752989 
(0.582) 
-0.0794149 
(0.815) 
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.975048 
(0.351) 
7.414866 
(0.000)*** 
6.744843 
(0.009)*** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
2.305721 
(0.284) 
8.235579 
(0.000)*** 
7.225766 
(0.006)*** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.539036 
(0.474) 
7.450592 
(0.000)*** 
6.788771 
(0.009)*** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.978067 
(0.339) 
7.341992 
(0.000)*** 
5.498714 
(0.034)** 
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Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
3.661675 
(0.110) 
5.672091 
(0.021)** 
3.911199 
(0.109) 
3.742166 
(0.180) 
1.755233 
(0.549) 
-43.01757 
(0.045)** 
 
4.453325 
(0.065)* 
6.460128 
(0.012)** 
5.077059 
(0.056)* 
4.859294 
(0.101) 
2.837567 
(0.359) 
-85.97198 
(0.059)* 
 
3.808071 
(0.100) 
6.190999 
(0.014)** 
4.591577 
(0.069)* 
4.390719 
(0.126) 
2.586305 
(0.396) 
-27.81898 
(0.264) 
 
3.039139 
(0.181) 
4.328481 
(0.083)* 
2.522045 
(0.312) 
2.560895 
(0.361) 
0.5466028 
(0.852) 
-62.53391 
(0.007)*** 
 
Observations          63 63   
 
63          63 
Number of 
 Groups 
         7 7 
 
7          7 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant 
at 5% level and *indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Tax holidays in Model A are statistically insignificant, meaning they do not explain FDI 
inflows into resources-rich SADC countries. However, the negative sign on the variable 
indicate that tax holidays give a negative signal about an economy to investors and discourage 
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their location in economies that use tax holidays. A 1% increase in tax holidays reduces FDI 
inflows by 0.045%. 
 
CIT is significant at 1% level as shown in Model B and is negatively signed indicating that an 
increase in CIT will lead to reduced FDI inflows to the SADC resources-rich countries. This 
supports the findings of Klemm and van Parys (2009) that lower income tax rates attract more 
FDI inflow into developing countries. Precisely a 1% increase in CIT reduces FDI inflows by 
0.325%. This supports the theoretical findings in Chapter 3 which argued that investors seek 
low operating costs which are long-term. Therefore, tax holidays are not preferred as much 
lower CIT in attracting FDI. 
 
Losses carried forward are insignificantly different from zero as shown in Model C. The 
insignificant values for the variable support the argument that investors are interested in 
incentives that are long-term. The variable has a p-value of 0.259 showing that it is 
insignificantly different from zero. Reduced CIT in specific sectors produced interesting results 
shown in Model D above; the variable has a negative effect at 1% level. Since the study uses 
the lowest rate offered in specific investment sectors in each SADC country to measure this 
variable, the sign indicates that high tax rates in key sectors reduces FDI inflows.  Specifically 
in Panel 1, reduced CIT shows that a 1% reduction in CIT will translate into a 0.25% increase 
in FDI inflows. This supports the neoclassical investment theory which argues that low costs 
attract investment since they enhances profits. 
 
The lagged FDI variable shows similar results for all four models estimated using Panel 1 
countries’ data. The variable is significant at 1% and is positively signed in all the models A to 
D. This indicates that the flow of FDI into SADC countries responds to previous year inflows; 
therefore, most investments in the region flow to areas where other investors are established. 
Thus, most investors use the follow-the-leader approach, where new investments are inspired 
by the performance of earlier investors. The results also support the New Economic Geography 
theory which argues that investment flows to the core region where economic activity is 
already high. This is typically true in developing countries where most FDIs are resources-
seeking and thus discovery of primary resources by early movers attracts new entrants. The 
effects of previous year FDI inflows in Panel 1 show coefficients that are almost equal. In 
Model A, a 1% increase in previous year FDI inflows increases FDI net inflows in the current 
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year by 0.75%. For models B, C and D a 1% increase in previous year FDI inflows increases 
FDI net inflows in the current year by 0.78%, 0.73% and 0.69% respectively. 
 
The governance index in the model shows the socio-economic status of a country. Panel 1 
results for models A, C and D show that FDI net inflows are positively related to a stable socio-
economic status of a country at 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. These results 
support the findings of Akanbi (2012) which conclude that investment spending in a country 
increases when the socio-economic environment is good. These results and the magnitudes of 
the coefficients indicate that the institutional stability and effectiveness in the SADC region are 
important in attracting foreign investment.  For instance, in Model A, a one index point 
increase (improvement) in governance will lead to about an 11% increase in FDI inflow to the 
region. 
 
 Market potential measured by GDP growth rate, is insignificantly different from zero in all the 
four models of Panel 1. This shows that the globalisation wave has removed the effects of 
market size since foreign markets are now easier to access due to technological improvement in 
information communications technology. The SADC countries’ integration has also widened 
the market for investors in the region thus market-seeking FDI to individual countries is 
insignificant. Though insignificant, the market potential variable is surprisingly negative in all 
four panels. For example, in Model A, a 1% increase in market potential reduces FDI inflows 
by 0.12%. This is contrary to the expected positive effect that market potential should have. 
This might be because of the nature of investment in the SADC resource-rich countries which 
is resources-seeking FDI. Thus, increases in the GDP growth rate indicate high incomes for the 
local nationals which might pose competition for foreign capital. High incomes also signal 
potentially strong pressure groups for indigenous participation in sectors that involve natural 
resources extraction which threatens the existence of foreign investment in those sectors. 
 
The stock of infrastructure variable has interesting results in all four models, which is 
surprisingly negatively signed. The coefficients are significant at 1% level in Models A and D 
and at 10% in models B and C. The coefficients have high values of -4.4 for model A, -3.3 for 
Model B, -3.4 for Model C and -5.1 for Model D. Theoretically, increases in stock of 
infrastructure is expected to positively impact foreign capital. However, the results in Panel 1 
for all the models A to D indicate that increase in infrastructure negatively affects inward FDI 
attraction. This conclusion supports the findings of Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) that 
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excessive productive expenditure by governments can be unproductive and that developing 
countries misallocate expenditure in favour of capital expenditure at the expense of recurrent 
expenditure. The negative relationship between infrastructure and FDI inflows can also be 
attributed to poor infrastructure regulatory frameworks. Following the recommendations of the 
World Bank in the 1990s most SADC countries privatised their state-owned enterprises in the 
infrastructural sector which created private companies in the industry. This move increased the 
cost of infrastructure and hence their positive attraction to FDI collapsed. Kirkpatrick, Parker 
and Zhang  (2006) conclude that though developments in the commucations sector have 
encouraged competition, the sector has characteristics that allow firms to retain a monopoly 
which might encourage them to exploit their power in pursuit of supernormal profit. 
 
The log natural resources variable also exhibits interesting results. Panel 1 shows that the 
natural resources variable (measured as natural resources rents as % of a GDP) has a negative 
relationship with FDI inflows and are significant at 1% level in all four models. This indicates 
that FDI in SADC is resources-seeking and when countries impose high royalties in mining and 
other taxes on foreign investment, FDI inflows fall. For instance, in Model B a 1% increase in 
natural resources rent as a % of GDP reduces FDI inflows by 1.36%. 
 
Trade openness measured as trade % of GDP is significant in all four models of Panel 1. The 
variable is positively signed indicating that openness to trade attracts FDI inflows into SADC 
resources-rich countries. The result supports the theoretical arguments that openness to trade 
reduces the costs of doing business to foreign firms and thus attracts foreign capital. The 
variable is highly significant at 1% level in models A, C and D and at 5% in Model B. Model D 
has the highest coefficient which shows that a 1% increase in trade as a % of GDP will lead to 
an increase in FDI net inflows by 2.075%. The coefficients for models A, B and C are also high 
taking values of 1.54; 1.51 and 1.59 respectively. 
 
Financial globalisation positively impacts FDI inflows in all four models of Panel 1. However, 
the variable is only significant in models A and D at 10% and 5% levels respectively. Model A 
shows the 1% increase in financial globalisation explains a 1.43% increase in net FDI inflows 
and in Model D, a 1% increase in financial globalisation accounts for a 2.47% increase in net 
FDI inflows. 
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The economic policy variable is insignificantly different from zero in models A, C and D of 
Panel 1. It is, however, significant at 10% level in Model B and negatively signed. Thus, an 
increase in inflation and government expenditure in the index reduces net FDI inflows into 
SADC resources-rich countries. A 1% increase in economic policy index reduces net FDI 
inflows by 0.26%. 
 
Table 19: Estimated empirical results of the SYS GMM Panel 2 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Independent 
Variable 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.1817723    
(0.000 )***     
 
0.1769628 
(0.000 )***     
 
0.1517319 
(0.000)***   
 
0.1682598 
(0.000 )***     
 
Tax holidays 0.0335549 
(0.002)***     
 
     
 
 
Log CIT  -0.02603 
 (0.006)***    
 
  
Losses Carried  
Forward 
  0.8545623 
(0.690) 
 
Reduced CIT    0.0891729 
    (0.093 )*    
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Governance  -2.617819    
(0.078 )*    
 
-2.300087 
(0.063 )*    
 
-3.0867    
(0.164 )    
 
-1.869469 
(0.085 )*    
 
Market 
potential 
0.1808723 
(0.016 )**    
 
0.1805173 
(0.112 )    
 
0.1913209 
(0.097 )*    
 
0.1569562 
(0.157)    
 
Infrastructure -4.638513    
(0.002 )***    
 
-4.702356 
(0.002 )***    
 
-4.774561 
(0.002)***    
 
-4.91995 
(0.001 )***    
 
Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.8224798 
(0.244)  
-0.9648517 
(0.033)** 
 
-0.7644326 
(0.252)  
-0.6970618 
(0.274) 
Log Trade 
Openness 
-0.0731741     
(0.978)   
 
-0.79119 
(0.772)  
 
-0.3125475     
(0.908)   
 
-2.5307442 
(0.074)*   
 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
3.960395 
(0.039)**    
 
3.512697 
(0.075)*    
 
4.154748  
(0.025)**    
 
3.912717 
(0.033)**    
 
Economic  
Policy 
0.255267 
(0.427)  
0.1704575 
(0.609)  
0.1703265 
(0.588)  
-0.0887271 
(0.789)  
Yr2004 
 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due  
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
Dropped due 
to collinearity 
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Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
-4.181803 
(0.002)*** 
-2.476348 
(0.031)** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
0.4285573 
(0.702) 
0.0264707 
(0.985) 
-2.684225 
(0.009)*** 
-1.843181 
(0.081)* 
-2.626588 
(0.024)** 
-4.307746 
(0.000)*** 
2.266665 
(0.868) 
-4.497011 
(0.001)*** 
-2.685077 
(0.020)** 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
0.8141012 
(0.508) 
0.333031 
(0.821) 
-2.384177 
(0.033)** 
-1.447129 
(0.218) 
-2.169428 
(0.109) 
-3.757873 
(0.009)*** 
-0.5028798 
(0.970) 
-4.460478 
(0.004)*** 
-2.753415 
(0.070)* 
-0.3645437 
(0.807) 
0.3192226 
(0.786) 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-2.894136 
(0.029)** 
-2.096105 
(0.096)* 
-2.859258 
(0.028)** 
-4.525393 
(0.001)*** 
4.965254 
(0.693) 
-1.238662 
(0.313) 
Dropped due 
to collinearity 
2.529052 
(0.023)** 
3.434598 
(0.005)*** 
2.698731 
(0.061)* 
0.5085404 
(0.682) 
1.368191 
(0.287) 
0.3558411 
(0.778) 
-1.3313991 
(0.298) 
-2.531855 
(0.834) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 
Number of 6 6 6 6 
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 Groups 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant 
at 5% level and *indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 19 shows the results from a system GMM estimation of Panel 2 models A to D, using 
stata 12 econometric software. Table 19 shows the estimation results from the four estimated 
models using one-step GMM estimation with constants as specified in the econometric models 
A to D in Chapter 7. The model also contains individual year dummies for the ten years in the 
model.  
 
The tax incentives variables in the panel significantly explain FDI inflows into resources-poor 
SADC countries except losses carried forward. Tax holidays are significant at 1% and are 
positively signed. The results show that a 1% increase in tax holidays leads to an increase of 
0.034% in net FDI inflows into SADC resources-poorer countries listed in Panel 2. This is in 
support of the findings by Klemm et al. (2009) that in developing countries tax holidays are 
important in luring foreign capital. Tax holidays in the SADC resources-poorer countries 
reduce costs to the investor thus encouraging investment in less attractive sectors. 
 
CIT is significant at 1% level and negatively signed. Precisely a 1% increase in CIT reduces net 
FDI inflows by 0.026%. This supports the theory which argues that increases in CIT increase 
the cost of doing business and thus push away investment. This finding is similar to those in 
Panel 1. Reduced CIT in specific sectors, though weakly significant at 10% level, is 
surprisingly positively signed in Panel 2 (shown in Table 19). The results show that increasing 
taxes in specific sectors increases FDI inflows into resources-poorer SADC countries. A 1% 
increase in least tax rate in specific sectors increase FDI inflows by 0.089%. Possibly this is 
because of the preferential treatment given to specific sectors over other sectors; thus in 
countries with limited resources investors prefer equal treatment in all sectors to ensure easier 
diversification of operations.  
 
The lagged FDI variable shows similar results for all four models A to D in Panel 2 estimation. 
The variable has a positive effect on net FDI inflows and is significant at 1% level in all four 
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models. The variable, however, has lower coefficients than Panel 1 estimations. Thus, the 
impact of previous year FDI inflows has a lower effect in lower-resourced SADC countries 
than in resources-richer SADC countries. In models A, B, C and D a 1% increase in previous 
year net FDI inflows leads to a 0.18%, 0.18%, 0.15% and 0.17% increase in current year net 
FDI inflows in models A, B, C and D respectively. 
 
The governance index is significant in models A, B and D at the 10% level and insignificant in 
Model C. Surprisingly; unlike in Panel 1, in Panel 2 the governance index is negatively signed. 
In models A, B and D a 1 unit increase in governance performance reduces FDI inflows into 
low-resources SADC countries by 2.62%, 2.3% and 1.87% respectively. This could be due to 
the fact that strong governance structures that ensure accountability in operations do not 
encourage FDI in resource-poor environments because they increase the cost of doing business. 
 
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is weakly significantly different from zero in 
models A and C of Panel 2 and insignificant in models B and D. Contrary to its effects in Panel 
1, estimations of the market potential variable has a positive impact on net FDI inflows. Thus, 
in lower-resourced SADC countries market-seeking FDI inflows are significant. Precisely a 1% 
increase in GDP growth rate increases net FDI inflows by 0.18% in Model A and by 0.19% in 
Model C. This result is expected since theory suggests that FDI moves to markets that are 
stronger and thus can find demand for their products. Importantly, this shows that less 
resources-rich SADC countries attract FDI in sectors other than the primary resources sector. 
 
The stock of infrastructure variable has interesting results in all four models in Panel 2. Just as 
in Panel 1, the results are surprisingly negatively signed. The coefficients are significant at 1% 
in models A to D. A 1% increase in infrastructure stock reduces FDI inflows by 4.64%, 4.70%, 
4.77% and 4.92% in models A to D respectively. This result reinforces those findings in Panel 
1. 
 
The log natural resources variables support the results in Panel 1. The variable is significant at 
5% in Model B of Panel 2. Thus, Panel 1’s result that taxing natural resources more in SADC 
countries discourages foreign investment is reinforced. Panel 2 Model B shows that a 1% 
increase in the natural resources variable reduces net FDI inflows by 0.96%. 
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The trade openness variable in Panel 2 shows a different result to that of Panel 1. The result is 
negatively signed though it is significant in Model D only at 10% level. In Model D a 1% 
increase in the trade openness variable reduces net FDI inflows by 2.53%. This indicates that in 
resources-poor SADC countries, foreign capital is in sectors that require protection against 
foreign produced products entering the market. Thus the SADC resources-poor countries have 
not improved their economic environments to ensure competitive production of other goods 
and services outside the primary resources sector. 
 
Financial globalisation significantly impacts positive FDI inflows in all four models of Panel 2 
at 5% level in models A, C and D, with 10% in Model B.  This result complements the findings 
of Panel 1; however, the coefficients in Panel 2 are higher than those in Panel 1. A 1% increase 
in financial globalisation increases net FDI inflows by 3.96%, 3.51%, 4.15% and 3.91% in 
models A, B, C and D respectively. This result suggests that financial development is important 
to foreign investment in other service sectors in the SADC countries with scarce natural 
resources. 
 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 2. Unlike in Panel 1 
the variable is positively signed in models A, B and C. This might be because government 
expenditure crowds in FDI inflows and moderate to low inflations do not discourage 
investment. 
 
Table 20: Estimated Empirical Results of the SYS GMM Panel 3 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Independent 
Variable 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
FDI (-1) 0.9189012 
(0.000)***   
0.892344 
(0.000 )***     
 
0.9245603 
(0.000)***   
 
0.9154076 
(0.000 )***     
 
Tax holidays 0.0780323       
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    (0.295 )    
 
 
Log CIT  -0.721275 
 (0.001)***    
 
  
Losses Carried  
Forward 
  0.9337763 
(0.448) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.0325512    
    (0.394 )    
 
Governance  0.4258281 
(0.023)**     
 
0.8436805 
(0.021)**     
 
0.7751284 
(0.005)***     
 
1.102428 
(0.004)***     
 
Market 
potential 
-0.0616652 
(0.343)     
 
-0.02511873 
(0.695)     
 
-0.056254 
(0.396)     
 
-0.04884783 
(0.449)     
 
Infrastructure -1.908309 
(0.034)**     
 
-1.4194 
(0.000)***     
 
-2.172851 
(0.015)**     
 
-2.196754 
(0.014)**     
 
Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.5296842  
(0.089)* 
-0.7130618  
(0.039)** 
-0.4579656 
(0.148) 
-0.5793247 
(0.057)*  
Log Trade -1.083133 -0.9571666 -0.9074215 -0.6550741 
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Openness (0.500)      
 
(0.543)      
 
(0.571)      
 
(0.674)      
 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
1.542521 
(0.051)*    
 
0.6371277 
(0.009)***     
 
1.967879 
(0.021)**     
 
1.513586 
(0.072)*     
 
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1248531 
(0.480)  
-0.1817259 
(0.300)  
-0.1418776 
(0.424)  
-0.1362478 
(0.446)  
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
 
Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
-0.4003894 
(0.778) 
0.2765428 
(0.839) 
3.616528 
(0.009)*** 
1.68104 
(0.152) 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.330272 
(0.322) 
2.009716 
Dropped due to 
collinearity 
-9.248697 
(0.347) 
-8.857821 
(0.364) 
-5.747985 
(0.552) 
-6.92987 
(0.471) 
-8.500497 
(0.367) 
-7.125888 
(0.449) 
-6.924801 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-0.585162 
(0.935) 
-0.3687737 
(0.959) 
2.530101 
(0.725) 
0.7324856 
(0.920) 
-0.7294905 
(0.918) 
0.4928031 
(0.945) 
0.7924337 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.14612 
(0.866) 
1.554275 
(0.820) 
4.414547  
(0.519) 
2.745105 
(0.693) 
1.317356 
(0.845) 
2.388776 
(0.724) 
2.521793 
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Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
(0.128) 
1.731301 
(0.223) 
0.5196761 
(0.732) 
20.29752 
(0.159) 
 
(0.465) 
-7.068726 
(0.452) 
-8.436732 
(0.370) 
-8.436732 
(0.370) 
 
(0.913) 
0.1712367 
(0.981) 
-1.474243 
(0.840) 
-3.12545 
(0.612) 
(0.714) 
2.1683 
(0.754) 
0.599894 
(0.754) 
24.1454 
(0.986) 
Observations 108 108 108 108 
Number of 
 Groups 
12 12 12 12 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant 
at 5% level and *indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 20 shows the results from a system GMM for Panel 3 models A to D using stata 12 
software. The estimation results were obtained using the one-step GMM estimation with 
constants as specified in the econometric models A to D. The model also contains individual 
year specific effects.  
 
The tax incentive variables indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero and the 
other three incentives (tax holidays, losses carried forward and reduced CIT in specific sectors) 
are insignificantly different from zero. Tax holidays, however, show a positive sign which 
supports the findings of Panel 2 that increasing tax holidays’ years attracts more foreign capital. 
 
CIT shows results similar to those in panels 1 and 2 which is a significant negatively signed 
effect on FDI net inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in the statutory CIT rate will reduce net 
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FDI inflows into twelve SADC countries in Panel 3 by 0.72%. This supports the theory and 
findings in panels 1 and 2 that FDI into the SADC is attracted by low tax rates which enhance 
increased profits.  
 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed, thus the effect is consistent with 
expected results. This is because FDI faces high set-up costs and thus benefits from losses 
carried forwards in initial years of establishment. The longer the years’ losses can be carried 
forward for tax purposes, the more attractive the destination. 
 
Reduced CIT unlike in panels 1 and 2 is insignificant but the negative effect is similar to the 
variable impact in Panel 1.  
 
The lagged FDI variable has similar effects to those in panels 1 and 2 which are highly 
significant at 1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the panel show that 
previous year FDI inflows positively affect current year inflows. The effects have higher 
coefficients than those in Panel 2 which shows that the previous year FDI inflows impact the 
combined SADC countries minus South Africa more than they do the resources-poor group. 
Statistically, a 1% increase in previous year net FDI inflows increases current year net FDI 
inflows by 0.92%, 0.89%, 0.92% and 0.92% in models A, B C and D respectively. 
 
The governance index is significant in all four models of Panel 3, at 5% level in models A and 
B and at 1% in models C and D. Similar to the findings of Panel 1, the variable is positively 
signed showing that SADC countries with high governance scores attract more foreign capital. 
Thus, in the SADC countries forming Panel 3 of the study, FDI favours countries with socio-
economic stability. In Panel 3, a 1 unit increase in governance performance increases net FDI 
inflows in SADC countries by 0.43%, 0.84%, 0.78% and 1.1% in models A, B, C and D 
respectively.  
 
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all four 
models of Panel 3. Surprisingly, however, just as in Panel 1 it is negatively signed. This finding 
is contrary to theory suggesting that high incomes discourage foreign capital due to possible 
competitiveness of local businesses (indicated by high incomes). 
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The stock of infrastructure variable is significant in all four models of Panel 3 at 5% in models 
A, C and D and at 1% in model B. The coefficients just as in panels 1 and 2, are negatively 
signed. The coefficients indicate that a 1% increase in infrastructure stock explains a reduction 
in net FDI inflows by 1.91%, 1.42%, 2.17% and 2.2% in models A to D respectively. This 
result reinforces those findings in panels 1 and 2. 
 
The log natural resources variables support the results in panels 1 and 2. The variable is 
significant in models A, B and D at 10%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Thus, the results in 
panels 1 and 2 reinforce that taxing natural resources more in SADC countries discourages 
foreign investment. For Panel 3, models A, B, and D show that a 1% increase in the natural 
resources variable reduces net FDI inflows by 0.53%, 0.71%, and 0.58% respectively. 
 
The trade openness variable in Panel 3 shows that the variable is insignificantly different from 
zero in all four models. The result is negatively signed as in Panel 2. The sign is contrary to 
theory and means that FDI into SADC countries prefers protected economies which are not 
open to trade.  
  
Financial globalisation has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows in all four models of 
Panel 3 at 10% level in models A and D, 1% in model B and at 5% in model C.  This result 
complements the findings of panels 1 and 2. A 1% increase in financial globalisation increases 
net FDI inflows by 1.54%, 0.64%, 1.97% and 1.51% in models A, B, C and D respectively. 
This result suggests that financial development is important to foreign investment in the SADC. 
 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 3. Similar to Panel 1, 
the variable is negatively signed in all the models. This is because government expenditure 
crowds out foreign investment and inflation levels in the SADC are too high which affects 
business viability. 
 
Table 21: Estimated Empirical Results of the SYS GMM Panel 4 
Dependent variable: FDI as a % of GDP 
Independent 
Variable 
Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
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FDI (-1) 0.9119658 
(0.000)***   
0.8842055   
(0.000 )***     
 
0.9181124 
(0.000)***   
 
0.9045428 
(0.000 )***     
 
Tax holidays -0.1001436  
    (0.155 )    
 
     
 
 
Log CIT  -0.0452 
 (0.009)***    
 
  
Losses Carried 
Forward 
  0.9052408 
(0.449) 
 
Reduced CIT    -0.0099738  
    (0.784)    
 
Governance  0.2175242 
(0.087 )*    
 
0.4763533 
(0.554)   
 
0.1638223 
(0.031 )**    
 
0.4213011 
(0.046 )**    
 
Market 
potential 
-0.0474351      
(0.454)     
 
-0.0087058      
(0.889)     
 
-0.0456667     
(0.479)     
 
-0.03126      
(0.618)     
 
Infrastructure -0.685311 
(0.068)*     
-0.3688582     
(0.054)*     
-0.7936212     
(0.060)*     
-0.5234846     
(0.002)***     
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Log Natural  
Resources 
-0.3291234 
(0.227)  
-0.6035176 
(0.057)* 
-0.2077596 
(0.426)  
-0.2305557 
(0.384) 
Log Trade 
Openness 
-1.351099   
(0.382 )    
 
-1.012735    
(0.501 )    
 
-1.145398    
(0.449)    
 
-0.7036566   
(0.640)    
 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
0.8308491 
(0.031)**     
 
-0.2300842 
(0.767)     
 
1.217181    
(0.018)**     
 
0.5815253 
(0.012)**     
 
Economic  
Policy 
-0.1307242 
(0.443)  
-0.202619 
(0.231)  
-0.1486099 
(0.385)  
-0.1582274 
(0.359)  
Yr2004 
 
Yr2005 
 
Yr2006 
 
Yr2007 
 
Yr2008 
 
Yr2009 
Dropped due  
To collinearity 
5.899724 
(0.371) 
5.750351 
(0.384) 
8.675983 
(0.192) 
7.226081 
(0.283) 
5.622282 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
-11.64383 
(0.230) 
-11.52865 
(0.231) 
-8.280672 
(0.386) 
-9.163584 
(0.335) 
-10.6495 
Dropped due 
To collinearity 
1.954367 
(0.773) 
1.719719 
(0.800) 
4.835564 
(0.479) 
3.304517 
(0.632) 
1.80938 
Dropped due  
to collinearity 
2.825582 
(0.665) 
2.719137 
(0.679) 
5.655541 
(0.390) 
4.348277 
(0.515) 
2.961434 
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Yr2010  
 
Yr2011 
 
Yr2012 
 
Yr2013 
 
Constant 
(0.283) 
6.714986 
(0.303) 
7.121997 
(0.283) 
6.91114 
(0.298) 
5.61058 
(0.401) 
5.64238 
(0.465) 
(0.252) 
-9.487239 
(0.306) 
-9.229978 
(0.323) 
-8.97133 
(0.332) 
-10.15462 
(0.273) 
-4.13543 
(0.564) 
 
(0.787) 
2.762216 
(0.682) 
3.203507 
(0.640) 
2.947802 
(0.667) 
1.608993 
(0.815) 
0.064523 
(0.456) 
(0.646) 
3.885741 
(0.547) 
4.050767 
(0.538) 
4.083123 
(0.535) 
2.779936 
(0.675) 
2.468545 
(0.956) 
 
Observations 117 117 117 117 
Number of 
 Groups 
13 13 13 13 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from stata 12 output 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant 
at 5% level and *indicates significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 21 shows the results from a system GMM for Panel 4 models A to D using stata 12 
software. The estimation results were obtained using the one-step GMM estimation with 
constants as specified in econometric models A to D. The model also contains individual year 
specific effects.  
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The tax incentive variables indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero and the 
other three incentives (tax holidays, losses carried forward and reduced CIT in specific sectors) 
are insignificantly different from zero. Tax holidays surprisingly show a negative effect 
contrary to the panel 2 and 3 estimations but similar to Panel 1. The possible reason for this is 
the addition of South Africa in Panel 4 which adds to the number of SADC countries that have 
abolished tax holidays. This negative effect is thus a consequence of that South Africa being 
the highest recipient of FDI inflows in the SADC. 
 
CIT shows results similar to those in panels 1, 2 and 3 which is a significant negatively signed 
effect on FDI net inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in the statutory CIT rate will reduce net 
FDI inflows into thirteen SADC countries in Panel 4 by 0.05%. This supports theory and 
findings in panels 1, 2 and 3 that FDI into the SADC is attracted by low tax rates which 
enhance increased profits. The coefficient in Panel 4 is smaller than that in Panel 3, showing 
that adding South Africa to the model in Panel 3 reduces the effects of CIT. This is because 
South Africa is moving away from using tax incentives as an FDI attraction strategy. 
 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed as in earlier panels, thus the effect 
is consistent with expected results. This is because FDI faces high set-up costs and thus benefits 
from losses carried forward in the initial years of establishment and the longer the years’ losses 
can be carried forward for tax purposes, the more attractive the destination. 
 
Reduced CIT in Panel 4 is insignificant and negatively signed. The negative effect supports 
theory that low taxes attract more investments. 
 
The lagged FDI variable has similar effects to those in panels 1, 2 and 3 which is a highly 
significant at 1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the panel show that 
previous year FDI inflows positively affect current year inflows. Statistically, a 1% increase in 
previous year net FDI inflows increases current year net FDI inflows by 0.91%, 0.88%, 0.92% 
and 0.90% in models A, B, C and D respectively. 
 
 
The governance index is significant in models A, C and D of Panel 4 at 5% level in models C 
and D and at 10% in models A. Similar to the findings of panels 1 and 3, the variable is 
positively signed showing that SADC countries with high governance scores attract more 
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foreign capital. Thus, the thirteen SADC countries forming Panel 4 of the study show that FDI 
favours countries with high socio-economic stability. In Panel 4, a 1 unit increase in 
governance performance increases net FDI inflows into SADC countries by 0.22%, 0.16% and 
0.42% in models A, C and D respectively.  
 
Market potential measured by the GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all 
four models of Panel 4. Surprisingly, however, just as in panels 1 and 3 the variable is 
negatively signed. This finding is contrary to theory which suggests that high incomes 
discourage foreign capital due to possible competitiveness of local businesses (indicated by 
high incomes). 
 
The stock of infrastructure variable is significant in all four models of Panel 4 at 1% in Model 
D and at 10% in models A, B and C. The coefficients, just as in panels 1, 2 and 3, are 
negatively signed. The coefficients indicate that a 1% increase in infrastructure stock explains 
reduction in net FDI inflows by 0.69%, 0.37%, 0.79% and 0.52% in models A to D 
respectively. This result reinforces those findings in panels 1, 2 and 3. 
 
The log natural resources variable, unlike the results of panels 1, 2 and 3, is significant only in 
Model B at 10% level. Thus, adding South Africa to the panel of SADC countries reduces the 
impact of natural resources rents. This is because of the dominance of South Africa in terms of 
resource richness and FDI inflows compared to other SADC countries. Therefore, even though 
South Africa receives high rents from its natural resources, it continues to attract high 
investment inflows due to other advantages it has, such as high economic development. For 
Panel 4 Model B, a 1% increase in the natural resources variable reduces net FDI inflows by 
0.60%. 
 
The trade openness variable in Panel 4 shows that the variable is insignificantly different from 
zero in all four models. The result is negatively signed as in panels 2 and 3. The sign is contrary 
to theory and means that FDI into SADC countries prefers protected economies which are not 
open to trade, even after adding South Africa to the model.  
  
Financial globalisation has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows in three models of 
Panel 4 at 5% level. This result complements the findings of panels 1, 2 and 3. A 1% increase 
in financial globalisation increases net FDI inflows by 0.83%, 1.22% and 0.58% in models A, 
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C and D respectively. This result suggests that financial development is important to foreign 
investment in the SADC. 
 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four models of Panel 4. Similar to panels 1 
and 3, the variable is negatively signed in all the models. This reinforces the argument that 
government expenditure crowds out foreign investment and inflation levels in the SADC are 
too high which affects business viability. 
 
8.5 Summary and conclusions 
 
The chapter analysed the estimation and results of the study and answered the study’s major 
research questions. Firstly, how effective are tax incentives in attracting foreign mobile capital? 
Secondly, what are the other determinants of FDI attraction into SADC countries? The study’s 
estimation choice was the SYS GMM estimator since it best addresses the estimation problems 
of endogeneity associated with dynamic panel data models.  
The data source for tax variables was the Ernst & Young’s worldwide tax summaries and the 
macroeconomic variables were found in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 
problem of unit roots in macroeconomic data was addressed by using the IPS and LLC unit 
roots test. Here, variables that failed to become stationary until the time series variable became 
incompatible with the IPS test. However, the combined results of the IPS and LLC tests 
concluded that all the variables are stationary in levels. The unit root tests result thus removed 
the need for cointegration tests in the study. 
The SYS GMM estimations in section 8.4 produced interesting results on the effectiveness of 
tax incentives in FDI attraction in the SADC region. Macroeconomic control variables also had 
interesting, and in some cases surprising relationships, with net FDI inflows into the SADC 
countries. The estimations were done using the one-step GMM estimation with constants as 
specified in econometric models A to D in Chapter 7. 
The tax incentive variables indicate that only CIT is statistically different from zero in the 
entire four panels estimated in the study and it constituted Model B. Consistent with theory, the 
CIT variable renders results which are negatively signed. Thus, it can be concluded that in 
SADC countries, increasing statutory CIT, reduces the attractiveness of a country to foreign 
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capital. Tax holidays had mixed and interesting results in all four panels. The variable 
significantly explains variations in FDI inflows only in Panel 2 which comprises the resources-
poorer SADC countries. The effect of the variable is positive in Panel 2, thus for the resources-
poorer SADC countries, increasing tax holidays attracts more foreign capital. Though 
insignificant in Panel 3, the variable has a positive effect, but surprisingly in panels 1 and 4, tax 
holidays show a negative effect. This indicates that adding South Africa to the set of all SADC 
countries listed in the study, changes the effect of tax holidays. This then shows that for 
transitional economies in the group (including South Africa) tax holidays discourage foreign 
capital. 
 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed in panels 2, 3 and 4 and 
negatively signed in Panel 1 of the study. The positive sign indicates that FDI in the SADC 
prefers longer losses carried forward. Reduced CIT shows a significant negative effect in Panel 
1. This indicates that increasing taxes in specific sectors affects overall FDI inflows in the 
SADC. Contrary to Panel 1, Panel 2 shows reduced CIT to be significantly positive for 
explaining FDI inflows into SADC resources-poorer countries. The variable, though 
insignificant in panels 3 and 4, has a negative sign. 
 
The lagged FDI variable has similar results in all four panels and their particular models which 
are highly significant at a 1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the 
panel show that previous year FDI inflows positively affect current year inflows.  
 
The governance index has significantly positive effects in panels 1, 3 and 4. This shows that 
improving the socio-economic status of an economy attracts more foreign capital in the panels. 
However, results in Panel 2 displays a negative effect of governance on FDI inflows. 
Therefore, for the SADC resources-poorer countries, improving the socio-economic 
environment renders negative FDI inflows. 
 
Market potential measured by GDP growth rate is insignificantly different from zero in all four 
panels in the study except in models A and C of Panel 2, where it is significant at 5% and 10% 
respectively. Surprisingly, however, it is negatively signed in panels 1, 3 and 4 and only 
consistent with theory in Panel 2 where it is positively signed. 
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The stock of infrastructure variable is significant and negatively signed in all four panels of the 
study. Thus, high stock of infrastructure renders negative FDI inflows in the SADC region. 
This is contrary to theory and can be explained by the nature of the FDI attracted to the SADC. 
The FDI in the SADC is mainly resources-seeking thus good infrastructure (constructed mostly 
by MNCs) might indicate over-exploitation and exhaustion of primary resources, making it a 
less attractive destination for resources-seeking investors. 
 
The log natural resources variable is significant and negatively signed in Panels 1, Model B of 
Panel 2, models A, B and D of Panel 3 and Model B of Panel 4. The effectiveness of the 
resources variable is weakened by adding South Africa. The trade openness variable is 
consistent with theory only in Panel 1 where it is positively signed and significant, showing that 
for resources-richer SADC countries opening trade attracts more investors. Contrary to theory, 
Panel 2, though only weakly significant in Model D, shows negative effects of trade openness 
to FDI inflows. This insignificantly negative result is also evident in panels 3 and 4.  
  
Financial globalisation has a significantly positive impact on FDI inflows in all four panels. 
This result suggests that financial development is important to foreign investment in the SADC. 
 
The economic policy variable is insignificant in all four panels in the study, except in Model B 
of Panel 1 where it is weakly significant at 10% level. The negative sign of the variable in the 
panels puts forward the argument that government expenditure crowds out foreign investment. 
It also means that inflation levels in the SADC are too high which affects business viability. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the findings and conclusions of the study and points out areas for future 
research. The chapter is structured as follows:  section 9.2 highlights the study summary and 
section 9.3 discusses the findings. In section 9.4 the study’s contribution to the body of 
knowledge is discussed and section 9.5 proffers policy recommendations. Section 9.6 provides 
recommendations for further study in the area.  
9.2 Summary of the study 
 
Tax incentives are important in FDI attraction in the SADC countries, therefore an effective tax 
mix that ensures efficient use of tax incentives is important to ensure sustainable FDI inflows in 
the region. Good governance in the region is important for FDI inflows to increase. Increasing 
government rents from natural resources reduces FDI inflows in the SADC. 
Previous year flows of FDI are positively related to current year inflows, thus consistent FDI 
attraction policies in the SADC are important. Infrastructure in the SADC should be 
consistently improved to ensure compatibility with the dynamic nature of foreign investment. 
Financial markets should be developed to ensure effective flow of capital and economic growth 
through more investment. 
The conclusions are drawn from the preceding eight chapters of the study; in Chapter 2 
conclusions were drawn from a literature review and data trend analysis. The third chapter gave 
conclusions on the FDI patterns in the SADC and discussed the determinants of FDI based on 
theory and empirical findings. Chapter 4 made an inquiry into non tax factors employed by the 
SADC economies in attracting foreign capital. Theory and empirical literature, in Chapter 5 
produced conclusions on the importance of tax incentives in attracting FDI. A thorough inquiry 
into literature followed in Chapter 6 which gave conclusions on the use of tax incentives as a 
tool to attract FDI in the SADC. The model choice analysis and conclusions were made in 
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Chapter 7 given the theoretical foundations and the nature of the data. Decisions about the most 
efficient methodology for the study were made after a review of the literature. Chapter 8 
presents the study’s empirical results and analysis.  
9.3 Thesis findings 
 
The discussion of the study findings starts with the general findings and conclusions of Chapter 
2. The chapter, after an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis from early classical 
propositions of the role of FDI in developing economies concludes that low capital in an 
economy is a major hindrance to the development process. The views of earlier theorists like 
Lewis (1954) for example, to the modern findings by the UN (2005) and Lui and Gerlach 
(2010) conclude that key economic benefits from FDI inflows are positive employment 
creation effects, higher production possibilities, greater access to financial resources for local 
firms, and a reduction in the national debt  burden.  
However, findings in small economies suggest that the unfair competitive advantages inherent 
in large MNCs can have detrimental effects on infant host country firms’ growth thus reducing 
welfare benefits in the economy. So Stiglitz (2000), in his main critique of developing 
economies opening their markets to foreign capital advocates for a sustainable growth in the 
local industries to guarantee long-term economic growth. Contrary to this view, Meier (1995) 
argues that the positive contribution of FDI to economic progress is slow. Therefore, 
institutions that ensure long-term existence of FDI in a developing economy are crucial to the 
full realisation of foreign capital benefits. 
The UNCTAD data on FDI flows across the world lends interesting conclusions to the study. It 
shows that the developed world receives the largest FDI inflow share demonstrating that the 
level of economic growth encourages FDI inflows. This finding is also supported by the SADC 
FDI inflow data which shows South Africa as receiving the largest share of FDI due to its 
hegemony in the region in terms of development. Economic crises are detrimental to FDI 
inflow attraction as witnessed by the fall in FDI inflow in developed countries in 2007 and 
2008 at the height of the global financial crisis.  
Natural resource endowments, especially oil-rich North African regions, received the highest 
FDI inflows in Africa between 1990 and 2012. There were also higher FDI inflows into Angola 
compared to other SADC countries. UNCTAD data shows Angola as being second to South 
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Africa in FDI inflow attraction. Political and social unrest negatively affect FDI inflows as 
evidenced by the fall in FDI inflows in the oil-rich Arab states of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt at 
the height of the Arab spring that caused civil wars across the Arab region. Political unrest also 
affected FDI inflows in Zimbabwe and Madagascar in 2008.  
After establishing the important role FDI has to play in developing countries and the trend in 
FDI flows in the global economy, the study moved to an analysis and synthesis of the factors 
that determine the locational decisions of foreign capital in developing countries with specific 
focus on the SADC countries in Chapter 3.  With the focus on theoretical and empirical 
literature, the chapter made a number of interesting findings. 
The general agreement of theoretical and empirical studies in this chapter is that the costs and 
risks of establishing business in foreign economies are too high. This gave rise to the consensus 
arguments that host markets have to seek peculiar characteristics that increase ease of doing 
business and enhance investors’ earnings if they wish to attract meaningful FDI. Investors were 
seen to follow the risk-return analysis in seeking high returns when risking foreign 
establishment. 
World Bank (2001 and 2011) reports identify that investors are mainly concerned about the 
profitability of their foreign establishments. The reports thus grouped factors that attract FDI 
into firm-specific and country-specific contexts.  
The earliest theory on FDI attraction determinants was the neoclassical theory based on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. Here, Coase (1937) makes the solid conclusion that capital 
moves to resource-rich regions in pursuit of higher rents. Mundell (1957) then expands the 
argument to include government policy variables centered mainly on trade policies. Thus 
investors are seen to favour economies that allow them to trade cheaply with other markets. In 
line with Mundell’s argument, Aliber (1970) extends the model to include exchange rates and 
argues that firms in countries with firm currencies take advantage of their strong currencies to 
earn economic rent in countries with weaker currencies. 
The neoclassical theory critique develops the first firm-specific effects theory the ownership 
advantage theory. The theory suggests that the peculiar advantages of an MNC encourage it to 
embark on foreign investment. These advantages include economies of scale and scope and 
technological know-how. Mason (1939) cements the firm-specific advantages theory with his 
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industrial organisation theory. Mason concludes that the firms’ managerial capabilities and 
thirst for growth are central in decisions to locate abroad. 
In combining the firm-specific and locational advantages factors that encourage foreign capital 
locational decisions, Dunning John (1977) pioneers the central theory in factors that determine 
FDI inflows in developing countries. The theory suggests that firms’ decisions to invest abroad 
are inspired by ownership, locational and internalisation factors. Ownership and internalisation 
factors are firm-specific while locational factors focus on host market factors that make it 
attractive to investment. This theory led to the elaboration of the motives for foreign investment 
being: resources-seeking; market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-asset-seeking. 
Resources and market seekers consider locational factors such as the kind of natural resources 
and markets. Where efficiency-seeking investors specifically consider managerial initiatives in 
making resources more productive through foreign location and so do strategic-resources-
seeking investors consider managerial capabilities in their quest to dominate foreign markets. 
The Uppsala model that followed the OLI paradigm has a different view on why firms locate in 
foreign markets. The model concludes that firms choose to locate in foreign markets as a way 
of learning to navigate in new environments. Buckley and Casson (1976) build on this theory 
by suggesting that businesses choose to locate in foreign markets in the hope of reducing 
transaction costs, information asymmetry and the uncertainties associated with dealing with 
agents in foreign markets without their physical presence. 
The industrial network theory argues that foreign capital follows previous market experience 
and investment success. This theory supports the use of a dynamic model in FDI determinants 
analysis, as previous investments are believed to affect future prospects of receiving foreign 
capital. Thus, policy variables that seek to create a rapport with investors are important from 
this model’s perspective. These policies include: property rights, patent and tax policies.  
The proximity concentration model which builds on the industrial organisation theory, adds 
technological innovation to the firm-specific factors that enhance FDI viability in foreign 
markets. The model, in analysing locational factors that attract FDI, surprisingly disregards the 
contribution of natural resources as a factor in luring FDI. Rather, the theory suggests that 
policies that reduce operational costs of business are central in FDI attraction. Thus, the ability 
of an economy to embrace and encourage technological progress as is also considered a key 
factor in FDI attraction. 
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The chapter then moved to host nation locational factors that attract foreign investment. In this 
section both theory and empirical literature unanimously point to policy variables as a key 
driver in FDI attraction. The policies cited include: educational, tax, health care, anti-trust, 
regional, environmental, fiscal and monetary policies. The section also identified market size 
and economic growth as factors that positively affect FDI inflows. 
Natural resources, contrary to the proximity concentration hypothesis, were also considered to 
be an important input variable in FDI attraction. External trade policies were also indicated as 
FDI attraction policies. The gravity factors such as: language, distance, cultures, geographical 
location and economic closeness were viewed as factors that explain the phenomenon of South 
African investors’  ‘dominance in Mauritius and Botswana’. Thus, this chapter inspired the 
next chapter which sought to establish the non-tax factors in FDI attraction with a view to 
identify the factors relevant to the empirical model to reduce the size of the error term. 
In Chapter 4 we established the non-tax efforts that attract FDI to the SADC countries. 
UNCTAD reports on the weak efforts of African countries to implement sound macroeconomic 
policies to curb inflation and establish strong currencies that encourage business establishment. 
UNCTAD (2005) also points to high production costs and policy mistrust emanating from 
inconsistencies in policy implementation as being rife in Africa and hence low FDI inflows. 
Low GDP per capita rates and thus small markets also discourage foreign capital from moving 
into Africa. 
The SADC has been making good progress in promoting regional integration to grow 
individual member states’ markets and attract regional FDI. The regional bloc established the 
SADC protocol on finance and investment with the view to fostering deeper integration and 
attracting FDI to industrialise the region. The region’s countries have favourable property 
rights’ protection laws except for Zimbabwe which, through its indigenisation policy, has 
discouraged FDI into the country. South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius are rated highly in 
infrastructural development and the SADC countries are working on erecting infrastructure that 
increases ease of doing business. Currency stability and sound macroeconomic policies are also 
positively pursued in SADC with the view to luring FDI.  
Chapter 5 honed in on a theoretical and empirical analysis on the effectiveness of tax incentives 
in FDI attraction. Tiebout (1956) coined the first theory on effectiveness of tax incentives and 
concluded that tax incentives work best in economies with supportive public goods provision to 
produce an attractive public goods mix. Holland and Vann (1998) identify key factors that 
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affect effective use of tax incentives in developing countries. Developing countries are viewed 
as using tax incentives to counter bad tax systems and poor macroeconomic policies. 
The capital arbitrage theory which argues that capital moves from capital-rich economies to 
capital-poor economies where there is cheap labour and favourable policy for higher returns is 
the basis of all theoretical arguments in support of the use of tax incentives in developing 
countries. The neoclassical investment theory concludes that tax incentives encourage 
reinvestments from established investors as they lower the user cost of capital. 
Dunning’s OLI theory also supports the use of tax incentives as they increase the locational 
advantages of an economy and increase FDI attraction. The intangible assets theory concludes 
that tax incentives lower operational costs and thus lure foreign capital. Therefore, the 
traditional theories of FDI movement support the use of tax incentives in FDI attraction. 
The modern theories start with the NEG theory which suggests that world economic activities 
are centered in certain regions. These regions form the core of economic activities, and 
countries outside the core region form the periphery. This theory states that tax incentives work 
best in countries in the core region for which capital has a high affinity. It thus discourages the 
use of tax incentives in peripheral regions. This theory discourages tax incentives in developing 
countries where economic activities are low, as they only lead to revenue losses with little gains 
in economic activity. 
Tax incentives are also used as a policy variable in addressing market failure, regional 
development and increased income distribution. Advantages of tax incentives are: correcting 
market failure, encouraging activities that confer positive externalities, new technology growth, 
encouraging infrastructural FDI, attracting environmentally friendly technology, increasing 
competitiveness of an economy to foreign capital and increasing the revenue base. The 
disadvantages of tax incentives are identified as: revenue loss, misallocation of resources, 
compliance and enforcement costs and increased corruption. 
The chapter then moved to the analysis of tax competition and tax harmonisation which are 
important in the decision whether to grant tax incentives or not. Tax competition based on the 
original Tiebout (1956) model concludes that tax competition increases efficiency as it leads to 
the equi-marginal principle in public goods provision. Oates (1972), however, has a different 
view of tax competition and suggests that it leads to low wages, low employment, capital losses 
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and reduced tax bases. Hence, the modern race-to-the-bottom theory that states that tax 
competition leads to suboptimal resource allocation in regions. 
The Z-M model concludes that the basis of tax competition is that capital moves to where it is 
taxed less. This model reckons that taxes move from mobile factors to immobile factors of 
production. The extensions of the Z-M model saw smaller countries receiving greater benefits 
from low taxes than the richer, larger economies. Factoring trade into the Z-M model, the 
conclusions are that tax competition leads to inefficient resource allocation as production shifts 
to low taxed sectors.  
Harmful tax competition is countered by tax harmonisation which seeks to equalise the 
corporate tax rate in the region and standardise tax policies. This, however, weakens the use of 
fiscal policy in individual member states.  
Empirical findings have divergent views on the effectiveness of tax incentives given the 
methodologies used in how taxes were measured and the delimitation of the studies. Van Parys 
and Klemm (2009) in a landmark study used tax incentive variables and concluded that 
developing countries use tax incentives successfully in attracting FDI. Most other studies have 
used marginal effective tax rates (METR) and average effective tax rates (AETR) to draw their 
conclusions. 
After an analysis of theory and empirical evidence on the effectiveness of tax incentives in FDI 
attraction, the study moved to establishing the use of tax incentives in the SADC. The chapter 
(mainly based on 2014 SADC data) showed that tax incentives are actively used in the SADC 
to attract FDI. Tax holidays are slowly being phased out in the SADC with countries such as 
Mauritius, Lesotho, South Africa and Seychelles having abolished them by 2014. In the DRC, 
tax holidays are used to develop special zones which are under-developed. Madagascar, 
Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe use tax holidays to promote the export sector in EPZs. 
Mozambique uses tax holidays in industrial development. 
Reduced CIT, royalties and VAT rates in specific sectors are used in all fifteen SADC member 
states. They are used in the industrialisation drive in the SADC. Zimbabwe and Angola grant 
reduced CIT rates in the industrial development sector. Zambia utilises these incentives in 
mining, manufacturing and agriculture. Tanzania uses reduced rates in tourism. Malawi. South 
Africa and Madagascar grant reduced CIT rates in the EPZs. Lesotho, the DRC and Botswana 
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offers reduced rates in agriculture, mining and manufacturing respectively. The Seychelles 
grants reduced CIT rates in marine resources. 
Tax allowances, tax credits and similar incentives are widely used in industrial development in 
all the SADC countries. Accelerated depreciation and losses carried forward are also actively 
used incentives in the SADC. 
The end of the chapter took a look at the factors that constrain the use of tax incentives in the 
SADC. These factors were identified as: losses in tax bases, tax cooperation and the need for 
macroeconomic convergence in the region, lack of political will and the need to increase 
indigenous people participation in business. 
Chapter 7 sought to establish the methods of achieving the main objective of the study which 
is: to establish the locational advantages that are central to attracting FDI into the SADC, with 
special interest in the role tax incentives play in creating these advantages. The study chose the 
Dunning (1980) OLI paradigm as the theoretical framework for achieving this objective. The 
‘L’ factors identified by the OLI paradigm as key in establishing a competitive FDI attractive 
economy form most of our variables in the model. 
The study, in its quest to also draw conclusions on the nature of investment in the SADC such 
as resources-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking or strategic-resources-seeking also 
included variables that assist in coming to such conclusions. In line with the OLI framework, 
Fedderke and Romm (2006), establish policy and non-policy factors that attract FDI in 
developing countries. Collectively, factors identified as key in FDI attraction are: natural 
resources, market size, infrastructure, good governance issues, investment favourable 
legislation, tax policy, exchange policy, patent rights and licencing policies. 
The study formulated the model according to the key factors that affect FDI in developing 
countries. The model thus chose to use: tax incentives, governance, market potential, 
infrastructure, natural resources, trade openness, financial globalisation and economic policy, 
as model independent variables. The data for the variables was derived from Ernst & Young’s 
worldwide tax summaries and the macroeconomic variables were found in the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. The study grouped SADC countries into four panels. Panel 1 
included the seven highest resource-rich countries according to the World Bank natural 
resource indicators, which are total natural resources rents as % of GDP. Panel 2 had the six 
least resource-rich countries, Panel 3 consisted of twelve SADC countries in the study (the 
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panel excluded South Africa which is an outlier in resource richness and growth) and Panel 4 
had all thirteen SADC countries in the study. Therefore, using the total natural resources rents 
as a % of GDP data, Panel 1 consisted of Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and Panel 2 included Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Namibia and Seychelles. Panel 3 consisted of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, and finally, Panel 4 had Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
Chapter 8 then did the estimations and gave conclusions on the effectiveness of tax incentives 
in FDI attraction in the SADC region. The chapter analysed the estimations and results of the 
study and achieved the main objectives of the study which were: firstly, to establish the 
effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI and, secondly, establishing the other 
determinants of FDI attraction into SADC countries. The study used a one-step SYS GMM 
estimator which efficiently dealt with the endogeneity problems associated with dynamic panel 
models and tax incentives data as noted in Chapter 7.  
 
The diagnostic tests started with the unit root tests. Using the LLC and IPS tests, the study 
concluded that the variables are stationary in level, thus there was no need for cointegration 
tests. The F-test for all the estimations showed highly significant values at 1% level and 
therefore the study concluded that the variables used in the estimation jointly explain the 
variation in FDI inflows into SADC countries. 
 
The independent variable analysis concluded that generally tax incentives have significant 
mixed effects on FDI attraction in the four different panels of the study. CIT was found to have 
a significantly negative effect on net FDI inflows into all four panels of the study. Therefore, 
increasing CIT in the SADC hinders FDI inflows. Tax holidays had mixed results in all four 
panels. In the resources-poorer SADC countries listed in Panel 2, tax holidays were found to 
positively explain FDI inflows into the SADC countries. Therefore, for resources-poorer SADC 
countries increasing tax holidays attracts more foreign capital. Though insignificant, in Panel 3, 
the variable has a positive effect but surprisingly in panels 1 and 4 tax holidays show a negative 
effect. This indicates that in resources-rich countries of the SADC, tax holidays discourage 
investors from investing in the region. The different results for tax incentives in SADC 
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countries according to resources richness, implies that tax cooperation in tax incentive 
administration is difficult in the region since there is no convergence in tax incentive 
effectiveness. 
 
Losses carried forward are insignificant but positively signed in panels 2, 3 and 4 and 
negatively signed in Panel 1. The positive sign indicates that FDI in the SADC prefers longer 
losses carried forward. Reduced CIT shows a negative significant effect in Panel 1 and negative 
insignificant effects in panels 3 and 4. This indicates that increasing taxes in specific sectors 
affects overall FDI inflows in the SADC. Contrary to Panel 1, Panel 2 shows reduced CIT 
significantly explaining positive FDI inflows into the SADC resources-poorer countries.  
 
The lagged FDI variable has similar results in all four panels and their particular models which 
are highly significant at 1% level positively signed effect. The positive coefficients in the panel 
show that previous year FDI inflows positively affect current year inflows.  
 
The governance index shows a significant positive effect in panels 1, 3 and 4. This shows that 
improving the socio-economic status of an economy attracts more foreign capital into SADC 
countries. However, the panel for resources-poor SADC countries shows a negative 
relationship between governance and FDI inflows. Therefore, for the SADC’s resources-poorer 
countries improving the socio-economic environment does not increase FDI inflows. 
 
Market potential, measured by GDP growth rate, is insignificantly different from zero and 
negatively signed in most models of the four panels in the study. The stock of infrastructure 
variable is significant and negatively signed in all four panels of the study. Thus, high stock of 
infrastructure explains negative FDI inflows in the SADC region. The log natural resources 
variable is significant and negatively signed in the study. The effectiveness of the resources 
variable is weakened by adding South Africa to the panels. The trade openness variable is 
positively related to FDI inflows in Panel 1, showing that for the resources-richer SADC 
countries, opening trade attracts more investors. Contrary to the Panel 1 results, Panel 2 
displayed negative effects of trade openness to FDI inflows.  
  
Financial globalisation significantly impacts positive FDI inflows in all four panels. Thus, 
developing financial markets in the SADC attract more foreign investors. The economic policy 
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variable is insignificant in most models of the four panels in the study. The negative sign of the 
variable in the panels suggests that government expenditure crowds out foreign investment and 
inflation levels in the SADC are too high which affects business viability. 
9.4 Study’s contribution 
 
This study makes far reaching contributions to the FDI attraction strategies’ debate in many 
dimensions. Firstly, to the researcher’s knowledge this is the first study to focus on FDI 
attraction factors that include tax incentive variables for SADC countries. The inclusion of 
derived tax holidays, CIT, reduced CIT and losses carried forward variables, offers credible 
results to policy makers in their choice of a tax incentive mix to attract FDI. 
Secondly, the derivation of indices in governance, infrastructure and economic policy variables 
gives the study clean and reliable data for efficient regression results. This macroeconomic data 
derivation will assist the FDI attraction debate with its inclusion of more variables and well 
behaved data in drawing conclusions. If such data is applied to more regions, more interesting 
and convincing results on factors that attract FDI will be found. 
Thirdly, in Chapter 2 an analysis and comparison of trends in FDI data in different African 
regions drew important conclusions on the impact of the socio-economic environment in FDI 
attraction. Fourthly, the classification of SADC countries according to resource richness 
developed a strong comparative analysis of its own kind. 
Fifthly, the use of individual tax incentives variables in each model precludes the effects of 
collinearity between tax variables and improves results efficiency. This will help in refining the 
debate on the tax incentive contribution to FDI attraction to individual tax incentive variables. 
9.5 Policy recommendations 
 
The study makes a number of policy recommendations for the SADC economies. Chapter 2 
recommended that the SADC governments strive to enhance economic advancement in their 
countries since developed parts of the world receive substantially higher FDI inflows. Political 
stability is also a key factor in achieving socio-economic stability and attracting more foreign 
capital. The SADC countries are thus encouraged to maintain consistent constitutions, strong 
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law enforcement institutions, impartial legal systems and smooth political change systems 
which reduce chances of political unrest. The latter would encourage capital investment and 
hence economic growth.  
Chapter 3 of the study recommends that generally SADC countries should pursue policies that 
encourage new investment. This can be achieved by low operational costs, since this would 
encourage FDI inflows. These policies should include: exchange rate stabilising policies, 
educational policies that create a more productive work force, policies that encourage 
technological innovation, anti-trust, regional, environmental, fiscal and monetary policies that 
guarantee property rights and patents, health care and tax policies.  
Chapter 8 recommends that the SADC pursue policies that increase domestic effective demand 
and ensure a stable market for products, in order to lure more FDI inflows. The chapter gave 
the policy recommendations based on empirical findings specific to the SADC. Firstly, the 
chapter recommends that SADC countries administer low CIT to encourage FDI inflows. 
Secondly, for resources-rich countries tax holidays should not be granted as they discourage 
FDI inflows; however, resources-poor countries can implement tax holidays as they attract 
investment in the countries. 
Thirdly, lowering taxes in specific sectors that are important to economic growth should be 
pursued by the SADC governments as this encourages FDI inflows. Fourthly, the SADC 
countries should establish policies that ensure openness to FDI since flows of FDI into SADC 
countries are related to previous year FDI inflows. Fifthly, good governance is crucial in the 
SADC as it encourages new investments and reinvestments by existing investors. The next 
point is that, infrastructure should be consistently improved to suit all types of investment. This 
demands that the SADC countries move away from improving infrastructure that only favours 
primary resource investment. This is because natural resources are non-renewable and once 
depleted, will no longer attract FDI.  
 
Lastly, SADC countries should improve its nationals’ accessibility to financial resources as this 
will attract more investors. 
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9.6 Recommendations for future study 
 
This study’s focus on the SADC countries contained the number of countries in the analysis; 
this creates problems in estimation of panel data models (Baltagi 2005). Therefore, future 
research on effectiveness of tax incentives using this study’s approach can achieve improved 
results if it can add more countries. For example, all African countries would, increase the 
number of countries in each panel. More countries would ensure more data points and thus 
more robust conclusions.  
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Appendix A 
Figure 7: A1 Dependent variable: net FDI inflow as a % of GDP 
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Figure 8: A2 Tax holidays 
 
 
Figure 9: A3 Reduced CIT in specific sectors 
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Figure 10: A4 CIT 
 
 
Figure 11: A5 Losses carried forward 
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Figure 12: A6 Trade openness 
 
 
Figure 13: A7 Natural resources 
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Figure 14: A8 Market potential 
 
 
Figure 15: A9 Governance 
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Figure 16: A10 Financial globalisation 
 
 
Figure 17: A11 Economic Policy 
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Figure 18: A12 Infrastructure 
 
 
A 13 Data trends analysis 
This section discusses the data trends and relationships of data behaviour between countries as 
plotted in Appendix A. The dependent variable net FDI inflow as a % of GDP is shown in 
Appendix graph A1. The graph shows that the variables range from negative values to positive 
values in the range of -10 to 42. Most SADC countries’ FDI net inflows range in values 
between 0 and 10. Mozambique had the fastest growing net FDI inflow in the study period 
which rose from around 2 in 2004 to 42 in 2013. Angola’s net FDI inflow fell the most from 24 
in 2004 to -6 in 2013. Graph A2 shows the behaviour of tax holidays. Most countries do not 
show changes in the time trend of this variable. This shows that the same holiday period was 
maintained in most countries between 2004 and 2013. The highest tax holiday offered was as 
high as 20 years and the least was no tax holidays at all as most SADC countries sought better 
incentives than the conventional tax holidays. 
Graph A3 shows reduced CIT in specific sectors which exhibits the same behaviour as tax 
holidays where countries maintained the same rate throughout the period. The lowest rate 
offered is 0% and the highest 40%. CIT rates in graph A4 shows that Zambia has the highest 
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rate of 45% and Mauritius, the lowest rate of 15%. Losses carried forward range from 3 years 
to an unlimited number of years, as shown in graph A5.  
Macroeconomic variables have a more defined time trend than tax incentives variables. Trade 
openness in graph A6 shows that Lesotho has the highest openness index of over 150 
throughout the period. South Africa has the lowest trade openness values of below 100 between 
2004 and 2013. The natural resources graph A7 shows that most SADC countries have the 
same range of natural resources ranging between 0 and 20, except for Angola and Zambia. 
Angola is an outlier with resources rents of above 40 compared to the next best country Zambia 
which has values ranging between 20 and 25. Mauritius has the lowest number of resources just 
above zero. 
Market potential shown by GDP growth rate also shows a similar trend to natural resources 
with most countries having values in the 0 to 10 range throughout the study period. Zimbabwe 
has the lowest growth rate below 0 from 2004 to 2008 which rose to around 10 in 2010 and fell 
drastically between 2011 and 2013. The governance index shows that the individual country 
data has same variations throughout the period. However, countries have wide variations with 
Mauritius having the highest average scores and Zimbabwe has the poorest record.  Graph A10 
shows financial globalization; it shows that the access to banks in most countries range between 
0 and 10. Seychelles has the highest access figure of between 40 and 50 in the period of study, 
followed by Mauritius with ranges between 18 and 22. 
Economic policy index graph A11 shows variations between 2008 and 2010. The infrastructure 
index in graph A12 shows that the SADC countries have different infrastructural stocks. South 
Africa has the highest index of above 4 in the period of study and Angola has the lowest with 
values ranging between -1.4 and 0. 
Appendix B 
Table 22: B1 Derivation of Economic Policy Index 
Principal  Components Analysis 
Eigenvalues 
Number 
(components=2) 
Value 
(trace=2) 
Difference 
 
Proportion  
 
Cumulative 
value 
1 
2 
1.07117 
0.928831 
0.142338 
………… 
0.5356 
0.4644 
0.5356 
1.0000 
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Eigenvectors 
Variable  
Loading 
PC1 
 
PC2 
  
Government 
Inflation 
-0.7071 
0.7071 
0.7071 
0.7071 
  
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Table 23: B2 Derivation of infrastructure index 
Principal  Components Analysis 
Eigenvalues 
Number 
(components=3) 
Eigenvalue 
(trace=3) 
Difference 
 
Proportion  
 
Cumulative 
value 
1 
2 
3 
1.79543 
0.967396 
0.237178 
0.82803 
0.730218 
………… 
0.5985 
0.3225 
0.0791 
0.5985 
0.9209 
1.0000 
Eigenvectors 
Variable  
Loading: 
PC1 
 
PC2 
 
PC3 
 
telephone 
electricity 
internet 
0.6797 
0.2264 
0.6976 
-0.2423 
0.9671 
-0.0778 
0.6923 
0.1161 
-0.7122 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
Appendix C Descriptive statistics 
Table 24: Descriptive statistics for Panel 1  
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDI 70 5.117639
  
8.055935 -5.98095 42.1086 
Tax Holidays 70 6.257143 6.419368 0  20 
Log CIT 70 3.468794 0.1322305 3.218876  3.806663 
Log Losses  
Carried Forward 
70 1.796096 0.3987589 1.098612 
   
2.302585 
Reduced  CIT 70 10.52857 9.429327 0  30 
298 
 
Governance 70 -0.5271286          0.5504665 -1.58          0.43 
Market Potential 70 3.142819 4.830837 -17.9515  18.5068 
Infrastructure  
Index 
70 -0.3384829 1.991317 -1.534163  4.726848 
Log Natural 
 Resources 
70 2.621836 0.7009959 1.394158  4.271171 
Log Trade  
Openness 
70 4.371043 0.2439851 3.822472 
  
4.939189 
 Log Financial 
Globalisation 
70 1.254922 0.6725667 
 
-0.0759571 
   
2.551716 
Economic 
Policy 
Index 
70 0.1899924 1.655951 -2.640939 
   
10.16996 
 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics for Panel 2 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDI 60 6.920253
  
4.756146 0.217592 19.8545 
Tax Holidays 60 4.333333 4.911649 0  20 
Log CIT 60 3.300067 0.2762199 2.70805  3.688879 
Log Losses  
Carried Forward 
60 1.841089 0.3878329 1.098612 
   
2.302585 
Reduced  CIT 60 11.31667 10.81664 0  40 
Governance 60 0.2050556          0.4682721   -0.8116667     0.8316667 
Market Potential 60 2.920659 3.624864 -8.69076  11.032 
Infrastructure  
Index 
60 0.4158341 1.259368 -1.396387  2.225538 
Log Natural  
 Resources 
60 -0.2624646 2.632074 -5.745855  2.22569 
Log Trade 
 Openness 
60 4.70079 0.2937308 4.122606 
  
5.344986 
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Log Financial 
Globalisation 
60 2.029385 1.165739 
 
0.1477129 
   
3.903279 
Economic 
Policy 
Index 
60 -0.2216578 1.165739 0.1477129 
   
4.001255 
 
Table 26: Descriptive statistics from Panel 3 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDI 120 6.300716
  
6.9293 -5.98095 42.1086 
Tax Holidays 120 5.816667 5.851069 0  20 
Log CIT 120 3.393786 0.2356405 2.70805  2.806663 
Log Losses  
Carried Forward 
120 1.779358 0.3846057 1.098612 
   
2.302585 
Reduced  CIT 120 11.3 10.2115 0  40 
Governance 120 -0.230825        0.637725       -1.58    0.8316667
  
Market Potential 120 3.122228 4.430161 -17.9515  18.5068 
Infrastructure  
Index 
120 -0.3599021 1.202963 -1.534163  2.225538 
Log Natural   
Resources 
120 1.23821 2.435843 -5.745855  4.271171 
Log Trade   
Openness 
120 4.557929 0.3003646 3.822472 
  
5.344986 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
120 1.571746 1.035321 
 
-0.759571 
   
3.903279 
Economic 
Policy 
Index 
120 0.0361047 1.465533 -2.640939 
   
10.16996 
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Table 27: Descriptive statistics from Panel 4  
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
FDI 130 5.949615
  
6.772942 -5.98095 42.1086 
Tax Holidays 130 5.369231 5.831136 0  20 
Log CIT 130 3.39092 0.2266671 2.70805  3.806663 
Log Losses  
Carried Forward 
130 1.816862 0.392877 1.098612 
   
2.302585 
Reduced  CIT 130 10.89231 10.06105 0  40 
Governance 130 -.1891974 
 
.629786       -1.58     .8316667 
Market Potential 130 3.040284 4.30169 -17.9515  18.5068 
Infrastructure  
Index 
130 0.0096634 1.728839 -1.534163  4.726848 
Log Natural  
Resources 
130 1.29062 2.348381 -5.745855  4.271171 
Log Trade   
Openness 
130 4.523234 0.3139 3.822472 
  
5.344986 
Log Financial 
Globalisation 
130 1.612366 1.006828 
 
-0.0759571 
   
3.903279 
Economic 
Policy 
Index 
130 -2.15E-08 1.414213 -2.640939 
   
10.16996 
 
Appendix D Interpretation of time dummies 
 
The time dummies and constants show insignificant values for panels 3 and 4. In Panel 1, years 
2004 and 2005 were dropped due to collinearity. Values for 2007, 2008 and 2010 are 
significantly different from zero and positively signed, meaning that the specific year effects 
for Panel 1 Model A in 2008 were 27.22%. This shows that for countries in the panel, events of 
2007 had a positive influence on FDI inflows. The constant is significant in models A, B and C 
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and negatively signed. This shows that the FDI inflows had a negative intercept, thus countries 
in the panel are not attractive to FDI inflows without implementing FDI attraction policies. 
Panel 2 has years 2004 and 2007 dropped due to collinearity. Values for years 2005 and 2006 
are significant and negatively signed. Thus, the events of those years negatively impacted FDI 
inflows.   
 
 
 
